The Strait of Hormuz Doctrine Gap: Why India Needs a Joint Warfare Framework for Energy Chokepoint Defence

• India imports more than 85 per cent of its crude oil requirements, while a substantial share of its energy supplies remains linked to the Gulf region. Yet despite these ambitions, India lacks a clearly articulated joint warfare doctrine specifically designed for energy chokepoint defence.
• The challenge is therefore not merely one of naval presence. It requires integrated military planning across domains.
• Yet doctrine has not evolved at the same pace as capability. India possesses many of the instruments necessary to protect critical sea lanes but lacks an integrated framework defining how these assets would be employed during a prolonged energy security crisis.
• The Strait of Hormuz has exposed a critical gap in India’s strategic architecture. Closing that gap will require more than additional ships or larger reserves. It will require a doctrine that recognises a simple but often overlooked truth: in the twenty-first century, securing energy flows is no longer a support function of national security; it is national security itself.

Back in January 1991, as everyone was glued to news about Operation Desert Storm, something else had military planners in Washington and Tokyo worried, and it wasn’t missiles or tanks, but oil tankers. Even before the first shot was fired, commanders knew that whoever controlled maritime energy routes could shape the outcome of the war just as much as any ground battle. That’s a lesson nobody has forgotten. You can fight on land, in the air, or online, but the lifeblood of every modern economy still moves by sea.

Maritime chokepoints have always been game-changers in military history. Think back to the British Empire and the Suez Canal, or the Allies strangling Japan’s supply lines in World War II. The real power often came down to who could keep the shipping lanes open. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s seminal thesis on sea power rested on a simple proposition: nations that control critical maritime routes shape the global balance of power.

Fast forward to today, and the Strait of Hormuz plays that same pivotal role. Only now, these chokepoints are even more complicated. They’re not just about military strength; they mix in economic security and the realities of global supply chains. If a missile hits a tanker in the Gulf, it doesn’t just matter in the region. Oil prices in India jump, factories in East Asia might pause production, and markets across Europe twitch before lunchtime. If you want to protect these lifelines, you need a much broader approach. It’s not just a navy problem anymore; it’s national security, through and through.

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz keeps hammering that point home. Almost 20% of the world’s oil trade squeezes through that narrow passage. What used to be a commercial route has become a geopolitical fault line. When trouble hits Hormuz, energy markets shake, and countries that depend on imports see just how exposed they are. For India, this isn’t a distant worry; it’s right at the heart of its economic future.

India imports more than 85 per cent of its crude oil requirements, while a substantial share of its energy supplies remains linked to the Gulf region.^[1] Although recent diversification efforts have reduced dependence on Hormuz-bound supplies, the strait continues to hold critical significance for India’s energy security and economic stability. At the same time, India increasingly projects itself as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), with expanding responsibilities extending from anti-piracy operations to humanitarian assistance and maritime domain awareness. Yet despite these ambitions, India lacks a clearly articulated joint warfare doctrine specifically designed for energy chokepoint defence.

This doctrinal gap is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.

The strategic significance of chokepoints is not new. From the Suez Canal and Bab-el-Mandeb to the Strait of Malacca, maritime bottlenecks have historically influenced the rise and fall of great powers. However, the Strait of Hormuz presents a uniquely complex challenge. Unlike traditional sea lane security missions focused on piracy or non-state threats, Hormuz represents a contested operational environment where state actors possess the capability to disrupt global energy flows through mines, drones, anti-ship missiles, swarm attacks, cyber operations, and grey-zone coercion.

The challenge is therefore not merely one of naval presence. It requires integrated military planning across domains.

Recent strategic developments indicate that policymakers are beginning to recognise the gravity of the issue. The Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New Delhi in May 2026 highlighted maritime security and energy resilience as key priorities, with participating nations announcing new initiatives aimed at securing critical supply chains and ensuring uninterrupted commercial flows.^[2] However, strategic signalling, while important, is not a substitute for operational doctrine. The distance between declaratory policy and executable military frameworks remains considerable.

The absence of a dedicated joint doctrine creates several vulnerabilities.

First, there remains ambiguity regarding command-and-control arrangements during a major maritime energy disruption. While India’s integrated theatre reform process has progressed, it is unclear how naval, air, cyber, space, and logistics assets would be synchronised during a sustained chokepoint crisis. Would the response primarily remain a naval responsibility, or would it trigger a broader joint operational framework involving multiple services and ministries?

Second, India lacks publicly articulated contingency mechanisms linking military responses with energy security planning. Strategic petroleum reserves can provide temporary relief, but reserves buy time rather than solve access problems. In a prolonged disruption scenario, safeguarding shipping routes becomes as important as managing inventories.

Third, the growing convergence between economic security and national security demands institutional adaptation. Energy flows are no longer merely commercial concerns; they have become strategic assets whose disruption can affect inflation, industrial production, military readiness, and broader national resilience.

Conceptual framework developed by the author based on international maritime security models and India’s evolving joint warfare architecture.

Other countries offer useful lessons.

The United States-led International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), established in 2019, was designed specifically to protect freedom of navigation and reassure commercial shipping in the Gulf region. While India may neither desire nor require a replica of the IMSC model, its emphasis on multinational coordination, persistent surveillance, intelligence-sharing, and scalable maritime security operations offers valuable insights. The framework recognises a fundamental reality: chokepoint security is not an episodic task but a continuous operational mission.

Japan presents another instructive case. Despite constitutional constraints on military operations, Tokyo has spent years integrating energy security considerations into its national security planning.^[3] Successive governments have combined strategic petroleum reserves, diversified sourcing, maritime surveillance deployments, and close coordination with partners to mitigate vulnerabilities arising from Hormuz dependence. The recent Hormuz crisis further highlighted how seriously Tokyo views the linkage between maritime security and energy resilience.

India possesses many of the building blocks necessary to develop a comparable framework.

The Indian Navy today operates as a credible blue-water force with expanding reach across the Western Indian Ocean. Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) has strengthened maritime domain awareness.^[4] Long-range maritime patrol aircraft, satellite surveillance capabilities, mission-based deployments, and logistics agreements with partner nations have significantly enhanced India’s operational flexibility. Yet these capabilities remain dispersed across multiple frameworks rather than integrated within a dedicated energy chokepoint defence doctrine.

The urgency of developing such a doctrine stems not only from India’s vulnerabilities but also from its growing strategic ambitions.

For much of its post-independence history, India’s defence planning remained primarily continental in orientation. The principal military challenges emanated from land borders, directing attention toward the northern and western frontiers. Today, however, India’s strategic geography is undergoing a profound transformation.

Nearly 95 per cent of India’s trade by volume and over 70 per cent by value moves through the maritime domain.^[5] India’s overseas energy dependence continues to grow, while the country’s economic interests increasingly extend across the wider Indian Ocean Region. Simultaneously, New Delhi’s strategic initiatives from SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) to the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative reflect an aspiration to shape the maritime order rather than merely participate in it.

The Indian Navy’s operational footprint has expanded correspondingly. Mission-based deployments now stretch from the Gulf of Aden to the Malacca Strait. The Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region has enhanced maritime domain awareness. Logistics agreements with countries such as the United States, France, Australia, Singapore, Japan, and others have significantly increased operational reach.

Yet doctrine has not evolved at the same pace as capability. India possesses many of the instruments necessary to protect critical sea lanes but lacks an integrated framework defining how these assets would be employed during a prolonged energy security crisis. In strategic terms, this represents a classic case of capability outrunning doctrine.

What, then, should such a doctrine include?

The first requirement is conceptual clarity. The Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) should lead the development of an India Joint Chokepoint Security Doctrine that explicitly identifies energy corridors as strategic assets requiring integrated protection.

Second, the doctrine should establish predefined joint operational structures for chokepoint contingencies. These structures must incorporate naval escort operations, maritime air power, cyber defence, space-based surveillance, intelligence fusion, and logistics coordination under a unified command framework.

Third, India should institutionalise regular joint exercises focused specifically on energy route disruption scenarios. Existing exercises frequently address conventional maritime security challenges, but dedicated simulations involving tanker escorts, mine countermeasures, drone threats, and commercial shipping protection remain limited.

Fourth, stronger civil-military integration is essential. The Ministries of Defence, External Affairs, Petroleum and Natural Gas, Shipping, and Finance should participate in periodic whole-of-government contingency planning exercises. Energy security crises do not respect bureaucratic boundaries; neither should preparedness mechanisms.

Finally, India should leverage emerging minilateral platforms such as the Quad to develop shared frameworks for maritime energy resilience. Collaborative maritime domain awareness, coordinated responses to shipping disruptions, and interoperability among partner navies could significantly enhance deterrence and crisis management capabilities.

The central issue is not whether another Hormuz crisis will occur. Maritime history suggests that strategic chokepoints will remain recurring arenas of competition and coercion. The more important question is whether India intends to approach such crises reactively or doctrinally.

As India’s economic growth, energy demand, and geopolitical responsibilities continue to expand, the country’s security calculus must evolve accordingly. The age when energy security could be treated as a purely economic concern has passed. Today, the tanker and the warship are inseparable elements of national power.

The Strait of Hormuz has exposed a critical gap in India’s strategic architecture. Closing that gap will require more than additional ships or larger reserves. It will require a doctrine that recognises a simple but often overlooked truth: in the twenty-first century, securing energy flows is no longer a support function of national security, it is national security itself.

^[1] Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, “India’s Oil and Gas Crisis a Wake-up Call for Transport Electrification”, IEEFA, https://ieefa.org/resources/indias-oil-and-gas-crisis-wake-call-transport-electrification.

^[2] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Fact Sheet: Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New Delhi, May 2026”, May 2026, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41234/Factsheet_Quad_Foreign_Ministers_Meeting_in_New_Delhi_May_2026.

^[3] Erin Sikorsky and Tom Ellison, “Protecting Japan’s National Security with Renewable Energy”, Council on Strategic Risks, 20 August 2025, https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2025/08/20/protecting-japans-national-security-with-renewable-energy/.

^[4] “Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region”, Indian Navy, accessed June 2026, https://ifcior.indiannavy.gov.in/home.

^[5] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “India’s Maritime Sector and Trade”, PIB, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2233239&reg=3&lang=1.

Diksha Bharti

_{Diksha Bharti is currently pursuing a Master’s program in Russian studies. She has previously worked as a Research Associate at Politika and the Consilium Research Institute. She has a keen interest in geopolitics and has contributed to several reputed platforms. Views expressed are the author’s own.}