President Erdoğan has the advantage of a consolidated voter base, a disciplined party organization and a pliant media while the other candidates will need to bring together ideologically diverse voters to succeed.
- The economy ranks high for voters and the government’s economic policy is high on the agenda of many voters in Turkey.
- Turkey is witnessing a significant rise in nationalism, with religion continuing to play an important role in the public sphere.
- Public broadcasting is almost completely monopolized by President Erdoğan, and a large majority of the media is also controlled by businessmen close to the president.
- Kılıcdaroglu’s biggest trump card before the election is the country’s strained economy.
2023 is the year of the centennial celebration of the Turkish Republic. It is also the year where it will be taking one of the most important political decisions, with presidential and parliamentary elections set for May. Notwithstanding war in two neighbouring countries, and major challenges to its economy, starting with sky-high inflation, Turkey has long planned to celebrate a century since the founding of the republic in 1923.
Factors that could impact the vote
Polls suggest growing frustration among the electorate. Turks head to the polls next year amid frustration about the country’s future trajectory. A growing number of disgruntled AKP voters may look to cast their vote for a party other than the incumbent.
Economy: The economy ranks high for voters: economic policy is high on the agenda of many voters in Turkey. A growing number of voters blame the country’s economic crisis on the incumbent AKP party, though boiling frustrations may not result in a decisive victory for the opposition because many disgruntled AKP voters still do not believe the opposition parties can solve the country’s economic problems.
Foreign Policy & elections: Foreign policy does not play a direct role in voter preference, despite the fact that issues of counterterrorism and cross-border operations are supported by the majority of the electorate. Foreign policy issues, given the current regional and global context, may not resonate with the average voter. He nevertheless clarified that “performance on foreign policy issues” still serves as an important indicator of the incumbent government’s competency.
The Kurdish question: Recent national polls showed that political parties in Turkey will have a difficult time securing a simple majority in parliament without the support of the pro-Kurdish HTP party, which makes minority votes even more pivotal in the upcoming election.
Nationalism & religiosity: Turkey is witnessing a significant rise in nationalism, with religion continuing to play an important role in the public sphere. Though Turkey, on average, is becoming ‘less’ religious due to the rise of a more secular younger generation, religion is nonetheless still significant. Political parties remain highly ‘Etatist’ in their policies, with some placing greater emphasis on religion than others.
Impact of the Earthquake on the elections
It is true that this disaster is the biggest in modern Turkish history, but the government’s repeated references to the events as the disaster of the century is a purposeful strategy. Following mounting criticism of the government’s incompetent response, Erdoğan admitted “shortcomings,” but tempered this acknowledgement by adding that, “It’s not possible to be ready for a disaster like this.”
A furious speech in which Erdoğan called government critics “dishonourable” and warned that state prosecutors will take action has added fuel to the fire. The government’s swift detainment of some journalists and opening of criminal investigations has faced strong resistance from the Turkish opposition. All eyes were on Turkey’s Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) as a microcosm of the centralization that exists under Erdoğan’s presidential system. AFAD was far too slow in responding to the crisis, to the extent that the hardest-hit cities, including Maras and Hatay, did not receive any evacuation help in the initial days—the most critical period in which to save lives. Frustrated local victims who were facing cold and hunger on the streets questioned why the Turkish Army was not fully deployed. Despite the extreme need for help, government officials insisted that “any coordination other than AFAD coordination” would not be allowed.
This response stood in stark contrast with the 1999 earthquake, when various NGOs, other government agencies like the Turkish Red Crescent, and Turkish military personnel were mobilized in tandem. The Turkish military’s involvement this time around was slow and extremely limited; fewer than 8,000 soldiers were deployed from an army of half a million. The restrictions on the Turkish Army’s involvement may be explained by Erdoğan’s policy of curbing the military’s visibility in domestic affairs. Not only did the centralization of decision-making around Erdoğan hamper the military’s independent mobilization to help address the disaster, but it also impeded a timely response by municipalities and civil society organizations.
Advantage Erdogan?
Erdoğan and his AK Party do have clear advantages. The election campaigns are taking place on a highly uneven playing field. Public broadcasting is almost completely monopolized by President Erdoğan, and a large majority of the media is also controlled by businessmen close to the president. Erdoğan campaigns in his capacity as President of the Republic and therefore has access to public resources. The recent amendments to the election law have also made election monitoring more difficult for the opposition. On top of the unfairness of the elections, President Erdoğan also has the advantage of a consolidated voter base and a disciplined party organization, while the other candidates will need to bring together ideologically diverse voters to succeed. Lastly, President Erdoğan has a proven track record of governing; opposition candidates do not.
Under these circumstances, the likeliest scenario is President Erdoğan winning the presidency. However, there is less clarity regarding the parliamentary elections and a divided parliament is quite possible. While the authorities of the parliament have been crippled by last year’s constitutional referendum, which gave the president the upper hand on most issues, the parliament has a very important symbolic and moral authority in Turkey. It was the Grand National Assembly of Turkey that commanded the war of independence under the leadership of Atatürk, founded modern Turkey in 1920, and turned Turkey into a republic in 1923. Therefore even in the absence of formal powers, and it still has some, the parliament will continue to carry weight in Turkish politics. In the case of a divided parliament, the president — whoever is elected — will need to accommodate parliamentary will. If the president fails to do this, he will have to govern under immense political and societal tension.
Regardless of the outcome of these elections, the Turkish political class and Turkish society have already demonstrated resilience. One of the criticisms of the opposition parties in Turkey has been that they are fragmented and cannot come together with a common agenda. This is not the case in Turkey anymore. While polarization paves the way for populism in Turkey, Turkish opposition parties are now very careful to use conciliatory and cohesive language, something never seen before. These efforts may or may not bear fruit in the upcoming elections, but they are certainly steps in the right direction. Many people in the West have already written Turkish democracy off or are preparing to do so. These hopeful signs from Turkish society suggest that this may be premature.
Opposition to Erdogan
The experienced name of Turkish politics, Erdogan’s opponent in the election on 14 May will be CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıcdaroglu. Kılıçdaroglu is an experienced politician like Erdoğan. Kılıcdaroglu, who became a candidate as a result of the decision of the Millet Alliance established under the leadership of CHP, will try to achieve an election victory against Erdoğan.
Kılıcdaroglu’s biggest trump card before the election is the country’s strained economy. Kılıcdaroglu says that if he wins the election, the economy will improve. Kılıcdaroglu’s supporters include the IYI Party, Democracy and Atılım Party, Future Party, Felicity Party and Democrat Party. Together with these parties, the CHP’s vote rate is estimated to be 40%.
Support to Kemal Kılıcdaroglu
HDP, which is not in the Millet Alliance, will also support Kemal Kılıcdaroglu. Although no official statement of support has been made so far, messages from HDP officials are in favour of Kılıçdaroğlu. Expressing that they can support Kılıcdaroglu in their statements, the exact stance of HDP is curious. Kemal Kılıcdaroglu may become the new President of Turkey if HDP supports him. It is estimated that HDP received between 8% and 10% of the votes.
(The author is a post-graduate student in International Relations at Kalinga university, Raipur. The opinions expressed are the author’s own)
References:
Aayush Pal is a freelance writer on contemporary geopolitical developments. The views expressed in his work are entirely his own.
Shobhil Shrivastava 
Dr. Niranjan B Poojar