- The adoption of the Presidential form of government in Kazakhstan marked the birth of right-wing politics promulgating anti-communism, which complemented neo-liberal as well as conservative political, economic, and social ideas.
- The essence of democracy had deteriorated as a result of Nazarbayev’s political repression, characterised by widespread personality cultism, grave violations of human rights, repression of dissent, and unfair and distorted electoral processes.
- The National Council for Public Trust in Kazakhstan was established in reaction to demonstrations that took place before and following the 2019 presidential elections, and the government pushed it as a forum for communication between the public and the government.
- With twenty-nine deputies elected in single-mandate districts and sixty-nine deputies elected from party lists, a mixed system was employed for the first time since 2004. The new registration threshold for parties was lowered from 20,000 to 5,000 members.
Kazakhstan has stood as a beacon of democracy in bleak Central Asia, assuring of prospects of participation of the civil Kazakh society. Kazakhstan’s transformation from human rights violations, rigged elections, and rule of decree makes it an ideal Central Asian state-building model. Although Kazakhstan has a democratic constitution and a unitary government in theory, in practice, it has a de facto authoritarian government and no free elections. Nevertheless, since President Nursultan Nazarbayev resigned in 2019, there have been progressively greater political reform and democratization attempts. The nation has realised how critical it is to match national policies with global norms to promote an atmosphere where fundamental rights are upheld and safeguarded. The article examines the understanding of the transition from left-wing to right-wing politics through Jeltoqsan to Consultative ideology. It further implies the structure of democratic governance, the adoption of structural reforms by President Tokayev, and seeking validation from international countries and organisations in contemporary times. The rationale of choosing this case study is critical to showcase the need for cooperative federalism with a blend of consultative ideology.
Heralding A New Transformation Through Movement
Kazakhstan had embarked on the trajectory for constructing a sovereign state after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1989. Due to the dichotomy between liberal and communist ideology, it became inherently difficult for the Kazakhs to follow hard-core norms in their governance system. In this context, President Nursultan Nazarbayev realised that following a Western ideology may not be feasible for Kazakhstan as it faced an economic slowdown in 1991 with the consumer prices inflating by 150 per cent, which had spiral effects on policy making. The adoption of the Presidential form of government was more idealised. It marked the birth of right-wing politics promulgating anti-communism, which complemented neo-liberal as well as conservative political, economic, and social ideas. With the economy’s gradual, steady growth, the macroeconomic indicators of inflation and unemployment were stabilised by enacting the Labour Market Policy of 1993. This pressing factor marks precedence in state formation, where the Kazaks demanded greater freedom and autonomy in decision-making. It paved the way for the development of democracy, liberty, and human rights security.
It is noteworthy to understand the transition of Kazakhstan from a conservative Bolshevik-driven communist regime to a democratic liberal society. The issue stems from its historical background, largely due to the Kazakhs’ lack of democratic experience in the past. Elite Political hierarchies with clan chiefs, secretaries, and imperial governors at the top, such as those associated with the Khans, Tsars, and Communist Party, did not allow for widespread political participation growth. There was a desperate attempt to restore the Turkic identity, where civil society engagement was crucial yet critical.
The Turkish identity is an ethnolinguistic term used to describe various Central Asian ethnic groups related by a shared linguistic and genetic heritage, thus making them all Pan-Turkic in origin. It contributes to Turkish nationalism that supports the steady, peaceful development of the ethnic, cultural, and religious customs of the Kazakh people. It took numerous shapes; one was implemented by Pan-Turkist politician Ismail Bey Gasprinsky, who inspired the Jadidist movement in Central Asia. He was among the earliest Muslim intellectuals within the Russian Empire to recognise the necessity of modernising the Turkic and Islamic communities through cultural and educational reform.
The civil society needed a renewed landscape to preserve as well as protect Turkic identity and culture, which the Soviets suppressed. Even to date, the majority of Kazakhstan’s demography is more fluent in the Russian language than in its local dialect, which stands as a testimony to the political oppression faced. After 9/11, the attempts at Russianization were debunked, and Turkish identity started to become more and more prominent. As an outcome, the Kazakh democracy movement spurted a new phenomenon in the form of a collection of political movements in Kazakhstan backed by opposition organisations and civil activists that call for changes to the country’s current political system in favour of a democratic, multi-party, parliamentary system. A series of movements to reforms were clustered, representing a dramatic shift from left- to right-wing politics after independence.
The civil society needed a renewed landscape to preserve as well as protect Turkic identity and culture, which the Soviets suppressed.
The Jeltoqsan movement is one movement that is regarded as a turning point for this transition. It began in 1986 when a group of young Kazakhs protested against Gennady Kolbin’s appointment to be the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan because of his ethnicity. This led to protests throughout the Kazakh SSR, which were eventually followed by calls for the nation’s independence as the Soviet Union fell apart. Later, Nursultan Nazarbayev ascended to the presidency of Kazakhstan and led the country through an authoritarian three decades.
Soon, a conglomeration of movements railed one after the other. The Azat and Alash parties staged protests in Alma-Ata in June 1992 to demand the resignation of former Communist government officials. Following the 1994 Kazakh legislative elections, in which recently established political parties were permitted to run for office for the first time, some parties, including nationalist ones, abstained from voting, while the Communist Party of Kazakhstan was prohibited. As a result, despite establishing a multi-party system within the Parliament, four significant pro-presidential parties held the seats in the Supreme Council.
In March 1995, Nazarbayev dissolved the Supreme Council in response to the ruling of the Constitutional Court. The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (QDT) was established on 17 November 2001 by several well-known Kazakh businessmen and officials. The QDT announced its policies, which included giving the Parliament more authority, holding direct elections for local government, enacting changes to the judiciary and elections, and allowing the media greater freedom. The Coordinating Council of Democratic Forces of Kazakhstan was established on 15 October 2004, following the 2004 Kazakh legislative elections, at the initiative of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, and the Ak Zhol Democratic Party. A political coalition for a ‘Just Kazakhstan’ was established in March 2005, and Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, the former chairman of the Mazhilis, was nominated as the sole opposition candidate for President alongside the Coordinating Council. This paved the way for a democratic beginning for Kazakhstan.
Nonetheless, the essence of democracy had deteriorated as a result of Nazarbayev’s political repression, characterised by widespread personality cultism, grave violations of human rights, repression of dissent, and unfair and distorted electoral processes. To move towards political pluralism, political participation, and mobilisation, it was imperative that political parties be restructured and that NGOs actively participate in constitutional reforms in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It is the spot where exiled Kazakh banker Mukhtar Ablyazov declared the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (QDT) would reopen in April 2017. In 2018, the QDT staged unofficial protests across Kazakhstan to overthrow the current administration, eliminate corruption, and switch to a parliamentary republic from a presidential one.
Perspectives On Present Democratic Efforts And Reforms
At the pivotal juncture of the 2019 Presidential Election, Nursultan Nazarbayev’s chosen successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, won 71% of the vote. Tokayev is considered a pragmatic leader who significantly instilled a new political paradigm. As a member of the opposition, his competency remained a testament to creating an effective conceptual framework of democracy.
The “power transfer,” or “tranzit vlasti,” that Astana finished in 2019 was a singular event. It came to mark the end of the first attempt at a non-dynastic, controlled shift away from authoritarian rule throughout post-Soviet Eurasia. The National Council for Public Trust in Kazakhstan was established in reaction to demonstrations that took place before and following the 2019 presidential elections, and the government pushed it as a forum for communication between the public and the government. It was founded to advance a Consultative Ideology that supports citizen-government communication through state-organised forums. Tokayev’s commitment to adopting a Consultative Ideology has given him unwavering support from the public domain.
A shockwave was sent on 2 January 2022, when massive anti-regime demonstrations broke out in response to an abrupt price increase for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). As a result, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev declared a state of emergency and asked the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) to send troops. This shocked Kazakhstan’s political system and gave Tokayev a window of possibilities since the society began to demand change, and that demand had to be met. A national referendum was held to ratify political reforms that strengthened the checks and balances through active community consultation. Under his tenure, a stride for a series of reforms was implemented in phases as follows:
Firstly, there were significant changes to the Constitution to revitalise the Parliament. The laws about elections were eased in advance of the national elections. Subsequently, Tokayev’s legitimacy was strengthened by holding an early presidential election. With twenty-nine deputies elected in single-mandate districts and sixty-nine deputies elected from party lists, a mixed system was employed for the first time since 2004. The new registration threshold for parties was lowered from 20,000 to 5,000 members.
The second is the transfer of authority from the President to Parliament, which will facilitate the registration of political parties and promote the candidacies of independents. There had never before been such a competition when independent candidates were permitted to run for office for the first time. Approximately 250 candidates applied to compete for just five seats in the two capital cities of Astana and Almaty. Kazakhstan’s dedication to inclusive governance was demonstrated by the wide range of candidates running for the lower house of Parliament, the Mazhilis, in the most recent parliamentary elections.
Thirdly, new political parties were formed, such as the Baytaq (Abundance) party of environmentalists and the Respublica party of young entrepreneurs. The major party changed its name to Amanat (Commitment) from Nur-Otan (Radiant Fatherland), its previous moniker. After demonstrations under the banner “Shal, ket” (Old man, get out), the original name, which was selected to rhyme with Nazarbayev’s first name, became divisive. The People’s Party of Kazakhstan (formerly the Communist Party), the Auyl party, which represents the interests of rural regions, the Nationwide Social Democratic Party, and well-known members of the “in-system” opposition also participated in the elections.
The fourth is the application of judicial and constitutional reforms, such as restoring the Constitutional Court and introducing a three-tiered pre-trial procedure model. By implementing the Social Code, Kazakhstan has proved to be a champion of citizens’ welfare. The National Council of Public Trust was established to increase public participation in the country’s governance. Later, it was reorganised as the National Kurultai (Congress), which comprises human rights organisations, attorneys, economists, independent experts, and civil servants. On 15 March 2024, Tokayev emphasised that preserving and promoting the achievements of Kazakh independence depends on a cooperative effort between a lawful state and diligent, nationalistic citizens, as well as ongoing adjustments to our cultural values to meet modern needs.
Fifthly, more people are participating in state governance and human rights protection. The main goals are decentralisation and equitable distribution of power throughout the nation, bolstering the rule of law, and guaranteeing equal opportunities for all citizens. The parties focused particularly on enforcing the zero-tolerance policy against violence against women and children. Notably, the United States praised the law enacted on 15 April 2024 that strengthened Kazakhstan’s penalties for child abuse and domestic violence.
Sixth, the nation has enacted reforms to empower citizens, realising the important role of the media. In line with international trends, it modified media laws and decriminalized defamation. These changes support freedom of expression and make the digital space safer.
The United States praised the law enacted on 15 April 2024 that strengthened Kazakhstan's penalties for child abuse and domestic violence.
The International Dimension and Larger Discourse
Democratisation has, time immemorial, been an issue in Kazakhstan due to the inherent power shift from USSR politics to the Nursultan regime to the current Tokayev presidency. Its determination to adopt democratic practices and institutions has stood as a warrant for systematic political change. The democratic transformation of Kazakhstan has been legitimised by different countries and international organisations, which have lauded this positive step.
On 20 May 2024, the third annual High-Level Dialogue on Human Rights and Democratic Reforms between Kazakhstan and the United States was co-chaired by Uzra Zeya, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, and Erzhan Kazykhan, the Assistant to the President of Kazakhstan for International Affairs. To promote accountability and transparency, the U.S. delegation has urged President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s political reform initiatives to be advanced with full cooperation and consultation with partners in civil society. They emphasised establishing and fostering a thriving and prosperous “New Kazakhstan,” where independent media, civil society organisations, and political parties can operate freely and without undue restrictions. It additionally vitalised multilateral collaboration with the C5+1 Platform and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. During the meeting, Zeya also emphasised how paramount it is to consistently carry out the human rights and rule of law action plan that Tokayev signed in December 2023. One can ascertain that it is indispensable for the U.S. to sustain the early stages of democratic awakening as opposed to the communist initiatives of Russia and China.
The USAID makes a commendable effort to promote a democratic culture in Kazakhstan by strengthening its civil society, enhancing its appeal to foreign investors, and maintaining the rule of law. In order to assist the Ministry of Information and Social Development in creating fair and transparent processes for allocating and overseeing grants to regional non-governmental organisations, USAID has reinforced state-civil society dialogue on a national scale. The USAID also promotes changes to the environment that support independent media, facilitate the creation of credible content, and offer technical assistance to regional non-state media organisations. Subsequently, in recent years, USAID has participated in and assisted Kazakhstan in its efforts to stop violent extremism and combat human trafficking. USAID collaborated with the International Organisation for Migration to support Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s 2020 adoption of a pact safeguarding migrant workers’ rights. Finally, through active training that has increased public confidence and trust in the system, USAID collaborates with the Supreme Court of Kazakhstan to improve the independence and professionalism of the legal system.
Further, the European Union, as a dialogue partner and promoter of democracy in Kazakhstan, has affirmed that it will render trade leverage by providing Preferential Trade Access. The EU Market Access is a special incentive arrangement for Kazakhstan’s sustainable development for good governance. The European Parliament approved the EU’s 2019-launched Central Asia Strategy on 18 January 2024. The comprehensive document strongly emphasises regional cooperation and reverence for human rights as the cornerstones of the E.U.’s approach towards this dynamic and strategically vital region. Agreements for Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation (EPCAs) were also essential to this endeavour. The New Generation Agreement of 2015, which went into effect on 1 March 2020, was signed by Kazakhstan, the first Central Asian country to do so.
Subsequently, the African Union has amplified workers’ voices to safeguard democracy. Kazakhstan’s opening to Africa by the 2050 Strategy through political ties and economic investments has boosted the call for efficiency in democracy sustenance. In addition, Kazakhstan is a firm adherent to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This paved the way for the United Nations to recognise Kazakhstan’s commitment to sovereign principles for developing an inclusive society. The U.N. system in Kazakhstan fully favours the nation’s goal to move up into the top 30 developed nations in the world. With the assistance of the 2030 Global Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 SDGs, the United Nations is confident that Kazakhstan can achieve its development objectives.
The transition from Jeltoqsan to Consultative Ideology nurtured the Kazakhstan constitution’s primary objective of reducing political tensions while keeping total control of the Parliament. It uplifted the spirit of Right-wing populism, which combined Turkic nationalism with civic nationalism, localism, and cultural nationalism. It was used as a populist rhetoric to critique the existing political institutions. It has transcended the region to uphold democracy, which demonstrates that universal democratic values, such as civil society, public elections, and independent media, need to be accepted and promoted in aspiring democracies. Today, the leadership of the President stands as a symbol and guarantor of national unity and state power, the Constitution’s inviolability, and a citizen’s rights and freedoms. The state now embarks on deploying the Kazakhstan 2030 policy to replace the Soviet ideology, legitimise the present administration among various ethnolinguistic audiences, and control the behaviour of the region’s elites. While Kazakhstan has made certain progress on its path to democracy, it still faces long and challenging roads ahead.
Dr. Lakshmi Karlekar is an Assistant Professor at the School of Humanities – Political Science and International Relations, Ramaiah College of Arts, Science and Commerce, Bengaluru. She holds a PhD in International Studies from the CHRIST (Deemed to be) University, Bengaluru. Dr. Anurag Tripathi is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Studies, Political Science and History at CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bengaluru. Views expressed are those of the authors.
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