- Divergent Intelligence Cultures and Objectives: Russian and Chinese agencies emphasize regime security and countering U.S. influence, while Indian intelligence focuses on safeguarding territorial integrity, countering terrorism, and advancing geopolitical interests without a primary focus on regime security.
- Scope for India-Russia Cooperation: There is significant potential for intelligence collaboration between India and Russia, particularly in counterterrorism and shared goals of promoting a multipolar world order.
- Challenges in India-China Intelligence Relations: Deep mistrust, border disputes, and competing regional interests limit intelligence cooperation between India and China. Chinese intelligence prioritizes internal control and focuses more on the U.S. and Japan than India, while India faces operational challenges due to limited resources and expertise in China.
(This article is part of a series on Russia, China and India Strategic Alliance. Part 1 can be read here)
An Overview of the Intelligence Agencies of India, Russia and China
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Government of the Russian Federation dissolved the Soviet Union’s intelligence Agency the Committee of State Security or KGB and its place established three separate intelligence agencies which are as follows:
- The FSB: also known as the Federal Security Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti), is Russia’s primary domestic security and intelligence agency. It is tasked with handling counterintelligence and surveillance operations within Russia’s borders.
- The Foreign Intelligence Service ( Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki; SVR ) is Russia’s foreign intelligence agency, a direct successor to the foreign intelligence branch of the former Soviet Union’s KGB.
- The Russian military: The intelligence collection and cyber capabilities within the Russian military are run by two directorates with Russia’s General Staff: The GRU or main intelligence directorate and the General Staff’s 8th Directorate. These two directorates run operations and supervise Russian cyber troops and the military research and development effort.
Source: Times of India
The Chinese Communist; Party’s ( CCP ) intelligence apparatus is spread across organs in several distinct bureaucratic systems on both the civilian and military sides. Of these, the state security system is among the most prominent. It includes counter-intelligence, political security, external influence work, and espionage among other functions. The system is led by the Ministry of State Security (MSS) but also incorporates agencies in all provincial-level governments.
Established in 1983 by then Chinese premier Deng Xiaoping the Ministry of State Security (MSS) has over the years emerged as China’s largest and most effective intelligence organization, working under the state council with its headquarters in Beijing. Under Article 4 of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law, it enjoys police powers to arrest and initiate prosecution in cases involving national security. The MSS has different wings covering foreign intelligence, internal intelligence, counter-espionage and counter-intelligence. There is a certain degree of overlap with the Second Department of the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) in respect of foreign intelligence and the Ministry of Public Security ( MPS ) in the field of domestic intelligence.
Though essentially a national security agency, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) has a wide intelligence network. Enjoying overriding powers over the police and law enforcing agencies, huge resources and proximity to the CCP make it a powerful security cum intelligence outfit. The MPS is empowered to draft any Chinese citizen to spy on fellow citizens or foreigners living in their area. Surveillance over visiting foreigners is an important function of the MPS which it performs through local law enforcement agencies besides its dedicated intelligence units.
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a dedicated intelligence apparatus of its own under the General Staff Department (GSD) of the PLA which is responsible for Human intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Cyber Warfare.
Following its independence from British colonial rule in August 1947 India inherited the Colonial Era Intelligence Bureau (IB). Until 1968 the IB which is responsible for India’s internal intelligence also handled external intelligence. However, following India’s defeat in the 1962 India- China war the Indian government felt the need for a separate external intelligence agency. As a result, India established the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in September 1968. Founded mainly to focus on China and Pakistan, over the following decades, RAW has expanded its mandate and is credited with greatly increasing India’s influence abroad.
Following allegations of RAW’s intelligence failures to detect the Pakistani occupation of the Kargil Heights in 1999 which led to the Kargil war between India and Pakistan, a new intelligence organization was set up: the National Technical Research Organization (NTRO) which would be the repository of India’s technical intelligence spy satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s), and spy planes. The Indian government also decided to create a Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), whose head would be an advisor to the Integrated Defence Staff and the defence minister. The DIA is empowered to conduct transborder operations to collect tactical military intelligence.
The Intelligence Cultures of India, Russia and China
The cultures of the intelligence agencies of India, Russia and China greatly differ in terms of threat perceptions and intelligence collection priorities. The core objective of the Russian and Chinese intelligence agencies is to ensure firstly regime security by countering perceived covert subversion by hostile powers namely the United States to bring about regime change in China and Russia by supporting domestic dissidents who are critical of the Russian and Chinese regimes. Regime security is a key objective of Russian and Chinese intelligence agencies because both Russia and China are highly centralized states where the top political leaders namely President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping have authoritarian styles of governance in keeping with their respective countries’ autocratic political cultures. The second objective of the Russian and Chinese intelligence agencies is to collect and analyse intelligence of a political, scientific, economic and military nature and conduct covert influence and propaganda operations that help the Russian and Chinese governments increase their global clout and influence in various parts of the world as part of their geopolitical competition with the United States.
In contrast to Russia and China, the core objective of India’s intelligence agencies is to collect and analyse intelligence of a political, economic, scientific and military nature and conduct covert influence operations to advance the security objective of securing India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty against external adversaries such as China and Pakistan who want to seize parts of Indian territory and internally against Extreme Left Wing Maoist Groups and separatist insurgent groups in India’s Jammu and Kashmir and Northeast regions. The second objective of collecting and analysing intelligence of a political, economic, scientific and military nature is to advance India’s Geopolitical and foreign policy objectives of maintaining its regional influence in South Asia and becoming a great power. Thus, since India has a democratic system of government, Indian intelligence agencies do not focus primarily on regime security and are instead focused on advancing the security and foreign policy interests of the Indian state which is not limited to any one political party or leader in power.
The Prospects and limitations for cooperation between the intelligence agencies of India, Russia and China
Given the different intelligence cultures of the three countries, there is scope for intelligence cooperation in areas of common interest and there are limitations to intelligence cooperation due to divergence of interests also. The scope for intelligence cooperation is greater in the case of India and Russia as both countries are part of the BRICS and SCO groupings and are advocates of a multipolar world order that would check US global hegemony. There is also scope for intelligence cooperation between India and Russia in the realm of counter-terrorism as both countries are victims of religiously motivated terrorist groups i.e. Terrorist groups based in the Caucasus and Central Asia in the case of Russia and Pakistan-based terrorist groups in the case of India. Russian and Indian intelligence agencies cooperated in supporting the Anti-Taliban Northern Alliance against the Taliban during the civil war in Afghanistan in the 1990s.
The main limitation to Russia – India intelligence cooperation is concerning different threat perceptions about the United States and China. Russia views the United States as its main geopolitical rival hence it views China as its partner to counter US global hegemony due to the convergence of their national interests in this regard. India on the other hand views China as its main geopolitical challenge due to the disputed India-China border and China’s diplomatic and military support to Pakistan as well as China’s growing economic and diplomatic influence in India’s immediate neighbourhood in South Asia. India, unlike Russia, maintains close defence and intelligence ties with the United States to balance China’s growing hegemony in Asia.
Intelligence cooperation between India and China faces several challenges. China and India are ignorant of each other’s strategies, with suspicion taking the place of intelligence just when understanding is crucial. The two countries both nuclear powers, have the world’s largest border dispute on their hands, at over 100,000 square kilometres. They tussle over sea routes in the Indian Ocean, spheres of influence in neighbouring countries and relations with Pakistan. The MSS, which is China’s largest intelligence organisation, suffers from several difficulties in its India work. First, it prioritises internal control within China over overseas work and even the latter is geared towards Hong Kong and Taiwan. Japan and the US come next, and India, despite its proximity and size, is lower down the list.
It is not easy to estimate how many Chinese intelligence staff focus on India but by counting analysis documents processed by the MSS that have entered the public domain via the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations in 2015 alone we get a vague idea of priorities. There were 69 dealing with India, compared with 493 for the US and 136 for Japan. Of those 69, at least some seem to be authored by non-specialists who normally write on other subjects. This reflects a lack of expertise in India within Chinese intelligence agencies.
India’s external intelligence agency RAW does not have an adequate number of agents who are not of Indian ethnicity (just as China has few non-Han agents). RAW also has scant cover for operations in China since so few Indian companies are active in China. Thus, limiting the Indian intelligence agency’s ability to accurately assess China’s strategic intentions.
Another important factor that limits intelligence cooperation between India and China is how India and China perceive the BRICS in their respective foreign policies. China alongside Russia views BRICS as an arena to cooperate with other regional powers of the Global South and incrementally limit the influence of the West. For instance, China wants to integrate BRICS countries into its BRI infrastructure by offering developmental assistance to the non-G7 nations more generously than the West.
India does not share Russia and China’s revisionist enthusiasm for containing the West. India’s primary grievance with the West is its exclusion from the United Nations Security Council, and it believes that support from BRICS would be necessary for any such reform. India’s membership in BRICS reminds the West of its long-cherished strategic autonomy and not to take its cooperation for granted while ensuring that the group bases its identity on a non-Western footing and not an anti-Western one. Thus, while both India and China have misgivings about American Global Hegemony their strategies for countering it are different.
References:
- Balachandran, V. (2022). Intelligence over Centuries. Indus Source Books
- Chaya, D (2023). The complexity and durability of India’s intelligence culture. Retrieved https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-complexity-and-durability-of-india-s-intelligence-culture
- Doval, A. (2013). Chinese Intelligence: From a Party Outfit to Cyber Warriors. Retrieved from https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/chinese-intelligence-from-a-party-outfit-to-cyber-warriors.pdf
- Faligot, R ( 2022 ). Chinese Spies: From Chairman Mao to Xi Jinping. HarperCollins India
- Groffman, N (2016). Why India and China must Strengthen Their Espionage Capabilities. Retrieved from https://swarajyamag.com/world/why-india-and-china-must-strengthen-their-espionage-capabilities
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- Riehle, K (2022). Russian Intelligence: A Case-based Study of Russian Services and Missions Past and Present. NI Press
- Soldatov, A & Borogan, I (2022). Russian Cyberwarfare: Unpacking the Kremlin’s Capabilities. Retrieved from https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/russian-cyberwarfare-unpacking-the-kremlins-capabilities/
Dhruv Ashok is a PhD research scholar from Christ (Deemed to be University), Bangalore. He writes on current affairs and international politics. His areas of interest include conflict resolution and historical narratives. Views expressed are the author’s own.
Dr. Niranjan B Poojar 
Aayush Pal 
Shobhil Shrivastava