- China is now striving to take the initiative, influence, and establish its channels for global discussion, especially by strengthening alignments with the Global South that were overlooked in traditional Western platforms.
- The Xiangshan Forum helps establish confidence while tackling issues such as the South China Sea conflicts and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, although critics object to China’s selective engagement, which tends to avoid directly addressing contentious regional issues.
- While groups like the G20 or BRICS focus on economic discussions, Xiangshan creates an opportunity for engagement in security and strategic matters, offering more than 60% of developing country participants a platform to address food security, conflict resolution, and sustainable development.
- Given China’s hegemonic behaviour, the question arises whether China is prepared to address regional security issues in a manner consistent with its implicit claims to leadership.
China’s leading forum for ‘‘international security’’ and military discussions, the “Beijing Xiangshan Forum”, was established in 2006 and is organised by the “China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS)” and the “China Association for Military Sciences (CAMS)”. It promotes conversation on international and ‘Asia-Pacific security” and is held yearly in Beijing. It places a strong emphasis on equality, transparency, inclusivity, and mutual learning. The meeting shows a comparison to Western-dominated forums such as the “Shangri-La Dialogue” by drawing representatives from more than 100 countries, defence ministers, military commanders, and academics. The Global South is given priority, allowing smaller countries to voice their concerns about security issues, including regional stability and new technologies like “artificial intelligence (AI)”. By 2014, it has changed from being a track 2 forum to a track 1.5 platform with participation from academics, chiefs of international organizations, and leaders in the military and defence, where it has been co-hosted by “CAMS” and CIISS since 2015, and in 2018 it changed its name to the Beijing Xiangshan Forum to reflect its broader focus. Early forums addressed topics like territorial conflicts and regional cooperation with an emphasis on “Asia-Pacific” security. By 2019, the 9th forum had grown to a high-level platform with 1,300 attendees, including 23 defence ministers.
At the 2014 “CICA Summit”, President Xi Jinping outlined China’s vision of a non-alliance-based security architecture” which the forum has continuously supported. It promotes “Asian solutions” to regional problems and stresses multilateralism while opposing “NATO-style systems”. “The 2018 forum demonstrated China’s emphasis on cutting-edge technologies by highlighting AI’s influence on warfare”. Despite “COVID-19 (2020–2022) disruptions”, experts kept discussing issues like the Russia-Ukraine conflict over videoconferences. Although the event is criticised for avoiding tough topics like conflicts in the “South China Sea”, its expansion shows China’s desire to compete with the “Shangri-La Dialogue”.
With the subject “Promoting Peace for a Shared Future,” the 11th Beijing Xiangshan Forum (September 12–14, 2024) attracted more than 500 representatives from more than 100 countries, reaching an extraordinary level. In his keynote talk, Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun focused on common, cooperative, and sustainable security while discussing the future of AI, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific region”. Rare discussions were enabled by the forum, which included members from “Russia and Ukraine”. Ukraine’s former deputy foreign ministry mentioned possible discussions between “Xi and Zelenskiy”. After a restart in 2023, there was a bit of renewed military communication, with the United States sending “Deputy Assistant Secretary Michael Chase”. In recent years, “NATO” and “EU” delegates were among the record number of attendees at the 2024 event, which had as its theme “Promoting Peace for a Shared Future,” Showing how it’s becoming more important. In contrast to Western alliance models, China utilises the event to advance its “Global Security Initiative (GSI)”, which advocates for comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security. Through further discussions, the “Xiangshan Forum” helps establish confidence while tackling issues such as the “South China Sea conflicts” and the “Russia-Ukraine conflict”. Whereas the critics object to China’s selective engagement, which tends to avoid getting into direct conflicts over regional issues, even though they’re part of the conversation. The forum also has some legal and economic effects. The “Xiangshan Forum” influences the legal frameworks in terms of “Asia-Pacific” by giving a forum for a wide range of viewpoints.
Through the Xiangshan Forum 2025, China is enhancing the professionalism and global reach of its security diplomacy, going beyond mere appearance to shape topics, priorities, and diplomatic positions for the concluding Xiangshan Forum.
The 12th forum, with the topic “Dialogue and Cooperation for Common Security,” was previewed at the first Navigator Meeting on 28-30 April 2025 at “Beijing’s Huabei Hotel”. Discussions on the importance of “BRICS”, major power relations following the 2024 elections, Asia-Pacific military cooperation, and “South China Sea tensions” were being held. The meeting, which had as its theme “Opportunities and Challenges for Global Security,” took place in the context of the rise of hegemony, protectionism, and unilateralism. The Chinese defence ministry stated that the forum is renowned for drawing together more than 200 defence officials, specialists, researchers, and media representatives from over 30 nations and international organisations to discuss at the Navigator meeting.” Speaking at the opening ceremony was Chinese Major General Zhang Baoqun, who is also the deputy head of the Ministry of National Defence’s Office for International Military Cooperation. The meeting was presided over by Major General Chang Wei, executive secretary general of the China Association for Military Science, with keynote remarks from Major General Chen Xiaoqian, vice president of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences and secretary general of the Beijing Xiangshan Forum. The Beijing Xiangshan Forum is dedicated to creating a forum for equal discourse, encouraging an open atmosphere for exchange, and fortifying the ties of inclusivity and mutual learning, Chen underlined in his keynote address. The forum seeks to give the international community stability and positive momentum by encouraging communication and collaboration in the area of international security, he continued.
In this regard, China initiated the inaugural Navigator Meeting — a preliminary conversation taking place months before its key annual “Beijing Xiangshan Forum”. This event was not just an operational change but a strategic manoeuvre that demonstrates how China is responding to “modern geopolitics and striving to reshape the international security framework”. This situation is set against a backdrop of strategic division, technological upheaval, and a renewed rivalry among major powers. In this changing landscape, China has moved beyond mere participation in international conversations — it is now striving to take the initiative, influence, and establish its channels for global discussion. This action enables China to strengthen a coalition of countries with similar interests, particularly from the “Global South”, that believe they are overlooked in conventional Western platforms such as “NATO summits or the Shangri-La Dialogue”. It provides China with an advantage in forming alignments, proposing conceptual frameworks.
Aligning with China’s focus on working together, military experts recommended easing tensions in the “South China Sea”. “John Pang stressed the role of BRICS” in security governance, while a Chinese academic, Li, underscored the growing impact of the Global South”. The aim of the Navigator Meeting, attended by officials and scholars, was to enhance communication for the 2025 forum. “China to host first-ever preview meeting of flagship annual Xiangshan security forum” highlights a significant recent development in the evolution of China’s global security diplomacy: the launch of a Navigator Meeting — a preparatory event ahead of the main Beijing Xiangshan Forum.” Further, the current security landscape is characterized by unpredictable and fluctuating relations between the “U.S. and China”. The outcomes of the “2024 U.S. elections” significantly impact global diplomacy, leaving both allies and a few adversaries uncertain about America’s strategic path. Ongoing challenges involving Taiwan, competition in the semiconductor industry, military encroachment in the Indo-Pacific, and ideological conflicts are continually exacerbating tensions. For the United States, this signals that China will not simply wait for Western choices but is instead creating its own diplomatic pace and framework.
The Navigator Meeting represents a shift in global security governance, as China begins to openly contest the supremacy of Western-led strategic platforms like NATO, the Shangri-La Dialogue, and the Munich Security Conference by promoting inclusive, multipolar alternatives.
Additionally, in the Indo-Pacific region, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth last month emphasised Washington’s commitment to “re-establishing deterrence” against what he described as “China’s aggressive actions.” Hegseth’s first official trip to Asia included visits to Japan and the Philippines, both signatories to the U.S. treaty, where he also committed to fortifying alliances and advancing regional military cooperation. In April, the United States and the Philippines began their yearly Balikatan military exercises. The exercise will involve the US Marine Corps deploying its new land-based anti-ship missile systems in the Luzon Strait, a crucial chokepoint within the initial chain of islands between Taiwan and the Philippines and a link between the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Additionally, Beijing’s naval forces use it as one of their main transit routes to the Pacific. Using the phrase “seriously undermines the common interests of regional countries,” the Chinese defence ministry denounced the deployment, adding to more tensions between the global powers in the Indo-Pacific Arena.
One of the most prominent contemporary issues in global governance is the emergence of the “Global South”. As economic and demographic influence shifts away from established Western powers, “nations in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and certain regions of the Middle East are seeking a larger role in defining international regulations”. The Navigator Meeting in China — along with the Xiangshan Forum — is becoming the leading multilateral platform for these perspectives. While groups “like the G20 or BRICS focus on economic discussions, Xiangshan creates an opportunity for engagement in security and strategic matters”. More than 60% of participants in recent events have hailed from developing countries, many of which lack platforms that enable them to engage on an equal footing with major powers. By bringing attention to their challenges surrounding food security, conflict resolution, and “sustainable development”, China is cultivating a base of support for its overarching narrative that the future global order should be more “equitable, multipolar, and inclusive”. The significance of the Navigator Meeting lies in its contribution to China’s institutional statecraft — establishing rules, frameworks, and procedures that align with its “geopolitical goals”. This serves as a current instance of “China deploying forum diplomacy” to offset Western constructs and maintain its central role in agenda-setting within global governance.
Regarding the impact and implications of the Xiangshan Forum, the “Navigator Meeting represents a shift in global security governance”, as China begins to openly contest the supremacy of Western-led security discussions. For many years, organisations such as “NATO”, the “Shangri-La Dialogue”, and the “Munich Security Conference” have influenced the dynamics of international strategic dialogue, largely shaped by the viewpoints of the “U.S. and Europe”. Now, with the “Navigator Meeting and the forthcoming 2025 Xiangshan Forum, China is positioning itself as a creator of frameworks and shaper of agendas rather than just being a participant. This aligns with “Beijing’s long-term goal of transforming global institutions to better reflect a multipolar world and to lessen the impact of Western dominance”.
The real significance of the Navigator Meeting lies in its ability to formalise China's status as a norm-contributor, developing not only policies but also the language and principles that will shape future global security collaboration within a more equitable and multipolar order.
By establishing a preliminary, agenda-setting meeting several months before the main conference, China is enhancing the professionalism and global reach of its security diplomacy. This goes beyond mere appearance — it enables China to shape which topics will take precedence at the concluding conference and how crucial stakeholders position themselves about those topics. The Navigator Meeting, therefore, provides these nations with an opportunity to communicate their priorities. Also positions China as a leader that values inclusivity and is open to hearing from non-Western perspectives. And Assists China in establishing enduring diplomatic relationships, which could lead these countries to become allies or supporters in broader global discussions, such as those concerning Taiwan, technological standards, internet governance, and reform within the UN.
Thus, in today’s landscape of increasing geopolitical divides, the gathering indicates a transition towards a multipolar world, where no single entity dictates global security. It also positions China as a stabilising player, promoting diplomatic engagement and alternative frameworks in the face of escalating tensions between the U.S. and China, as well as regional instability. Ultimately, the real significance of the Navigator Meeting lies in its ability to formalise China’s status as a norm-contributor, developing not only policies but also the language and principles that will shape future global security collaboration. If it gains traction, it could serve as a foundational element of a new, inclusive international order, particularly attracting states that wish to maintain their independence from great-power rivalry.
Therefore, the stage was set for a fruitful conversation led by China, in which the participants from the area were eager to contribute. China has attempted “win-win collaboration,” “cooperative mechanisms,” “trust building,” and “crisis management”, which were all used for the underlying issues addressed. But owing to Chinese hegemonic behaviour, this comes into a state of question. Whether China is prepared to address regional security issues in a manner consistent with its implicit claims to leadership was the lingering question following the Xiangshan Forum.
References:
- Anonymous Tag. (2025). Xiangshan Forum. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/tag/xiangshan-forum/
- Chan, M. (2024, April 18). China to host first-ever preview meeting for flagship annual Xiangshan security forum. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3307969/china-host-first-ever-preview-meeting-flagship-annual-xiangshan-security-forum
- China Diplomacy. (2025, April 24). The Xiangshan Forum serves as an important dialogue platform for regional peace. http://en.chinadiplomacy.org.cn/2025-04/24/content_117842826.shtml
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- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2024, September 15). Vice Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong attends the 11th Beijing Xiangshan Forum and delivers a keynote speech. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/wjbxw/202409/t20240916_11491672.html
- Wong, Hayley. (2025). China to host first-ever preview meeting for flagship annual Xiangshan security forum. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3307969/china-host-first-ever-preview-meeting-flagship-annual-xiangshan-security-forum
- World Scientific. (2021). China’s Xiangshan Forum and multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/full/10.1142/S2377740021500160
Lakshmi Karlekar is a PhD Research Fellow in International Studies at CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Central Campus, Bengaluru. Tanishaa Pandey is a BBA LLB student at the School of Law, CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Central Campus, Bengaluru. Views expressed are the author’s own.
Megna Devkar 
Archita Gaur