
- A U.S. government report has alleged that China launched a targeted disinformation campaign to undermine French Rafale fighter aircraft sales in the aftermath of ‘Operation Sindoor’ in May 2025.
- The Commission notes that China sought to ‘hinder sales of French Rafale aircraft in favour of its own J-35s,’ relying heavily on artificial intelligence tools and coordinated inauthentic behaviour.
- The Commission says these actions are part of China’s broader “gray zone” strategy that uses cyberattacks, economic pressure, disinformation, and covert influence to gain advantage without open conflict.
A U.S. government report has alleged that China launched a targeted disinformation campaign to undermine French Rafale fighter aircraft sales in the aftermath of the India–Pakistan border crisis of May 2025. The claim appears in the 2025 Report to Congress by the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, which documents a range of Chinese “gray zone” activities across multiple domains, including cyber, economic, legal and informational tactics.
According to the report, Beijing began circulating fabricated material online to discredit the Rafale platform at a time when several air forces were evaluating new combat aircraft. The Commission notes that China sought to “hinder sales of French Rafale aircraft in favour of its own J-35s,” relying heavily on artificial intelligence tools and coordinated inauthentic behaviour. The report enumerates that fake social media accounts were used to spread AI-generated images depicting supposed ‘debris’ from Rafale jets, portraying them as not being reliable or effective in combat.
The timing, the report suggests, was not coincidental. India’s retaliation to Pakistan’s terror sponsorship through ‘Operation Sindoor’ had sharpened international focus on the airpower capabilities of the two neighbours. India’s earlier acquisition of Rafales had already proved an important factor in its regional air deterrence posture. China, it is alleged, attempted to sow doubt among prospective buyers of Rafale, particularly those in regions in which Beijing has been heavily marketing its J-35 stealth fighter.
The broader document outlines similar influence efforts by China in other areas, indicating a pattern of information manipulation designed to shape foreign perceptions of Chinese technology while undermining competitors. These actions, the Commission warns, fall within a larger strategy of “gray zone” operations, activities that stop short of open conflict but aim to gain strategic advantage through cyberattacks, economic pressure, disinformation, and covert political influence.
While the report does not specify the countries targeted by the alleged Rafale-related disinformation, it emphasises that AI-generated content enabled rapid, wide-scale dissemination of misleading material. The Commission highlights this as a growing challenge for governments, noting that fabricated imagery is becoming an increasingly common tool in geopolitical information campaigns.
The report concludes that such campaigns reflect an evolving information environment in which advanced AI tools are accelerating the scale and sophistication of covert influence efforts, complicating global defence procurement debates and international security assessments.
France has not publicly responded to the specific findings, but Paris has previously accused multiple state actors of attempting to distort defence-related narratives. India too has repeatedly flagged the spread of manipulated content to influence prospective buyers, especially during periods of regional tension.
Economic Stakes & Market Share
The focus of these influence efforts includes regions where Rafale and China’s J-35 are in direct competition: Southeast Asia (Philippines, Malaysia), West Asia (UAE, Saudi Arabia), parts of Europe (Greece, Romania), and Africa (Egypt). The stakes are high as Rafale has emerged as one of the world’s most sought-after 4.5-gen fighters, with a proven combat record, strong export success, and advanced weapons integration. In contrast, the J-35 is positioned as a lower-cost “stealth alternative,” relying heavily on China’s political and industrial leverage.
The Rafale, developed by Dassault Aviation, has evolved into one of Europe’s most successful defence exports of the 21st century, and that success is decidedly more than anecdotal. According to Dassault’s public data, by the end of 2024, the company reported delivering 21 Rafales in that year (14 for France, 7 for export) and guiding 30 export order intakes—all pointing to sustained demand.
From a numbers standpoint, while earlier Rafale export momentum was modest, by 2025, aggregates show that the order-book for the Rafale reached some 533 units worldwide. Export contracts include key buyers such as India, Egypt, Qatar, Greece and the UAE. The economic value is substantial: each advanced combat aircraft comes bundled with weapons packages, training, logistics, industrial offsets, and long-term support. One recent India deal alone—for 26 carrier-capable Rafale Marine jets—was valued at around US $7.5 billion.
While China historically has lagged in winning major export fighter contracts, the narrative is shifting. News reports highlight that China may offer the J-35 at significantly discounted rates (one report cites a “50% off” deal to Pakistan) to gain its first major export customer. Analysts note that China is active in cutting corners on cost, bundling political-industrial incentives, and leveraging a lower-price pitch to undercut Western rivals.
Rafale vs J-35: Capability Comparison

| Feature | Rafale | J-35 |
| Role / Generation | Multi-role 4.5-gen fighter, proven export success. (Wikipedia) | 5th-generation stealth fighter (naval and land variants) under production in China. (Wikipedia) |
| Combat/Operational Experience | Combat-proven in Libya, Syria, India-Pakistan theatre; well exported. (Fly a jet fighter) | Export intentions were announced, but large-scale exports have not yet realised. (Wikipedia) |
| Export Track Record / Orders | Export intentions were announced, but large-scale exports have not yet been realised. (Wikipedia) | Over 500 units ordered, including exports; strong market presence. (Aviation International News) |
| Stealth / Sensor / Survivability | Good “4.5-gen” sensors, but not full stealth; will face 5th-gen competition. | True stealth design claimed; twin-engine, internal bays, carrier capable. (Interesting Engineering) |
| Industrial / Offset Appeal | Production transfer agreements (e.g., India) increase appeal. (Wikipedia) | China may use the J-35 as a “bundle” with political/industrial concessions in export deals. |
| Cost / Risk for Buyer | Higher cost but lower technical risk due to export pedigree. | Potentially lower cost, but higher risk (less mature ecosystem, supply chain concerns). |
| Strategic Appeal | Trusted by Western-aligned buyers; strong interoperability. | Appeals to buyers aligned with China; used as a strategic tool in influence campaigns. |
