- The essence of the strategy adopted by the IB was to take a strategic approach to conflict resolution rather than conflict management.
- RAW’s strategies against terrorists and separatist insurgents who resort to violence against the Indian state include persuasion, bribery, dividing and conquering, and, as a last resort, direct violence.
- The primary objective of the IB is to convince local armed separatist/terrorist groups to give up their armed struggles for secession against the Indian state and seek a political solution within the framework provided by the Indian constitution.
- Agencies like IB and RAW are not responsible for tactical intelligence failures like the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, as in many cases, the security forces fail to adequately act on the intelligence reports provided by the IB and RAW to generate tactical intelligence.
The roots of India’s intelligence culture lie in the early years after India’s independence in the 1950’s when Prime Minster Jawaharlal Nehru insisted that separatist insurgent groups who had taken up arms against the Indian state were “our people” who needed to be reformed and co-opted into the mainstream democratic processes laid the foundation for India’s intelligence doctrine for counterinsurgency/ counterterrorism in disturbed areas in the North East and Jammu and Kashmir. This became the basis for all future operations conducted by India’s various intelligence agencies operating in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. It envisaged a clear divide between winning hearts and minds (soft approaches) and targeted killings (hard approaches). The former was given utmost importance, and India’s internal intelligence agency, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), was made the nodal agency to achieve these goals.
The Winning Hearts and Minds – Soft Approach
The essence of the strategy adopted by the IB was to take a strategic approach to conflict resolution rather than conflict management. As a result, several separatist insurgent movements are now part of India’s political process, and no separatist movement has ever been successful. From an operational point of view, the IB achieved this through the Kautilyan method of conflict resolution, i.e., persuasion, bribery, and trickery (divide and rule) to persuade separatist insurgents/terrorists to give up arms and enter into a political settlement within the framework provided by the Indian constitution. The IB’s divide and rule strategy received the highest emphasis and has been emulated by other security bureaucracies operating in conflict zones.
When India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), was established in 1968, it adopted a similar operational strategy. RAW’s operational strategy was based on the assumption that India’s neighbourhood too had sections that were ‘misguided’ about India’s intentions and ‘misinformed ’about India’s security concerns, and, therefore, their co-option was both a security and a diplomatic necessity.
Pursuing the winning hearts and minds strategy, the RAW’s psychological warfare division (PSYWAR) has remained one of its most active divisions. In the 1980s and 1990s, when Pakistan began supporting armed separatist insurgencies and terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir, the RAW’s PSYWAR division remained active in countering Pakistani propaganda internationally by soliciting support from the Indian diaspora across the world. Since then, the RAW’s stations in Western countries have operated on twin mandates. First, to establish long-lasting relationships with the Indian diaspora aimed at fostering positive bilateral relations. Second, to monitor and manipulate sections within the Indian diaspora that support separatist movements in India. The RAW’s successful turning of the Khalistani separatist Ripudaman Singh Malik into an Indian asset is a case in point on the latter.
Thus, the primary objective of the IB as India’s internal intelligence agency in the areas of counterinsurgency/ counterterrorism is to convince local armed separatist /terrorist groups to give up their armed struggles for secession against the Indian state and seek a political solution within the framework provided by the Indian constitution. The primary objective of the RAW as India’s external intelligence agency in the areas of counter insurgency/counterterrorism is to counter any adverse propaganda by Pakistan and hostile elements in the Indian diaspora which seek to evoke international sympathy towards local separatist and terrorist groups in India which might force the Indian state to accept the separatist/terrorists demands for secession.
The Targeted Killings – Hard Approach
In the aftermath of the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts, which killed 257 people and injured more than a thousand. The perpetrators, members of the Mumbai underworld in collaboration with Pakistan’s Inter–Service Intelligence agency (ISI), were sheltering in Pakistan. In the aftermath of the 1993 Mumbai blasts, the chief of India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), sought the government’s approval to assassinate those responsible for this attack. But when the order came from India’s then-prime minister Narasimha Rao, it simply said track and report. Thus, the RAW was not allowed to conduct targeted killings of those who carried out the 1993 Mumbai blasts.
After it was stopped from striking back against those who planned and carried out the 1993 Mumbai terrorist bombings, RAW started its infiltration of terrorist and separatist insurgent groups. The RAW’s strategies against terrorists and separatist insurgents who resort to violence against the Indian state include persuasion, bribery, dividing and conquering, and, as a last resort, direct violence. RAW was always discouraged by India’s political leadership from resorting to direct violence against terrorists and separatist insurgents operating from safe havens in foreign countries.
Due to a lack of political approval for target killings and the political leadership’s insistence on winning over local insurgents/terrorists. The Intelligence Bureau (IB), along with other domestic security agencies, adopted a divide and conquer policy against local separatists/ terrorists who refused all efforts at laying down arms and accepting a negotiated settlement within the framework of the Indian constitution. This strategy would result in the killing of their would-be targets without exposing the culpability of the concerned agencies. Since murders are the norm in counterinsurgency/ counterterrorism environments in conflict zones such as Kashmir and the North East, the IB and other domestic security agencies only had to exploit this in their favour. An example of this is the employment of former militants under the leadership of Kukka Parray in Kashmir in the early 1990s. More subtle examples of Indian intelligence agencies turning a blind eye to inter-group rivalries resulting in killings can be observed in the North East insurgencies.
The RAW has pursued this policy in neighbouring countries. The fake currency trade in Nepal help sustain terrorism in India and rival gangsters vying for control of this lucrative trade engaged in tit for tat killings. Such gang wars have offered the RAW a deniable means of rupturing terrorism networks, which also does not always require political approval.
Following the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks in Mumbai carried out by the Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, which killed an estimated 174 people, RAW increased cooperation with Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency to learn the requisite skills to conduct overseas assassinations. However, the then Congress-led UPA government refused to authorise targeted assassinations of those responsible for the 26/11 terror attacks and instead chose diplomacy to pressurise Pakistan to curtail the activities of anti-India terrorist groups.
However, following the election of the BJP-led NDA government to power in 2014, RAW seems to have received authorisation to conduct targeted killings against anti-India terrorists in Pakistan. The UK Sunday Guardian report, which came out in September 2024, alleged that RAW had carried out assassinations of more than 20 terrorists on Pakistani soil since 2019. However, the Indian government denies any official involvement in any of these killings in Pakistan.
Thus, in the absence of direct political approval, IB and other domestic security agencies adopted a divide and conquer strategy to create splits within terrorist/insurgent groups to exploit these divides within the target groups, to eliminate those separatists/ terrorists who consistently sabotaged any peace offers by the Indian state. Since direct targeted killings by RAW as an option to deal with Pakistani state-sponsored terrorism was not officially approved by the Indian governments in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s due to fear of India losing its international reputation as a responsible state, which respects international law as under international law, state-sponsored assassinations are illegal. This reluctance of the Indian state to engage in state-sponsored assassinations led RAW to develop its innovative strategy of penetrating, manipulating, and causing divides within terrorist groups, which in turn offered RAW opportunities to conduct assassinations via third parties. Such indirect killings by RAW of suspected terrorists may have also received tacit political approval. It has only been since 2014 that, according to media reports that RAW seems to have received government approval for target killings of anti-India terrorists in Pakistan. However, the Indian government officially denies any involvement in any of the recent killings of anti-India terrorists in Pakistan.
India’s Strategic Intelligence Culture in the Context of the Pahalgam Terrorist Attack
Following the Pahalgam terrorist attack by the Resistance Front, a proxy of the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba in Jammu and Kashmir, which killed 28 Hindu tourists, there has been a lot of media speculation about intelligence failures on the part of the IB and RAW. However, such an impression is misleading as the IB and RAW are agencies responsible for strategic intelligence collection and strategic intelligence assessments for internal and external security and not tactical intelligence collection and tactical intelligence assessments for border security, counterterrorism/ counterinsurgency operations or maintenance of law and order.
Tactical intelligence collection and tactical intelligence assessment in insurgency/ terrorism affected regions like Jammu and Kashmir is the responsibility of the Jammu and Kashmir police, Central armed police forces, and the army.
The core strategic intelligence objectives of the IB and RAW concerning Jammu and Kashmir are:
- Collecting and analysing intelligence about the Pakistani army’s evolving proxy war terrorist strategies against the Indian state in Jammu and Kashmir
- Infiltrating Pakistani-sponsored terrorist groups active in Jammu and Kashmir, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Hizbul Mujahideen, to collect and analyse intelligence about their evolving terrorist strategies to keep the Indian security forces updated about the terrorists’ strategies.
- Preparing intelligence assessments regarding which local Kashmiri commanders of the terrorist groups are susceptible to breaking away from Pakistan’s influence and laying down arms based on their intelligence inputs, as well as intelligence inputs received from the Jammu and Kashmir police, the Central armed police forces and the army
The above strategic intelligence collected and analysed by the IB and RAW is vital for the Indian state to craft a calibrated and measured response to terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, agencies like IB and RAW are not responsible for tactical intelligence failures like the recent terrorist attack in Pahalgam in South Kashmir as in many cases the security forces fail to adequately act on the intelligence reports provided by the IB and RAW to generate their tactical intelligence regarding the tactical operational strategies of Pakistani-sponsored terrorist groups.
The divide and conquer strategy of the RAW and IB which seeks to contain if not resolve, ethno-nationalist separatist insurgencies in India’s North East states faces significant challenges in dealing with religiously motivated Pakistani state sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir as terrorism of this kind seeks to radicalize the local Kashmiri population to wage an Islamic holy war or Jihad against the Indian state to merge Muslim majority Jammu and Kashmir into Pakistan and also to fulfil the Islamic Hadith of Ghazwa e Hind which seeks to establish Islamic rule over all of South Asia.
Therefore, unless the problem of Islamist radicalisation within Kashmiri society is effectively addressed by the Indian state, it will be difficult for agencies like RAW and IB to craft strategies that enable a resolution of the terrorism problem within the framework of the Indian constitution.
Failing Forte of State Intelligence: A Case for J&K attacks;
The recent terror attacks in Pahalgam, Kashmir, have brought to the fore an issue that was buried under the rubble for an extended period. The state of affairs in the state intelligence in India is often neglected, ignored or looked down upon with frivolity. One needs to understand that the State intelligence in every state forms the core veins of Intelligence detection and counterintelligence measures. From detecting terror threats to decoding the drugs and narcotics rackets, State Intelligence plays a critical role in threat detection and threat diffusion.
To be blunt, the biggest failures of state intelligence agencies across the states, including J&K, have been their failure to develop proper intelligence and counterintelligence charters and strategies. The State intelligence agencies form the weakest linkage in our framework of the larger intelligence structure and the system and network of intelligence gathering. Their cadres fully come from the normal civilian police background, dominated by the group A and group B Services of the state police forces, they often suffer from low morale, a lack of knowledge and skills in the art and craft of professional intelligence training. Apart from this, one of the most overlooked facts happens to be the lack of adequate resources, mainly stemming from abysmally low budgets, and the lack of cutting-edge technologies for the state intelligence forces. In most cases, the postings in state intelligence within the police departments across the states are considered punishment postings, and the most efficient and brilliant officers posted in the intelligence turn indifferent or ignorant of their immense intellectual calibre and operational capabilities.
Another major issue is the lack of coordination, synergy, and jointness of operations within the various intelligence agencies in India, which is why both the intelligence gathering and counterintelligence aspects are suffering.
The Case for a Joint Intelligence Theatre Command in India
India’s national security landscape has evolved rapidly in the 21st century, necessitating a transformation not only in defence capabilities but also in the structure and coordination of intelligence agencies. While the armed forces are moving towards a theatre command system for integrated warfighting, a similar restructuring is vital for India’s intelligence apparatus. A Joint Intelligence Theatre Command (JITC) would significantly enhance synergy, real-time intelligence sharing, and operational efficiency across agencies such as the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), and other agencies of the paramilitary forces, central police forces and state intelligence units. Preferably, an officer of the rank of an Additional Director of the Intelligence Bureau must be made the head of the Joint Theatre Command. Such a Joint Command. A JITC must be constituted in the Jammu and Kashmir region on a priority basis.
In the current situation, the intelligence architecture operates in silos, often leading to duplication of effort, intelligence gaps, and coordination challenges. The 26/11 Mumbai attacks and the 2016 Pathankot airbase assault underscored the need for better inter-agency coordination. A JITC could mitigate such lapses by providing a unified command and control centre, integrating strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence inputs across sectors and regions.
The establishment of theatre-specific intelligence cells under a centralised command would allow for localised threat assessment, rapid response, and seamless integration with military commands. For instance, dedicated Northern, Western, and Eastern intelligence commands could focus on threats from Pakistan, China, and insurgency-hit regions, respectively, mirroring the military’s theaterization plan. This regional division would also ensure that intelligence collection and analysis are context-specific and actionable.
Officers from IB should be deputed to R&AW, and vice versa; the officers of State Intelligence, Central Intelligence agencies, paramilitary agencies, and military intelligence must be deputed across each other’s intelligence organisations.
As modern warfare increasingly involves hybrid threats—cyber warfare, information manipulation, and terrorism—all of which require joint intelligence operations rather than isolated responses coming from individual intelligence agencies. The Formation of a JITC would enable the pooling of technological resources, human intelligence, and satellite data, thereby building a comprehensive and multidimensional threat mapping and detection.
The U.S. model of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) coordinating all intelligence activities offers a precedent for such a structure. India, too, needs a central authority or joint command that prioritises intelligence integration and coordination without infringing on the autonomy of individual agencies.
A Joint Intelligence Theatre Command would be a force multiplier for India’s national security. Fostering collaboration, reducing redundancy, and enabling swift and well-informed decision-making would certainly transform India’s intelligence ecosystem into a more agile, responsive, and robust framework equipped to tackle 21st-century threats, mostly emerging from the futuristic technologies.
However, we need to realise the basic fact, which should be embedded within an intelligence officer and an agent, that ‘The combination and blend of advanced technological upskilling with the traditional art and craft of intelligence gathering’ makes the officer both valuable and deadly. Furthermore, the blend of tactical and strategic decision-making must become the main pillar of Indian intelligence.
Modi’s Mantra of “Reform, Perform and Transform” must be applied in fostering the compelling need for reforms in India’s intelligence architecture. The country cannot witness more gruesome tragedies like the Pahalgam terror attack. Therefore, prioritising intelligence should be one of the main pillars of India’s national security strategy.
References:
- Chaya, D. (2022). The culture complexity and durability of India’s intelligence culture. Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-complexity-and-durability-of-india-s-intelligence-culture
- Mahadevan, P. (2011). The Politics of Counter Terrorism in India. Bloomsbury Academic
- Bhaumik, S. (2007). Insurgencies in India’s Northeast: Conflict, Co-option & Change. East-West Centre. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06478
- Chaya, D. (2022). India’s Intelligence Culture and Strategic Surprises. Routledge
- Chaya, D. (2023). The New Mossad? Canada’s murder has thrown a spotlight on India’s spy network. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.com/world/asia/article/the-new-mossad-canada-murder-has-thrown-a-spotlight-on-indias-spy-network-8fk0jqpck
Dhruv Ashok is a PhD Research Scholar at CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bengaluru, with interests in conflict resolution, historical narratives, and international politics. Viswapramod is also a PhD Scholar at the Department of International Studies and Political Science, CHRIST University, with an MA in International Relations. Views expressed are the authors’ own.
Aayush Pal 
Anuraag Khaund 
Pranav S