Between Islam and the Gun: Why Pakistan Remains Trapped in Its Own Narrative

• Pakistan was not merely carved out of British India but conceived as an ideological project rooted in the Two-Nation Theory, which fostered a defensive and exclusionary identity.
• The country evolved into a “praetorian state” where the army became the ultimate arbiter of politics, dominating national security, foreign policy, and even civilian governance.
• Locked in perpetual rivalry with India, Pakistan has relied on high military spending, proxy wars, and asymmetric strategies, which reinforced the military’s dominance and constrained peace efforts.
• Even in 2025, Pakistan’s ideological rigidity, military dominance, and dependence on external patrons like the U.S. and China continue to define its governance and foreign policy, just as Cohen described two decades ago.

To understand the present, one must study the past, and the book The Idea of Pakistan (2004), written by Stephen P. Cohen, remains one of the most influential scholarly works on Pakistan’s political identity, strategic choices and long-term viability. Written by a veteran South Asia analyst at the Brookings Institution, the book provides a framework to understand Pakistan’s behaviour through its foundational ideology, internal civil-military power structures and foreign policy compulsions.

Cohen’s core argument is that Pakistan is not simply a territorial state carved out of British India in 1947; it is an ideological project based on a conception of Muslim political identity, which has continuously shaped its governance, national security priorities and strategic culture.¹  This “idea” has evolved under pressures of domestic instability, regional rivalry and global geopolitics, often producing patterns of state behaviour that appear rigid, security-centric, and resistant to political pluralism.

This essay unpacks three interlinked aspects of Cohen’s work-Pakistan’s ideological foundations, its troubled civil–military balance and its strategic behaviour in the regional and global arena. Although written just over two decades ago, the book continues to offer a formidable framework for understanding and evaluating the poor choices Pakistan has made in recent years.

Origins of the Two-Nation Theory

Cohen cites Pakistan’s origin in the Two-Nation Theory, the assertion that Muslims and Hindus constituted separate nations with incompatible political interests.² For Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founding father, this ideological claim justified the partition of India. But Cohen stresses that after 1947, the ruling elite struggled to translate this negative identity, “not India”, into a coherent, positive nation-building narrative. He argues that Pakistan’s ideology has remained defensive and exclusionary, privileging religious identity over linguistic or ethnic pluralism, which has:

• Alienated non-Punjabi ethnic groups (Baloch, Sindhi, Pashtun, Bengali pre-1971).
• Fostered a state narrative that equates dissent with disloyalty.
• Relied excessively on Islamic symbolism to hold together a diverse population.³

The fact is, Pakistan is a nation where ethnicity and language are still powerful forces shaping identity and politics. Individuals often identify strongly with their ethnic group, sometimes more so than with a national Pakistani identity, a problem that could reach a crescendo in the coming years. Pakistan is the world’s first modern Islamic state, but even today, it has not managed to unite its people under the banner of Islam.

Islamization and State Identity

While Jinnah’s vision was arguably secular in legal structure, subsequent leaders, especially under Zia-ul-Haq, embedded Islam deeply into the constitution, legal system and foreign policy.⁴ This ideological framing, according to Cohen, has locked Pakistan into permanent rivalry with India, since reconciliation would undercut the founding premise of a separate Muslim homeland.

The Civil–Military Imbalance

“Failure of vision. Pakistan’s founders expected the idea of Pakistan to shape the state of Pakistan; instead, a military bureaucracy governs the state and imposes its own vision of a Pakistani nation.”

Cohen famously describes Pakistan as a “praetorian state” where the army is not only the defender of the nation but also the ultimate arbiter of its politics.⁵ The Pakistani military, he argues, acquired this role due to weak civilian institutions post-1947 and a perceived existential threat from India. A major contributing factor was U.S. military assistance during the Cold War, which strengthened the army’s organisational and economic clout. By the 1980s, the military was not merely a defence institution; it controlled significant economic assets, influenced foreign policy, and shaped ideological narratives through state media.

Cohen details how the “military–bureaucratic oligarchy” entrenched itself by manipulating electoral outcomes and defining national security in narrow, India-centric terms. But the most destructive policy was supporting jihadist proxies to achieve strategic goals at low cost. Even during democratic interludes, civilian leaders like Bhutto, Sharif, and Zardari could not fundamentally challenge the military’s dominance because their legitimacy and survival often depended on army tolerance.⁶ 

Security Dilemma with India

“One important difference between the two states is that Pakistan’s domestic and external policies are more entwined than those of India, partly because of Pakistan’s more perilous geostrategic position and partly because the dominant Pakistan army looks both inward and outward.”

Cohen’s Pakistan is locked in a security dilemma with India, perceiving every Indian move as a potential threat to its survival.⁷ This perpetual hostility has led to policies that justify high military spending despite economic weakness. Its reliance on asymmetric strategies (proxy wars, insurgencies in Kashmir) has further Islamized the state, and any initiative by the civilian leadership to pursue peace is not only politically risky but often followed by terror attacks on India. For the army, normalisation with India undermines its domestic role, since security threats justify its political primacy, and peace would mean dilution of power.

Afghanistan as Strategic Depth

Cohen analyses Pakistan’s long-standing desire for “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, ensuring a friendly (or pliable) regime in Kabul to prevent encirclement by India. This policy fueled decades of involvement with Islamist factions, from the Mujahideen in the 1980s to the Taliban in the 1990s and beyond.⁸ But the Taliban has now come into its own as shrewd rulers and negotiators, leaving Pakistan facing the spectre of losing influence in the North West Frontier.

Relations with the U.S. and China

Cohen identifies Pakistan’s balancing behaviour between the U.S. and China as a core survival strategy, with the U.S. relationship being transactional and centred on military aid and counterterrorism cooperation. But the fact is, Pakistan played both sides in Afghanistan in the 1980s and post-9/11, acting as a very expensive toll road.

With regard to China, Pakistan initially acted as an interlocutor. Later, with American sanctions, it developed a deeper strategic partnership, especially in defence technology, nuclear assistance, and infrastructure (now evident in CPEC). For Pakistan, its geostrategic position bordering India, China, Iran and Afghanistan was seen as leverage to extract aid and political support from both blocs. Yet it never used this advantage to elevate its population or develop its infrastructure. Pakistan remains a country with very high illiteracy, and the simple answer is that only then can it continue to function as a feudal state.

Ideological Rigidity

Two decades after Cohen’s analysis, Pakistan’s ideological framework remains largely intact. State narratives continue to emphasise Islamic solidarity, and India is still seen as a threat that has not reconciled with the partition. Attempts at moderate reform, like the 2018–2022 Imran Khan government’s partial outreach to India, have been undermined by entrenched military thinking and public suspicion of India. The army remains the most powerful institution. The political crises of 2022–2023, with Imran Khan’s ouster and subsequent crackdown on PTI, reaffirm Cohen’s thesis: the military decides political outcomes when its interests are threatened.

Relevance of Cohen’s Framework Today

Cohen’s work remains relevant because Pakistan’s ideological–military nexus still drives its policy. A striking example is Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir meeting President Trump in the White House. Pakistan’s strategic behaviour is still reactive – defined by India, Afghanistan and dependence on external patrons. It is perhaps the only country that appears to function best amid economic fragility and political instability, conditions that keep the military dominant and diplomacy limited.

The Idea of Pakistan is a seminal work that remains essential for understanding Pakistan’s enduring patterns of governance and foreign policy. Cohen’s tripartite focus on ideology, civil–military balance and strategic behaviour explains why Pakistan struggles to break free from its security-driven identity. Even in 2025, the ideological foundations still constrain flexibility with India, allowing the military to dominate politics as Munir consolidates power, with the possibility of another short conflict with India on the horizon. The other constant is that strategic partnerships with China and the U.S. remain central to survival. As the geopolitical environment has shifted toward a more multipolar competition, Pakistan’s internal structure and identity narratives, first dissected by Cohen, remain surprisingly constant.

References:

1. _{Cohen SP. The Idea of Pakistan. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press; 2004.}
2. _{Jalal A. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1994.}
3. _{Haqqani H. Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 2005.}
4. _{Nasr V. Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2001.}
5. _{Cohen SP. The Pakistan Army. Karachi: Oxford University Press; 1998.}
6. _{Lieven A. Pakistan: A Hard Country. London: Allen Lane; 2011.}
7. _{Ganguly Š, Kapur SP. India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia. New York: Columbia University Press; 2010.}
8. _{Rashid A. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press; 2000.}

Balaji Subramanian

_{Balaji is a freelance writer with an MA in History and Political science and has published articles on defence and strategic affairs and book reviews. He tweets @LaxmanShriram78. Views expressed are the author’s own.}