- CBMs Are Temporary Measures: Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between India and China reduce immediate tensions but often fail to address deep-rooted conflicts like territorial disputes, making them short-lived and unreliable.
- Strategic Calculations: China’s disengagement at the LAC is driven by logistical challenges, economic interests, and the need to reallocate resources rather than a genuine intent to improve relations.
- Persistent Mistrust: Divergent strategic goals and China’s history of selective adherence to agreements highlight the limited effectiveness of CBMs in fostering lasting trust or stability in Sino-Indian relations.
The Recently concluded meetings between Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi have emphasized the importance of resolving border disputes to stabilize bilateral relations and avoid flashpoints like Galwan.
This meeting has taken place during a four-year hiatus following the 2020 clashes in the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and the intent for the revival of this dialogue mechanism indicates a mutual commitment to addressing and managing border issues through diplomatic channels. These discussions have led to agreements aimed at de-escalating military tensions in the region through Confidence-building measures (CBMs).
What are CBMs?
CBMs are tools designed to reduce misunderstandings, misperceptions, and risks of conflict between states by increasing transparency and trust. However, CBMs are often limited in their effectiveness in achieving durable peace, especially in complex relationships like that between China and India which it perceives as its challenger in Asia.
China’s approach to international relations often reflects a long-term strategy centred on asserting dominance in its region and challenging the global status quo. It has a long history of testing the will of its opponents and conforming to international rules and laws. One of the best examples is when China refused to accept the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the case of The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China.
CBMs are unlikely to deter actions that align with these strategic goals, as they might be seen as temporary concessions rather than transformative agreements. Also, it must be noted that CBMs typically rely on voluntary adherence without enforcement or punitive measures for non-compliance. For instance, even after agreements like the 1993 and 1996 Sino-Indian CBMs along the border, China and India faced military clashes, such as the Galwan Valley skirmish in 2020. China has, in some instances, used agreements strategically, adhering to them only when convenient and disregarding them when they conflict with its strategic interests.
CBMs are only Temporary Measures
CBMs often fail to address the root causes of conflicts, such as territorial disputes. For example, the ongoing disagreements over Arunachal Pradesh or Aksai Chin between China and India are unlikely to be resolved through CBMs alone. China’s governance philosophy and approach to statecraft, which emphasize centralized authority and strategic ambiguity, often clash with liberal-democratic norms, making trust-building inherently challenging.
China is using these newly agreed CBMs as a way to buy time while consolidating its strategic position as it has come to the unmistakable conclusion that India cannot be budged and its military cannot be intimidated. One can even say that China is using the CBMs as a tool to manage international perceptions, signalling cooperation while pursuing unilateral advantages.
Why China agreed to the Status Quo
China’s decision to disengage from the standoff in LAC and withdraw troops from disputed border areas with India is an outcome of its strategic shortcomings and India’s resolve. One of the reasons is that the prolonged border standoff has adversely affected economic ties, with India imposing restrictions on Chinese investments and banning numerous Chinese apps. China, being a significant trading partner, has a vested interest in normalizing relations to facilitate trade and economic cooperation.
Source: CLAWS
China’s decision to disengage from LAC is influenced by a combination of diplomatic initiatives, economic interests, strategic military shortfalls, and broader geopolitical objectives. This move reflects a calculated approach to balancing its regional ambitions with the necessity of maintaining stable and cooperative relations with neighbouring countries like India.
But more importantly, China though capable of sustaining a large military presence in the harsh terrains of the Himalayas found it logistically challenging and resource-intensive and presumably concluded that this was a zero-sum game. For China disengagement allows China to reallocate military resources more efficiently.
Conclusion
China taking a step back in the Line of Actual Control is not out of trying to mend fences with India but is a calculated move to open a different front. Where is anybody’s guess? China is currently emphasizing domestic economic growth and technological advancement. Reducing external tensions allows the Chinese leadership to concentrate on internal priorities without the distraction of border conflicts.
While India aims for peace and stability to focus on economic development, China resorted to creating tensions to assert regional dominance. China’s rivals often view its actions as expansionist (e.g., territorial claims in the South China Sea or along the Line of Actual Control with India). CBMs are insufficient to bridge this deep-seated mistrust, especially when both sides operate with divergent power asymmetries and security paradigms.
China’s decision to disengage from LAC is influenced by a combination of diplomatic initiatives, economic interests, strategic military considerations, and broader geopolitical objectives. This move reflects a calculated approach to balance its regional ambitions with the necessity of maintaining stable and cooperative relations with India.
One thing is clear, India must not let its guard down at the LAC because CBMs!
References:
- https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/nsa-ajit-doval-meets-chinese-counterpart-says-peace-along-lac-essential-for-improving-ties-101726153611073.html
- https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/CH96B1124.pdf
- https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/indias-pangong-pickle-new-delhis-options-after-its-clash-with-china/
Balaji is a freelance writer with an MA in History and Political science and has published articles on defence and strategic affairs and book reviews. He tweets @LaxmanShriram78. Views expressed are the author’s own.
Dhruv Ashok 
Aayush Pal 
Shobhil Shrivastava