Mob Rule and Moral Collapse: Bangladesh’s Broken Transition

• Bangladesh under Yunus is faced with economic breakdown, joblessness, and mob lynchings, random arrests, and sectarian violence.
• The minorities, especially the Hindus, were targeted in more than 2,010 attacks in 45 districts, with temple desecrations and killings of AL supporters reported from across the country.
• This violence endangers the democratic transition in Bangladesh, and it may end up in military intervention or the domination of the Islamists.

The present crisis in Bangladesh can be traced back to the July upheaval of 2024, when student demonstrations over job quotas escalated into a nationwide protest against Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s administration. The brutal crackdown, dubbed the July Massacre, killed nearly 1,400 protesters. This led to the resignation of Hasina on August 5, 2024, and her escape to India. Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus took over as the head of the interim government with the backing of the military, and he promised to bring about reforms and elections. Still, violence broke out as soon as Hasina was ousted. Leaders of Awami League (AL) and its affiliates were targeted despite her ouster. Over 1,494 sculptures were vandalised, homes of AL leaders were set ablaze, and even police stations were attacked. The riots led to the deaths of at least 119 on the resignation day alone.

The minorities, especially the Hindus, were targeted in more than 2,010 attacks in 45 districts, with temple desecrations and killings of AL supporters reported from across the country. The targeting of AL leaders and supporters was aggravated by Islamist rhetoric accusing India of supporting Hasina. The wave of violence resembled the communal violence that Bangladesh witnessed in 2001 and 2013, during the unrest orchestrated by the BNP-Jamaat combine.​ 

The December 2025 unrest was triggered by the death of the Inqilab Moncho convenor, Sharif Osman bin Hadi, which sparked mobs to burn media offices in Karwan Bazar in Dhaka, including the Daily Star and Prothom Alo, the two most popular English and Bengali dailies. Journalists were attacked, and at least 25 of them were freed after hours of confinement; both outlets cancelled the Friday edition, bringing their operations to a halt.

In Chattogram, demonstrators rioted in front of the Indian Assistant High Commission, and in Rajshahi, an Awami League office was razed by a bulldozer. The house of former mayor ABM Mohiuddin Chowdhury was burnt. ​ This is a repeat of previous media attacks on Hasina, such as ATN Bangla, Ekattor TV, and Somoy TV vandalism in August 2024, charged with allegations of pro-AL-style bias. Cultural property such as Chhayanout was burnt down, and this highlighted a trend where revolutionary zeal transforms into mob lawlessness against the remnants of the former regime. ​ 

Bangladesh under Yunus is faced with economic breakdown, joblessness, and mob lynchings, random arrests, and sectarian violence. More than 400 former AL officials have been charged with 1,170 politicised cases, courts have denied bail, and courts have approved crossfire killings – 44 police have been indemnified in the first year of Yunus. Independence of the judiciary has been lost, which has led to extra-judicial measures. 

Operation Devil Hunt, initiated in February 2025, was meant to contain destabilisers, although it did not help to contain anarchy. Fracturing opposition politics can be seen through the clashes between BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, who were once anti-Hasina allies, over the timing and the influence of the election. BNP advocates an early election to bring back Khaleda Zia into power; Jamaat wants postponements to play on the anti-secular emotions in the country. Yunus has ordered polls on February 12, 2026, but it will lack credibility without the participation of the Awami League, the largest party in Bangladesh. 

The polarised politics further deteriorated in November 2025 due to the death sentence handed to Sheikh Hasina by a Bangladeshi court over ‘crimes against humanity’ during the 2024 crackdown. Reforms are paralysed in anticipation of stability, and Yunus is failing to maintain cohesion in the country. In the absence of an inclusive conversation between AL, BNP, and Jamaat, the elections will either be boycotted or the elections will be marred by claims of fraud, a repeat of the controversial elections of 2018 and 2024.

This violence endangers the democratic transition in Bangladesh, and it may end up in military intervention or the domination of the Islamists. Economic decline after 2024 has been drastic. Beximco and other factories were burned down. Locally, anti-India demonstrations have created tension in relationships, which is caused by the exile of Hasina. Hindus and Ahmadis continue to face threats of constant danger, with hundreds of cases reported so far, yet the government has been reluctant to arrest the culprits. Targeting journalists undermines the free press that is essential in fair elections. Reform in the judiciary, protection of the minorities, and multi-party concurrence are the only forms of stability that will be achieved in Bangladesh, so that the country will not be in its persistent turmoil. 

References:

• _{https://ddnews.gov.in/en/media-offices-torched-journalists-targeted-uneasy-calm-in-dhaka-after-night-of-violent-riot-following-osman-hadis-death/} 
• _{https://www.albd.org/articles/news/41619/Bangladesh%E2%80%99s-Crisis-Deepens-in-2025:-A-Nation-in-Decline} 
• _{https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/5/timeline-sheikh-hasinas-reign-ends-after-15-years} 
• _{https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/17/asia/bangladesh-sheikh-hasina-verdict-intl-hnk} 
• _{https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/what-is-behind-political-tension-roiling-bangladesh-2025-05-27/} 
• _{https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/from-uprising-to-uncertainty-bangladeshs-fragile-transition-to-stability/} 
• _{https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/17/tension-high-as-bangladesh-tribunal-convicts-ex-pm-hasina}

Shrivara Mahajan

Shrivara Mahajan is pursuing an International Relations major with a minor in Public Policy at OP Jindal Global University. He is a Senior Intern at the Jindal Centre for the Global South and has priorly interned with The Spread Smile Foundation. Views expressed are the author’s own.