- Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defence pact on 17 September, formalising decades of military cooperation but leaving operational and nuclear specifics intentionally vague.
- The timing reflects Gulf states’ shifting security concerns and Pakistan’s search for financial, strategic, and diplomatic leverage amid economic fragility.
- For India, risks include Saudi energy leverage, enhanced Pakistani military readiness, nuclear ambiguity, and diplomatic pressure during potential crises.
- India must pursue diplomatic outreach, regional confidence-building, and stronger Gulf partnerships to protect its interests while avoiding escalation.
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement on 17 September, which declares that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.” The text released by both sides and widely reported contains sweeping language that resembles collective-defence pledges, raising immediate questions about deterrence, nuclear politics, and regional signalling.
To understand what has changed and why India should pay attention, we must separate three layers: the pact’s wording (what it promises), the historical Kingdom of Saudi Arabia(KSA)-Pakistan relationship (what it builds on), and the geopolitical moment that made KSA and Pakistan formalise ties now. The historical layer is where India’s immediate strategic calculation begins.
From Longstanding Ties to Formal Pact
KSA–Pakistan’s defence cooperation is not a new development. Since the 1960s, Pakistan has been a principal military partner to the Kingdom: training Saudi recruits, deploying contingents to protect holy sites, running joint exercises and supplying equipment from Pakistan’s ordnance factories. Institutional agreements, a Mutual Cooperation Program (1967), a Protocol Agreement (1979) and an Armed Forces Organisation Agreement in the 1980s created enduring channels of training, intelligence sharing and force presence. The Saudi–Pak Defence Partnership: Past and Present document provides details of repeated high-level visits, medals awarded to visiting chiefs, and dozens of joint drills across army, navy and air force lines. In short, the pact largely formalises an intense and institutionalised partnership rather than inventing it.
That history explains why KSA and Pakistan could move quickly from courtesies and exercises to a formal mutual-defence arrangement: the infrastructure, advisers, training pipelines, and operational familiarity already exist. But prior practice also shows limits: Pakistan in the past has resisted direct deployment decisions for political reasons, and many arrangements have remained semi-secret and calibrated to political constraints.
What the Pact Promises — and What It Leaves Unsaid
Public statements highlight the mutual-defence clause and a vow to strengthen “joint deterrence against any aggression.” However, the agreement’s public summaries leave key operational questions unanswered: what constitutes “aggression,” what decision-making procedures apply, whether any clause binds nuclear posture, and whether forces will be stationed or merely trained and advised. Multiple media reports and official statements confirm the headline language but also note that specifics have not been fully disclosed.
That ambiguity has spawned speculation. Some commentators have asked whether Pakistan’s nuclear capability could formally or informally become an umbrella for KSA’s security. Senior analysts counsel caution: the pact’s wording echoes NATO-style assurances but does not necessarily create a legally clear “nuclear umbrella.” Experts point out that linking a formal security guarantee to nuclear deployment would carry enormous escalation risks and diplomatic consequences, which both countries would likely prefer to avoid making explicit.
Why Now? The Strategic Context
The pact arrives amid a volatile regional moment. Gulf states are reassessing security partnerships as the reliability of traditional endorsers appears more fluid and as cross-regional crises, including strikes and proxy fights, raise anxieties in KSA. For Pakistan, a formal alliance offers financial, strategic and prestige dividends: deeper Saudi aid and investment at a time of economic fragility, and an elevated diplomatic role as a security partner to an influential Arab state. Western and regional reporting places the deal within this context of shifting Gulf security calculations.
Implications for India: Near- and Mid-Term
First, diplomatic signalling. India has invested heavily in a recent reset with KSA, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit in April 2025 that expanded energy, trade and defence cooperation, and India will now have to reconcile closer India–Saudi economic ties with a KSA policy that has formalised security ties with Pakistan. India’s Ministry of External Affairs has publicly said it will study the pact’s implications and remain committed to protecting India’s national interests. That measured response indicates India will balance commercial ties with strategic caution.
Second, rhetorical space for Pakistan. The pact allows KSA to elevate Pakistan’s security position rhetorically. In crisis scenarios, opponents could attempt to frame strikes against Pakistan as broader regional aggression, a framing India must guard against diplomatically. India’s choices will include intensified diplomacy with KSA, clearer articulation of red lines, and closer intelligence and defence cooperation with Gulf partners to prevent misunderstandings.
Third, nuclear politics. Any hint that Pakistan’s nuclear capability is now convertible into a Saudi deterrent would be a major worry for India and for global non-proliferation regimes. For now, authoritative analysis warns that such a literal “nuclear umbrella” is speculative; both KSA and Pakistan appear to have left that door intentionally vague. Indian policy should press for transparency and confidence-building in the region to avoid accidental escalations.
Fourthly, domestic politics and optics. In India, the pact has already been seized upon by political opponents as a foreign-policy setback; such domestic debate will shape India’s public posture and could constrain the government’s diplomatic flexibility.
KSA’s Potential Role in an India–Pakistan War
If there were to be a conflict between Pakistan and India, the new defence agreement between KSA and Pakistan could have important strategic implications, having the potential to affect the balance of power both directly and indirectly. Among the most immediate levers at KSA’s disposal is its financial and energy clout. India imports almost 20% of its crude oil from KSA and thus would be susceptible to being cut off. In a war scenario, KSA can reduce or cut oil exports to India while, at the same time, providing concessional supplies or outright monetary aid to Pakistan. This act will test the economic strength of India, while giving Pakistan much-needed budgetary relief, allowing it to continue military action with reduced pressure on its own funds.
Apart from the economic factor, the defence agreement creates opportunities for further military cooperation. KSA has traditionally subsidised elements of Pakistan’s defence infrastructure, and this new deal could potentially have those contributions extended through arms acquisition assistance, training programs, or joint military exercises. Although this does not necessarily mean Saudi troop deployment on the battlefield, the indirect consequence of that support would be to enhance Pakistan’s combat readiness, quietly tilting the balance in its direction.
The agreement also adds a depth of strategic vagueness with nuclear undertones. By linking its own stockpile status to Pakistan’s, KSA sends an implicit message of deterrence without activating any real nuclear reserves. Such vagueness may also place external pressure on India, underlining the possibility of having international players call for premature de-escalation of tensions. Effectively, the sense of a wider, indirect nuclear context would not only affect India’s strategic equation but also the diplomatic context of the conflict.
Ultimately, the agreement provides a platform for KSA to shape the narrative on multiple fronts. Through channels such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Gulf-based media, Riyadh could frame the conflict in humanitarian or religious terms, thereby constraining India’s diplomatic manoeuvrability. This narrative leverage could make it more challenging for New Delhi to maintain international understanding or secure neutral stances from key global actors during hostilities, indirectly amplifying Pakistan’s strategic space.
Together, the KSA-Pakistan defence agreement is not just symbolic but introduces complex pressures that may shape both the economic and strategic landscape for India. Even if Saudi Arabia is not actively engaged in combat, its role may be significant, demonstrating how contemporary wars increasingly depend as much on indirect levers of power as on battlefield dynamics.
Diplomatic and Strategic Priorities for India
Following the KSA-Pakistan defence pact, India’s first task at hand should be to take diplomatic initiative with the KSA itself to settle the terms of operation of the accord. This should be done not as a confrontational effort but as a proactive endeavour to reassert the strength of Indo–Saudi ties in areas of vital importance like energy security, investment, and counter-terror collaboration. The Strategic Partnership Council established during the April high-level exchanges offers a convenient institutional vehicle for such a discussion. Citing existing agreements and shared economic interests, India can assure that the accord with Pakistan would not be at the expense of jeopardising the trajectory of its own partnership with KSA, which has been developing increasingly over the past ten years.
At the same time, India also needs to expand the debate beyond bilateral assurances. The risk of nuclear misfire or miscalculation in the event of a future crisis in South Asia with the involvement of external great powers necessitates immediate regional and international debate on nuclear-risk reduction and crisis management. Drawing in Gulf partners and major powers to evolve such norms would not only protect Indian interests but also position India as a serious stakeholder demanding stability within a more integrated West Asia–South Asia security complex.
In conclusion, India should increase its own security and intelligence cooperation with the Gulf states, not as a tit-for-tat response to the KSA-Pakistan move. Instead, it has to address shared concerns on common issues of terrorism, maritime security, and the spread of advanced weapon systems. By presenting Indian actions in the context of common problems and mutual protection, rather than being limited to competition, India can establish its strategic presence in the region as well as its image as a long-term-thinking partner.
In all, these measures would enable India to react to the changed geopolitics rationally, safeguarding its vital interests, consolidating its regional alliances, and limiting space for misadventure in any looming crisis with Pakistan and its foreign backers.
Tejashree P V holds a Master’s degree in English Literature from IGNOU and a Bachelor’s degree in Journalism, English, and History from Vivekananda Degree College. A UPSC aspirant, she has a keen interest in international affairs, geopolitics, and policy.
Aayush Pal 
John T Guite and Vinay N Bhushan 
Balaji Subramanian