- By 2026, India’s strategic response has evolved from the foundational SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision toward the more expansive MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) doctrine.
- India has moved from being considered a “Net Security Provider” to one that is now regarded as the “Preferred Security Partner.”
- The vision of achieving “Growth for All” as a durable reality in an ocean that remains a peaceful zone, where sovereignty is not swapped for short-term benefits, is clearly defined.
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has transitioned from a quiet maritime thoroughfare into the primary theatre of 21st-century geopolitical contestation. At the heart of this shift lies the “Grey-Zone”, a space of hybrid conflict where state actors employ unconventional tactics that fall just below the threshold of open warfare. For India, the primary challenge is to maintain regional stability while countering the creeping influence of extra-regional powers, particularly in its immediate maritime neighbourhood: the Maldives and Sri Lanka.
By 2026, India’s strategic response has evolved from the foundational SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision toward the more expansive MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) doctrine. This evolution reflects a shift from a reactive posture to a proactive, “preferred security partner” model designed to insulate the IOR from grey-zone exploitation.
The Architecture of the Grey-Zone in the IOR
In the context of the Maldives and Sri Lanka, maritime grey-zone challenges are not defined by naval skirmishes, but by a “death by a thousand cuts” to national sovereignty and regional balance. These activities manifest in several distinct ways:
Dual-Use Infrastructure and Debt Diplomacy: Commercial investments in deep-sea port development and artificial island construction are frequently considered to be shell companies that also serve to develop military capabilities, without the case for construction based on military need being evident. In many developing countries, as in Sri Lanka, debts accumulated through the financing of large-scale infrastructure projects can create structural dependency, thereby limiting the host country’s ability to make independent strategic decisions due to long-term debt obligations.
Scientific Research as Cover for Intelligence: The presence of so-called research vessels (specifically the Yuan Wang series) in Malé and Colombo serves many purposes; however while their requirement to conduct marine science is often made to be part of the justification for their presence, they also can complete bathymetric surveys to establish submarine routes and/or collect data on satellite/missile telemetry; both of these actions represent examples of the harvesting of gray-zone data.
IUU Fishing and Paramilitary Presence: Before conducting acts of territorial assertion, illegal, unregulated, or unreported (IUU) fishermen usually rely groups known as a fishing militia (or “maritime militias”) to establish a continual presence in an area of contention, regardless of the legality of that presence, or on the existence of legal fishing vessels; thus creating distinctions between activities conducted by civilians and activities conducted by the state to encroach upon another sovereign’s territory.
From SAGAR to MAHASAGAR: An Evolutionary Leap
When SAGAR was launched by Prime Minister Modi in 2015, there was an emphasis on economic integration and collective security. However, the changing situation in both the Maldives and Sri Lanka, marked by domestic political instability and shifting allegiances, required a stronger framework.
The introduction of MAHASAGAR in 2025 provided this new structure. MAHASAGAR demonstrates that growth is a key component of security. By taking into account the “Global South” perspective, India is attempting to position itself as a builder of bridges rather than a regional hegemon; therefore, there is an emphasis on comprehensive maritime security, including UDA (Underwater Domain Awareness) and the sharing of intelligence on non-traditional threats, which can be exploited by grey zone actors.
Strategic Interventions: The Maldives and Sri Lanka
- Redefining the “First Responder” Role
India has moved from being considered a “Net Security Provider” to one that is now regarded as the “Preferred Security Partner.” This shift in terminology, though slight, is important in countries such as the Maldives and Sri Lanka, where national sovereignty is particularly sensitive. By 2026, India will continue to provide capacity-building support to both countries by supplying the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) and the Sri Lanka Navy with equipment (Dornier aircraft, fast patrol vessels) and technical support (training and data) to perform their own maritime policing functions.
- Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
One of the most effective ways to counter grey zone threat tactics is to reduce or eliminate their ambiguity. The Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), established by India, has developed into a central nervous system of regional security. By incorporating both Sri Lanka and the Maldives into its Merchant Ship Information System (MSIS) and sharing white-shipping data, India has ensured that any “research vessel” or “dark fleet” has no place to hide.
- Institutionalising Trilateral Cooperation
The Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) has become the cornerstone of a new regional security structure. By enhancing trilateral cooperation and engagement between India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, while also bringing in Mauritius and Seychelles, New Delhi has created an emerging localised security architecture among the participating countries. In 2025–2026, India directed and expanded trilateral cooperation and engagement through joint EEZ patrolling and Exercise DOSTI to incorporate sophisticated “tabletop” simulations that have specifically been developed to address hybrid threats.
Countering the Narrative of Inevitability
The perception that outside forces will dominate and benefit from the grey zone is what keeps it thriving. The Expanded SAGAR vision of India counters this with ‘developmental diplomacy.’ Rather than taking on debt burdens for unproductive projects, India’s initiatives (such as the Greater Malé Connectivity Project and infrastructure improvements in northern Sri Lanka) are fully transparent and based on the needs of the community.
Furthermore, India’s hosting of both the International Fleet Review (IFR) and MILAN 2026 provides a multilateral alternative to the unilateral encroachment. Through the coordination of over 50 navies (with representatives from both the Maldives and Sri Lanka), India is sending a clear message that while the Indian Ocean has an ‘Indian’ geographical identity, its commitment to a rules-based order is ‘International.’
The Road Ahead
Security in the Indian Ocean is no longer merely about protecting the ocean but also about securing the data, the seabed, and the political will of each country that borders the Indian Ocean. As we head toward 2026, the SAGAR-MAHASAGAR continuum will depend on India’s ability to maintain a long-term, steady, dependable, non-interfering partnership.
For example, in Sri Lanka and the Maldives, competition will likely continue to take place in the maritime grey-zone; however, India is reducing ambiguity of the grey-zone through greater Maritime Domain Awareness, tripartite agreements, and an emphasis on the Blue Economy. The vision of achieving “Growth for All” as a durable reality in an ocean that remains a peaceful zone, where sovereignty is not swapped for short-term benefits, is clearly defined.
Hridbina Chatterjee is a final-year postgraduate student in International Relations at Jadavpur University, Kolkata. She has written for newspapers and think tanks, with interests in South Asian politics, India’s foreign policy, and the Indo-Pacific. Views expressed are the author’s own.
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