- India’s nuclear tests, its principled position on them and the diplomatic ship that sailed in those unnerving stormy seas cannot be without the excellent backup and work of the Indian intelligence agencies.
- It was due to R&AW that the first test and its responses made by the Indian government led to a turbulent but successful decade till the next test in the 90s.
- The second nuclear test under PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee stunned the world as India followed and continued to rely on the intelligence inputs of the intelligence community in India.
India has become the excuse for every crisis it seems. Any type of conflict today and the world cannot come to a parley without India’s involvement. India is present in two important groups which shows its extensive engagement with both Russia and its allies and the West. India has learnt from its history that such an important position comes with responsibility and optimum intelligence that is regarded as extremely crucial to India’s rise as a power in today’s times. From nuclear to other important capabilities, India relies on its own national interest preserved with important work from all agencies involved.
India enters an Era where geopolitical tensions are on the rise again. The kind which can be best described as chaotic at best for any world order to sustain or start over. During these times, defence expenditures have increased multifold to cater for the growing demands of Power politics within nations. The Ukraine crisis has made sure that countries re-look at their strategy and approach their capabilities in multiple ways of deterrence. Quite naturally, countries outside the group of the Global North will aim to look up these aspects as well. War, unfortunately for those that crave peace is inevitable and it will hit us soon in the next few decades, if not months.
India enters this new Era with a different perspective in mind and with a different approach to engagement in international relations. Most of it is mapping old relations that were maintained by previous regimes but also by their own understanding under the current government. The Modi government has been proactive in its optical objectives towards international organizations and their demands geopolitically as well as economically. Today, India is considered an unofficial representative and voice of the global South as well as a promoter of diversity in the very same international organisations. India doesn’t mince itself when it talks of an ‘Era of no war’. India is serious and often disappointed by the lack of Global acceptance of it.
But as history suggests, India did not land in this role without its trials and tribulations and betrayals. India had to face a deep-rooted suspicion by the West due to its closeness to the Soviet Union. In that process, the West traded its partnerships with both Pakistan and China for their own benefit which gravely impacted India and its rise to prominence. India had hoped that it would get some good, moral support as it maintained a democracy despite the volatile South Asian region and the lack of democratic values in its neighbourhood. But alas, the West wasn’t interested in any of that and played its ‘Great Game’ to meddle in the affairs of this region. From its tacit support to Pakistan to putting sanctions on India, the US and even Europe had failed multiple times to assure India of an unbiased assessment in the United Nations and elsewhere. From time to time, India had to rely on the Soviets for helping them out in such situations.
The Soviet itself was not without its problems. During the Sino-India War, the Soviets did not wholeheartedly support India and even later could not match India’s demands at times. It had been the most important ally despite all of these drawbacks but was stuck in its own Cold War with the United States and was often reluctant to take a side between India and China. Even though the Soviet Union ended, the current Russian Federation still partly follows this type of understanding today. Although many dynamics have changed, India’s problems with China are something that the Russians cannot answer completely and offers to be the negotiator only.
The Soviet itself was not without its problems. During the Sino-India War, the Soviets did not wholeheartedly support India and even later could not match India's demands at times.
In such testing times that extend from the past to this point, India had to boldly assert itself and make their own strategy to handle an unfriendly neighbourhood which is continued to this day, further complicated than before. India soon understood that not only is the United Nations Permanent Five not suitable to always support India but also, they wish to use India for their own benefit. Amidst the realisation around this, India’s ethos has been to not only become an alternative platform for those without a voice but become an important contender for the developing and the developed world. Much of the credit goes to India’s wise decisions around its diplomacy and the role of various agencies that gave the correct input which made India make important decisions that not only addressed the problem but made sure the consequences would be in their best interest. And so, that is where we come to the topic and the role of one of India’s premier intelligence organs, the Research and Analysis Wing or known as ‘RAW’ and its influence on our nuclear tests.
The Legacy of R.N. Kao and R&AW’s Importance with Pokhran-1
If India’s diplomacy and other defining moments need someone to give important recognition for their constant, attentive and informed answers to difficult questions asked around the world, the name RAW comes into play. Research & Analysis Wing ( RAW ) was started by one of India’s best strategic minds and a well-respected bureaucrat, Rameshwar Nath Kao. Born On the 10th of May, 1918, Rameshwar Nath Kao was born to a Kashmiri Pandit family in Benaras, UP. One of the foremost intelligence officers, he was instrumental in forming the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW). He was also the Secretary of Research in the Cabinet and served as a personal advisor to both Nehru and Rajiv Gandhi.
Under Indira Gandhi’s tenure as the Prime Minister, Kao was tasked to build a premier intelligence agency that can tackle external threats while the Intelligence Bureau (IB) was put to tackle domestic issues. He started the Research & Analysis Wing to tackle this issue. Over the years, Kao also visited Ghana on the orders of Nehru to help Kwame Nkrumah in setting up an intelligence and security organisation. He even received a letter of recommendation from Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai for helping the Chinese to probe threats on his life. Under his guidance, R&AW was credited for getting important intelligence regarding the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War as well as the merger of Sikkim in 1975.
It was after this war that India initiated the first nuclear test under Indira Gandhi. R&AW was responsible for working with the scientists as well as a few members of the Army to complete ‘Operation Smiling Buddha’. Unlike her father, Indira Gandhi was not negatively opinionated towards nuclear tests. Despite reluctance, she gave the go-ahead and on the 18th of May, 1974, Raja Ramana the chairman of the ‘Atomic Energy Commission Chairman’ led[1] the team of scientists and successfully conducted tests. This test was done in secret because there was actionable intel from intelligence agencies that the P5[2] and the Nuclear Suppliers Group would try to prevent them from continuing these tests. The history behind these tests was down to the war with China and their announcement of having nuclear status in the 60s. R&AW also had intelligence around Pakistan and was constantly tracking the stages of Pakistan’s strategy around centrifuges in 1970. Around the 1980s, R&AW monitored Pakistan’s decision to make an explosive bomb and in the 90s, it had evidence that Chinese nuclear scientists were present in Pakistan and assisting the Pakistani regime to help their nuclear program.
A passage from an article from The Diplomat accounts for R&AW’s actions in monitoring Pakistan.
The trail of documents begins with a Joint Intelligence Committee Report (dated February 24, 1976) titled “Pakistan’s Capability[3] to Produce Nuclear Weapons.” This paper was an update to a JIC Paper from March 1975. It assessed that in the absence of assistance for plutonium-239 or uranium-235, “Pakistan could not be in a position to explode a nuclear device at least for four years from now.”
It was due to R&AW that the first test and its responses made by the Indian government led to a turbulent but successful decade till the next test in the 90s.
Moreover, in 1976, diplomatic cables from the Indian Embassy in Ottawa revealed that India was becoming aware of Chinese scientists’ presence in Pakistan. A Hungarian diplomat informed an Indian diplomat in Ottawa that the Canadian government was aware that Chinese scientists[4] were being given access to facilities with Canadian material in Pakistan, despite the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP-I) coming under IAEA safeguards.
By September 1977, India’s external intelligence Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) had begun to report on Pakistan’s plans in detail, issuing a report called “Pakistan — Clandestine Purchase of Nuclear Equipment and Materials.” Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission[5] (PAEC) had set up a purchasing channel in Bonn, Germany, and Abdul Waheed, a cousin of General Zia-ul-Haq, oversaw the funds for these clandestine contracts. $11 million was already spent by Pakistan in Western Europe on plutonium technology, including the purchase of a “shearer” for use in its reprocessing facility.
The Pakistan explosive device program was coming together and, in 1981, a “Monthly Report” from the Indian Embassy in Islamabad warned New Delhi that “it is very likely that Pakistan will succeed in exploding a nuclear device, possibly this year.” The embassy also informed that “Zia was extremely keen to explode the nuclear device at the earliest possible.”
It was due to R&AW that the first test and its responses made by the Indian government led to a turbulent but successful decade till the next test in the 90s.
Pokhran-2
The second nuclear test under PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee stunned the world as India followed and continued to rely on the intelligence inputs of the intelligence community in India.
On 11th May 1998, India conducted nuclear tests which was the second instance of nuclear testing by the nation. This particular test helped India achieve the capability to build fission and thermonuclear weapons. India also developed a computer simulation capability that helps predict the yields of nuclear explosives. The codename of this operation was ‘Operation Shakti’ and it was conducted over a series of three days. On 13th May, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared India as a ‘nuclear state’. The importance of these tests was such that the world reacted mostly negatively. The US put economic sanctions while China and the United Nations condemned and stated the ‘seriousness of these nuclear tests’.
A well-known fact was that American satellites were constantly tracking and viewing our landmass from space. The US had successfully pressured India before in 1995 so it made a meticulous plan to conduct those tests without raising any attention to the West. The US even tried to convince India to join the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as well as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite the pressure by US President Bill Clinton, India remained defiant, just like in the past since it did not serve their national interest as well as their strategic policy of deterrence. This is nothing short of a culmination of important intelligence which was supplied by both IB and R&AW that made sure India successfully performs nuclear tests in secret for the second time.
The most predictable and noisy reaction came from Pakistan as it considered a start of a ‘nuclear arms race’ in South Asia. Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif ordered his administration to conduct their own tests which they did on 28th May 1998 as Chagai-1 and Chagai – 2 on 30th May. When they received backlash, they blamed India for their own nuclear tests.
Late PM, Vajpayee’s bold action with the decisive leadership of numerous scientists especially Dr Abdul Kalam made this happen as India shocked the world again for the second time. The PM was explicit as he succinctly said “Our intentions were, are, and will always be peaceful but we do not want to cover our action with a veil of needless ambiguity. To safeguard our national interest, to serve the needs of national security, and to reject the notion that it is the security of only some in the world that was important and all others were irrelevant, we had to boldly and resolutely assert the autonomy of our decision making.“
This day is also celebrated as National Technology Day and many scientists are awarded on this day for their contributions to science and technology.
Conclusion
India’s nuclear tests, its principled position on them and the diplomatic ship that sailed in those unnerving stormy seas cannot be without the excellent backup and work the intelligence agencies do on a 24-hour and 365-day basis. These people work without any hesitation for the nation and for furthering our cause in these contesting times. Religious barriers blur as well as other factors that politicians fight on because of these people who could have chosen to live their lives like us but decided to take these tasks for the sake of the country.
(Anhad Jakhmola is a postgraduate scholar in international relations. He has his undergraduate degree in history and is pursuing his PhD in Defence and Strategic Studies. He is a columnist for many portals and is a keen public speaker in debates and discussions. Views expressed are author’s own)
References:
[1] “Operation Smiling Buddha: The story of India’s first nuclear test at Pokhran in 1974”, The Indian Express, 2023.
[2] “Operation Smiling Buddha: The story of India’s first nuclear test at Pokhran in 1974”, The Indian Express, 2023.
[3] Vivek Prahladan, “Declassified: How India Tracked Pakistan’s Development of a Nuclear Device” The Diplomat, 2017.
[4] Vivek Prahladan, “Declassified: How India Tracked Pakistan’s Development of a Nuclear Device” The Diplomat, 2017.
[5] Vivek Prahladan, “Declassified: How India Tracked Pakistan’s Development of a Nuclear Device” The Diplomat, 2017.
Aayush Pal 
Balaji Subramanian