- Russian new foreign policy is a perfect reflection of contemporary geopolitics, presenting Moscow’s plan for the future, tackling its concerns, and presenting possible solutions to current crises.
- The strengthening of international economic, technological, cultural, and cross-border cooperation in the polar region should “take into account the national interests of the Russian Federation.”
- With India being the centre of Russian planning, Indo-Russian relations will only surge higher.
Russian President Vladimir Putin on Friday approved Russia’s updated new foreign policy that emphasises strengthening strategic partnerships and trade ties with India and China, while identifying the West as an “existential” threat. “The Russian Federation intends to give priority to the elimination of vestiges of the dominance of the United States and other unfriendly countries in world politics,” the document stated, outlining the elimination of Western dominance in global politics as a top priority. This concept is a strategic planning document that provides a systemic vision of the national interests of Russia in the domain of foreign policy, including basic principles, strategic goals, major objectives, and priority areas of Russian foreign policy.
Addressing the new foreign policy Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said, “Russia’s new foreign policy concept stresses equality among countries.” The top diplomat added that the redistribution of development potential in favour of new centres of growth was leading to the emergence of a new multipolar world order. The main task of the new concept of Russia’s foreign policy is the establishment of a multipolar world order, with a special emphasis on polycentricity and the sovereign equality of all states, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said at President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with permanent members of the Security Council on Friday.
“In the concept, we have explained our vision of the principles of a more balanced and fair world order. They include polycentricity, the sovereign equality of states, their right to choose models of development, and the world’s cultural and civilizational diversity. “The promotion of a multipolar world order is defined as a framework task on all foreign policy issues,” he said. “The world economy is undergoing fundamental structural reorganisation and transition to a new technological basis, and this is the mainstream trend in international relations at the current stage,” Lavrov concluded.
The new foreign policy of Russia states the following:
- Russia is not an enemy of the West and will not isolate or hold hostile intentions once there’s acceptance of multipolar realities with a return to interaction based on respect.
- Strives for reliable security, preservation of cultural identity, and equal development opportunities for all nations — the basis of reciprocity.
- Intention to eliminate the dominance of the US and unfriendly states in world affairs; conditions to abandon states showing neo-colonial ambitions
- Will investigate the alleged development, deployment, and use of biological weapons in neighbouring territories.
- Global governance to prevent abuse of dominant positions or monopolising the world economy
- Counter Russophobia, and protect the Russian language, culture, sports, and the Orthodox Church from discrimination.
- Flagship Project: Transform Eurasia into a single all-continental space for peace and prosperity (Arctic region included)
- Prevent divisions in Asia-Pacific; develop Africa to be an influential world centre; strengthen ties with the Islamic world; build mutually beneficial cooperation in Latin America.
- Russia considers the US the main source of anti-Russian policy and a risk to security, including international peace and a fair and balanced future for mankind.
The indifference to the West
Under President Putin’s new concept of foreign policy, the United States is directly called the main initiator and conductor of the anti-Russian narrative. Russia does not consider itself an enemy of the West and expects it to realise the futility of confrontation with the Russian Federation. The constructive, neutral, or unfriendly nature of the policies of other countries and state associations towards the Russian Federation is a determining factor for building relations with them. Breaking off relations with the West helped Russia find new allies for the development of the polar region. The old paradigm of Russia’s “cooperation” with NATO countries in the region has no future. A harbinger of this was the future inclusion of Finland and Sweden in the military bloc. Putin has decided not to “fight” the United States, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland but plans to bring”new blood” to the development of the region by including China, India, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Singapore.
Recently, the President of the Russian Federation amended the “Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2035” by excluding references to the Arctic Council and the Council of the Barents/Euro-Arctic Region. The strengthening of international economic, technological, cultural, and cross-border cooperation in the polar region should “take into account the national interests of the Russian Federation.” “The Arctic accounts for 11 per cent of Russia’s GDP and about 20 per cent of its exports,” said Korchunov, a senior Arctic Council official for the Russian Federation. And now the Russian Federation will pay more attention to “states outside the Arctic region and strengthen cooperation with them,” ignoring NATO countries’ “wants” in the region.
India in the new Russian foreign policy
The 42-page document singled out ties with China and India, stressing the importance of “the deepening of ties and coordination with friendly sovereign global centres of power and development located on the Eurasian continent.” India and Russia maintained close strategic, military, economic, and diplomatic interactions during the Cold War. Both Russia and India refer to this alliance as being unique and privileged. The strategic partnership between India and Russia is based on five main pillars: politics, defence, civil nuclear energy, counter-terrorism cooperation, and space. India and Russia celebrated the 75th anniversary of their diplomatic relations. According to the document, Russia will continue to build a particularly privileged strategic partnership with India to enhance and expand cooperation in all areas on a mutually beneficial basis and place special emphasis on increasing the volume of bilateral trade, strengthening investment and technological ties, and ensuring their resistance to destructive actions of unfriendly states and their alliances.
President Putin understands that Russia should not expect its large neighbour in Eurasia to act as a non-aligned, inward-looking nation, keeping a low profile in international relations and behaving like a middle power. Instead, Russians should acknowledge India’s new status and self-image as a great power, its focus on rapid economic development, and its ambition to become a global economic powerhouse and a leader in modern technologies. They need to understand the fundamental reasons behind India’s growing closeness with the United States and its increasing hostility toward China.
From President Putin’s approach, it is clear that cultivating and developing the strategic partnership should remain the overall objective of this yet-to-be-developed strategy. However, the partnership should be structured and styled as one of the equals, with Moscow dropping all residual vestiges of its sometimes patronising attitudes towards its Indian counterparts. Putin understands that Russia needs to take a second look at New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific strategy. An in-depth strategic dialogue with New Delhi on that subject could dispel Moscow’s presently negative and suspicious attitude towards the strategy. The Russians need to accept that New Delhi’s ideas have different sources and objectives than Washington’s similarly titled strategy. Essentially, India’s new strategy is a logical continuation of its Look East policy. By the same token, Moscow could increase mutual trust with New Delhi by working through and patiently dispelling Indian concerns regarding Russia’s strategic ties with China and its situational cooperation with Pakistan.
Greater Eurasian Partnership
These discussions could pave the way to engaging New Delhi in a strategic dialogue on Greater Eurasia, which is the strategic framework for Moscow’s approach. One might consider amplifying Russia’s traditionally continental geopolitical concept by adding a maritime element covering the seas and oceans washing Eurasia. For a geopolitical dialogue with India, the relevant areas could include the Arctic, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean—from Murmansk to Mumbai. By the same token, India’s strategy, which so far has been couched predominantly in maritime terms, might get a continental dimension, starting with Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Iran.
Based on the above proposition, Moscow needs to engage more closely with New Delhi as it further fleshes out the idea of a Greater Eurasian Partnership. Maintaining strategic partnerships with both India and China at bilateral and trilateral (RIC) levels is crucial for general geopolitical stability in Eurasia. Russia, which has neither the ambition nor the resources to dominate Greater Eurasia, could play a key role in maintaining Eurasian equilibrium, which requires Russo-Indo-Chinese understanding. While being realistic about its partners and their complicated relations, Russia needs to proactively facilitate efforts at better understanding between New Delhi and Beijing and promote positive interaction among the three great powers. Such interaction is also needed for engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a key aspect of the Greater East Asian Partnership. It is even more necessary for building up the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a continent-wide dialogue platform.
Moreover, close relations with New Delhi would help Moscow engage pragmatically on Eurasian and Indo-Pacific issues with Washington and Tokyo, which are linked with New Delhi through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Much as India finds Russia’s partnership with China useful for managing its relations with Beijing, Moscow could use its close relations with New Delhi to weigh in diplomatically on the Indo-Pacific agenda. India, which is genuinely interested in an improved relationship between Russia and the United States, might be useful here. At the global level, Russia would benefit from closer interaction with India not only within the BRICS but also at the United Nations.
On several regional issues, from Afghanistan to the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East, India needs to be treated as Russia’s privileged interlocutor and partner. Sidelining New Delhi, as has occasionally happened in discussions on Afghanistan, should never happen again. New global issues, from the spread of pandemics to climate change and the energy transition, open up broad new areas for Russia-India cooperation, even as they require the careful management of differences. Engaging early with each other would favour cooperative elements over competitive ones and make it possible to chart a coordinated approach to what have become vital issues for the world community.
“To help adapt the world order to the realities of a multipolar world, Russia intends to make it one of its priorities to enhance the capacity and international role of the interstate associations of BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the RIC (Russia, India, China), and other interstate associations and international organisations, as well as mechanisms with strong Russian participation,” read the document. And in this, Russia came out with a special focus on Africa.
Emphasis on Africa
Russia for the first time made an emphasis on Africa. Although the media constantly discussed the topic of Russia’s active participation in African affairs, previously this direction was not a priority for the country. The main actors were Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner PMC. However, the tide has turned. As the relations between the Western world and Russia heated up, the latter was looking for new directions, and Africa, given its rich history of cooperation with the Soviet Union, is now one of the key vectors. In a new concept, “some developed states” (meaning the USA and European countries) are accused of “sophisticated neo-colonial policies towards Africa.” Russia intends to “support in ensuring the independence of the states through assistance in the areas of security, including food and energy security, military, and military-technical cooperation.”
Adding to that, Russia will provide “assistance in settling and overcoming the consequences of armed conflicts in Africa, advocating the leading role of African States in these efforts, based on their formulation of the principle “African problems, African solutions”. The document emphasizes “expanding trade and investment with African states and African integration structures (primarily the African Continental Free Trade Area, the African Export-Import Bank, and other sub-regional organisations), including through the EAEU.” Russia points out “the strengthening and deepening of Russian-African cooperation in various fields on a bilateral and multilateral basis, first of all within the framework of the African Union and the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum.” Previously, Africa had a much smaller role in Russia’s foreign policy. However, now that Russia has shown that Africa is one of the most important regions, it will do everything in its power to strengthen its influence on the continent.
Hence, Russian new foreign policy is a perfect reflection of contemporary geopolitics, presenting Moscow’s plan for the future, tackling its concerns, and presenting possible solutions to current crises. With India being the centre of Russian planning, Indo-Russian relations will only surge higher.
(The author is a post-graduate student in International Relations at Kalinga university, Raipur. The opinions expressed are the author’s own)
(Aayush is a post-graduate student in International Relations at Kalinga University, Raipur. The opinions expressed are the author’s own)