Balochistan’s Long War for Independence: From 1948 Uprisings to the 2025 Jaffar Express Hijack

• Balochistan, despite being rich in mineral resources like oil, gas, copper, and gold, remains one of the poorest regions in Pakistan, with a majority of its population lacking access to necessities like electricity and clean drinking water.
• Baloch grievances stem from bureaucratic underrepresentation, economic exploitation, cultural marginalization, and a lack of political autonomy, exacerbating their alienation from the Pakistani state.
• The Pakistani army has sought to counter Baloch separatism by promoting Islamization and backing Deobandi and Salafi militant groups in Balochistan, further destabilizing the region.
• The rise of armed separatist groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has overshadowed moderate political efforts due to the state’s failure to address the region’s demands through constitutional means.

Origins of the Separatist Insurgency in Balochistan 

The landscape of Balochistan is comprised of an area of over half a million square kilometres in the South-Eastern part of the Iran Plateau, south of central deserts and the Helmand River. The Baloch are the main ethnic group in the province followed by the Pashtuns. The majority of the inhabitants are Sunni Muslims. A small number of Shias and Hindus also reside in the province. Balochis are across three countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. The largest part of Balochistan belongs to Pakistan. Balochistan accounts for nearly half the land mass of Pakistan and only 3.6 % of its total population. Balochistan is very rich in mineral resources such as oil, gas, copper and gold.  Despite this, Balochistan is one of the poorest regions of Pakistan. A vast majority of its population lives in deplorable housing conditions where they do not have access to electricity or clean drinking water. 

Balochistan has experienced a long and bloody separatist insurgency for several decades. The combatants are the central Pakistani government and Baloch nationalist separatists who have waged an armed separatist insurgency to achieve separate statehood for Balochistan since Pakistan’s military annexation of the princely state of Kalat in 1948, which comprises most of the territory of present-day Balochistan. In Pakistan’s Balochistan province, separatist insurgencies were fought in 1948, 1958-1959, 1962-1963 and 1973-1977 and the current ongoing insurgency began in 2004 but intensified in 2006 following the killing of the Baloch separatist leader Akbar Khan Bugti by Pakistani troops on the orders of Pakistan’s then military ruler Pervez Musharraf. The Pakistani state has followed a mainly military approach when dealing with the Baloch insurgency. The one common thread that has run through the history of Balochistan since 1948 is the Baloch frequently rising in rebellion against the Pakistani state. Every Baloch rebellion lasted longer than the previous one, every separatist rebellion encompassed a wider geographical area than the previous one, and every rebellion involved more Baloch than the previous one.

Before the partition of British India in 1947, Balochistan consisted of four princely states under the British Raj. These were Kalat, Lasbela, Kharan and Makran. Two of these provinces, Lasbela and Kharan, were fiduciary states placed under the Khan of Kalat’s rule by the British, as was Makran which was a district of Kalat. When it became clear that the British were planning to partition British India into the two sovereign states of India and Pakistan, the Baloch populated areas lobbied the British government for independence. However, their request was rejected by the British government and so they unilaterally declared their independence on August 15, 1947, which was one day after Pakistan gained its independence. The origins of the Baloch’s desire for separate statehood lay in the fact that since 1876, Kalat, the largest and most influential Baloch state, had been autonomous under the British government of India about its internal affairs. However, there was a difference of opinion between the ruler of Kalat known as the Khan of Kalat and the Kalat assembly. The Khan of Kalat favoured acceding to Pakistan in exchange for a reasonable amount of autonomy in the state’s internal affairs, while the Pakistani central government would maintain authority over the defence, foreign policy and communication of Kalat. However, the Kalat Assembly voted in favour of independence. Symbolising the mood of the Assembly to work with but not under Pakistan’s control, Mir Ghaus Bizenjo, a member of the Kalat Assembly, said: “If Pakistan wants to treat us as a sovereign people, we are ready to extend our friendship. But if Pakistan does not do so and forces us to accept this fate, flying in the face of democratic principle, every Baluch will fight for freedom”

The Baloch separatist insurgency has been ongoing since Pakistan annexed Kalat in 1948, with multiple armed uprisings occurring in 1948, 1958-59, 1962-63, 1973-77, and the most recent insurgency that began in 2004.

Causes of the separatist insurgency in Balochistan 

1. Bureaucratic Underrepresentation:  Right since its annexation of Balochistan by Pakistan in 1948 the Baloch continue to be grossly underrepresented in Pakistan’s civil service, bureaucracy, Pakistan armed forces as well as paramilitary forces such as the Sibi Scouts and the Kalat Scouts with the officer corps being dominated by Punjabis and Pashtuns. 

2. Language Issue: The imposition of Urdu as the sole national language of Pakistan as a means to forge a common Islamic identity among Pakistan’s diverse ethnic groups alienated the Baloch. The Pakistani state since 1948 used Urdu at the cost of the Baloch and other regional languages in Pakistan even though Urdu was not spoken by any of Pakistan’s major ethnic groups. Urdu was considered the choice for Pakistan’s national language even though it was not indigenous to any of Pakistan’s provinces including Balochistan because many of Pakistan’s leaders like the first Governor General Jinnah and the first Prime minster Liaquat Ali Khan were Indian Muslim migrants who feared that according equal status to Balochi and other regional languages would promote sub-nationalism which would lead to the disintegration of the Pakistani state.  The 1956 One Unit Scheme which grouped all the provinces of West Pakistan including Balochistan into a single unit to counter the Bengali majority of East Pakistan and prevent Bengalis from forming a future government on their own further alienated the Baloch as it prevented the Baloch from asserting their own distinct identity as the One Unit Scheme gave Punjab which had the most population in West Pakistan over all other ethnic groups including the Baloch.

3. Loss of Faith in Moderate Politics:  In Balochistan till the 1990s, provincial governments with a semblance of Baloch representation were allowed to function for only three years. The first was the National Awami Party coalition in 1972-1973 led by Sardar Attaullah Mengal that lasted about ten months before being dismissed by Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto; the second was the government of Nawab Akbar Bugti (1988-1990) was dismissed when Benazir Bhutto’s first government was sacked; and the third was a coalition government headed by Akhtar Mengal in 1997-1998, which could function for fifteen months. This has bred the belief that Baloch provincial governments were not allowed to complete their terms by the Punjabi-dominated establishment of Pakistan. 

 4. Colonisation:   Punjabis constitute an overwhelming majority of settlers in Balochistan. According to the senior leader of the National Party, Hasil Bizenjo, the first batch of Punjabis migrated to Quetta in 1901. A good number of them shifted to different parts of Balochistan after the 1947 partition. The majority of these Punjabi settlers do business; a good number of them are in teaching and medical professions. In 1998, settlers were 25 percent of the total population of Quetta while Baloch were 27 percent. The Baloch resent the presence of Punjabis, Pathans and Urdu-speaking Muslims from other parts of Pakistan settling in Balochistan, as they consider them to be collaborators with the security forces and they resent the domination of the settlers. This has resulted in Baloch separatist militants targeting and killing Punjabis and other settlers in Balochistan. More than 1000 settlers are estimated to have been killed across Balochistan, according to human rights organisations. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, some 800 settlers who were ethnically Punjabis, including schoolteachers, barbers and professors, were murdered apparently by Baloch separatist militants, between 2006-2012.

5.  Mineral Resources:  Balochistan’s resources, particularly natural gas, have been exploited to produce energy for the rest of Pakistan, particularly the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. The current developmental issue, which has led to separatism in Balochistan, is the construction of the Gwadar port as a transportation hub with Dubai. This project was announced in 2001 and is being implemented by the Chinese. This has led to the alienation of the Baloch as they have been excluded from the construction of the project. The Balochistan province is also the hub for the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline which has been targeted several times by Baloch separatists to show their disagreement with the government in their exploitation of Balochistan’s natural resources. The critical resource that is at the centre of Baloch estrangement is natural gas which is critical to Pakistan’s economy.  

6. Lack of Opportunities:    In Balochistan, the Balochs feel alienated due to their underrepresentation and unemployment at the federal level. Historically, the bulk of the Pakistani army is comprised of Punjabis who constitute 70-75 per cent, Pashtuns who constitute 15-21 per cent, with a small proportion of Sindhis and Mohajirs who constitute 3-5per per cent and Baloch who constitute 0.3 per cent. In the Pakistani bureaucracy of the 830 civil service posts in Balochistan, ethnic Baloch held only 181 in 1979. Balochistan had the highest percentage of out-of-school children at seventy per cent, followed by Sindh at fifty-six per cent Punjab at forty-four per cent, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with the lowest percentage of out-of-school children at thirty-six per cent. This lack of education and employment opportunities is one of the important causes that has fuelled support for separatism in Balochistan.

The Pakistani state has followed a predominantly military approach in dealing with the Baloch insurgency, leading to repeated cycles of rebellion and suppression.

State response to the separatist insurgency in Balochistan 

 The Pakistani state has adopted a mainly military approach when dealing with the Baloch separatist insurgency. An element of the Pakistani army’s strategy to counter Baloch separatism has been to try and supplant the Baloch ethnic identity with a common Muslim identity through Islamization. As part of this strategy, the   Pakistani state has encouraged Islamic Deobandi and Salafi militant organizations to operate in 19 Baloch districts of Balochistan, especially in the districts of Mastung and Lasbela. Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies have faced accusations of human rights violations such as abductions, killings, forced disappearances, and torture. 

Apart from a military response against the Baloch separatists, the Pakistani state has also taken initiatives for economic development in the province. However, such initiatives have often been criticized for being inadequate and poorly executed. For example, on November 23, 2009, the then-Pakistan People’s Party government presented Aghaaz-e-Huqooq Balochistan. The landmark package contains several initiatives to address the problems of the Baloch people and bring them into the mainstream. However, many grievances of the Baloch, such as the over-handedness of Pakistani security forces, exploitation of resources and denial over control of resources such as natural gas, were not addressed. Even by its admission, the government could implement only fifteen of the sixty-one proposals contained in the package. In February 2013, a ten-member special cabinet committee said that the desired results were not achieved despite the unprecedented allocation of funds. 

The Pakistani state’s use of military force to quell any opposition in Balochistan and the failure of moderate politics to pressure the Pakistani state into accepting the moderate demands for autonomy for Balochistan as well as giving the Baloch control over their mineral resources such as natural gas has led to resentment among Baloch and has led to armed separatist groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), The Balochistan Republican army, United Baloch Army (UBA), Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB) gaining the ascendancy over moderate politics to resolve the Baloch issue.

Conclusion 

Thus the failure of the Pakistani state to adequately address the political and economic grievances of the Baloch within the framework of the Pakistan constitution and the Pakistani army’s brutal counter-insurgency tactics have contributed to the alienation of the Baloch population and their support for armed separatist groups such as the Balochistan Liberation Army ( BLA ) which was responsible for hijacking the  Quetta-Peshawar Jaffar Express Train on March 11 2025  which resulted in the deaths of at least 8 Pakistani security forces personnel and 30 BLA militants. Around 190 passengers were rescued by the Pakistani security forces. The BLA claims to have killed 50 hostages. 

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Dhruv Ashok

Dhruv Ashok is a PhD research scholar from Christ (Deemed to be University), Bangalore. He writes on current affairs and international politics. His areas of interest include conflict resolution and historical narratives. Views expressed are the author’s own.