- During the Soviet-Afghan War, Pakistan, with substantial backing from the United States and Saudi Arabia, became a central conduit for support to the Afghan mujahideen.
- The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021 was perceived by some analysts as a strategic victory for Pakistan, given its historical ties to the group.
- The fact remains, that no matter how many airstrikes Pakistan carry out, it will find it very difficult to fight a force that is renowned for its asymmetrical warfare.
- The proxy that Pakistan created has now crossed the Durand Line and has entered into Pakistan and like a python, it is slowly constricting and burying its fangs.
In 2011, then United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned Pakistan and said “You can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbours,” and now the snakes that Pakistan called its strategic asset are biting them. To have a better understanding one would have to delve into the past and look at Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan.
It all started in the 1970s when Pakistan began supporting Afghan Islamist groups as a countermeasure against Afghanistan’s support for Pashtun and Baloch nationalists within Pakistan. Under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) played a pivotal role in this strategy. Notably, in 1975, the ISI sponsored an armed rebellion in the Panjshir Valley, involving figures like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Massoud. This initiative aimed to destabilize the Afghan government and counter its influence.
From this conflict, the fighters took a pivot towards Islamic radicalism which later became the backbone of the anti-Soviet resistance and the Taliban. During the Soviet-Afghan War, Pakistan, with substantial backing from the United States and Saudi Arabia, became a central conduit for support to the Afghan mujahideen. The ISI coordinated the distribution of funds, arms, and training to various insurgent groups fighting Soviet forces. This period solidified Pakistan’s role as a key player in Afghan affairs.
In his book Ghost War written by author Steve Coll writes, “The ISI’s task was to funnel billions of dollars in CIA and Saudi funds to the Afghan mujahideen, a role it carried out with ruthless efficiency.” As a result, Pakistan benefited from billions of dollars in aid but also radicalised its own society in the process under President Zia ul Haq.
"You can't keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbors." – Hillary Clinton (2011).
Soviet withdrawal and the rise of the Taliban
In the early 1990s, following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Pakistan shifted its support to the Taliban, seeking a stable and friendly regime in Kabul that would provide strategic depth against India. After a prolonged civil war between the various warlords, the Taliban with the ISI’s backing captured Kabul in 1996. Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani journalist and author, noted that “between 1994 and 1999, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan” alongside the Taliban.
From 1996 to 2001, Afghanistan which was once a progressive Islamic country that had Hindus and Sikhs as its minorities time travelled to the past. The Taliban imposed the strictest form of Islamic Law, the Sharia with women facing the brunt. Between 1994 and 2001, the Taliban were effectively a proxy of Pakistan. Their rise to power in Kabul was made possible by direct ISI support.
Post 9/11
However, after the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan officially allied with the United States in the War on Terror. However, reports and analyses indicate that powerful elements within the ISI continued to provide support to the Taliban and associated groups, undermining efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. A 2010 report by the London School of Economics suggested that the ISI maintained extensive links with the Taliban, including involvement in strategic decision-making.
Bruce Riedel one of the foremost American experts on national security in his book, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad writes, “Pakistan is adept at playing a double game, publicly supporting U.S. counterterrorism efforts while covertly aiding the Taliban.”
"The return of the Taliban marks both a strategic win and a headache for Pakistan, as it faces the consequences of its own policies." – International Crisis Group.
Recent Developments post US withdrawal
The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021 was perceived by some analysts as a strategic victory for Pakistan, given its historical ties to the group. However, this development did not pan out the wanted. In the last few months, the dream of having a strategic backyard has backfired leading to security threats the leaders and particularly the military did not see coming.
According to the International Crisis Group an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation committed to preventing and resolving deadly conflict, “The return of the Taliban marks both a strategic win and a headache for Pakistan, as it faces the consequences of its own policies.”
According to Husain Haqqani, a former Pakistani journalist, academic, political activist, and former ambassador of Pakistan to Sri Lanka and the United States in his book Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, “For decades, Pakistan has nurtured and shielded the Taliban as a strategic asset, and their victory in 2021 reflects Islamabad’s long-term objectives in the region.”
Conclusion
Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the security landscape in Pakistan has deteriorated, particularly due to the resurgence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban. The TTP has intensified its insurgency against the Pakistani state, leading to a significant increase in attacks on security forces and civilians. In December 2024, Pakistan conducted airstrikes targeting suspected TTP hideouts in Afghanistan’s Paktika province, dismantling a training facility and eliminating several insurgents. These strikes indicate Pakistan’s willingness to extend its military operations beyond its borders to counter the TTP threat.
But the fact remains, no matter how many airstrikes Pakistan carry out, it will find it very difficult to fight a force that is renowned for its asymmetrical warfare. Already the Army which is the principal ruler of Pakistan has suffered a lot of causality with not only the TTP attacking them but also facing direct threats from the Baluch Liberation Army (BLA) which is seeking an independent Baluchistan.
The TTP, an umbrella organization of various militant groups, has historically sought to overthrow the Pakistani government to establish its strict interpretation of Islamic law. Following the Afghan Taliban’s takeover, the TTP found renewed strength and sanctuary across the border, enabling it to regroup and escalate its operations within Pakistan. Also, Pakistan has not done itself any favours as they have always viewed the Taliban as its proxy and only saw them as a means to their end. However, this proxy has now crossed the Durand Line and has entered Pakistan and like a python, it is slowly constricting and burying its fangs.
References:
- “Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan” by Steve Coll provides an in-depth examination of the covert operations and the intricate dynamics between the U.S., Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
- “Faith, Unity, Discipline: The Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan” by Hein Kiessling offers a comprehensive history of the ISI, detailing its operations and influence in regional politics.
- “Pakistan’s Hard Policy Choices in Afghanistan” by the International Crisis Group analyzes Pakistan’s strategic interests and the challenges it faces in Afghanistan.
Balaji is a freelance writer with an MA in History and Political science and has published articles on defence and strategic affairs and book reviews. He tweets @LaxmanShriram78. Views expressed are the author’s own.
Nandhini T 
Aayush Pal 
Shrivara Mahajan