- A particularly noteworthy development is Moscow’s agreement to help revive a defunct Soviet-era steel plant in Pakistan—a gesture that has raised eyebrows in New Delhi.
- At the time of Pakistan’s creation in 1947, the Soviet Union viewed the new state with deep suspicion.
- In a landmark moment during his visit to India in December 1955, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin openly declared that Kashmir was an integral part of India—a statement that underscored Moscow’s strategic choice and effectively froze meaningful engagement with Pakistan for decades.
- The most recent example of the existence of mistrust can be concluded from the fact that Russia has dismissed recent Pakistani media reports as fake, which claim that Moscow is expanding economic ties with Islamabad.
In recent years, Russia has made quiet but significant moves to improve its ties with Pakistan. A particularly noteworthy development is Moscow’s agreement to help revive a defunct Soviet-era steel plant in Pakistan—a gesture that has raised eyebrows in New Delhi. For many, this signals a potential shift in regional dynamics and even the possibility of diplomatic discomfort between India and its long-time strategic partner, Russia.
However, to assume that such cooperation could spark serious friction between India and Russia may be premature. This is not the first time Moscow—either as the Russian Federation or its predecessor, the Soviet Union—has attempted to recalibrate its position in South Asia. As the adage in diplomacy goes: “There are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests.”
The Russia-Pakistan relationship is a complex web of historical events and geopolitical strategies. From the days of Partition in 1947 through the Cold War, the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, and into the modern era, ties between the two nations have been shaped by geopolitical compulsions, not emotional alignments. This intricate dance of power and influence is a fascinating study in the ever-shifting sands of international relations.
To understand the present, we must dive into the past.
Early Scepticism and Strategic Apprehensions
At the time of Pakistan’s creation in 1947, the Soviet Union viewed the new state with deep suspicion. This suspicion was not unfounded, as Moscow interpreted the Partition of British India—particularly the emergence of Pakistan—as a strategic manoeuvre backed by Western imperial interests, especially the British and Americans. The USSR feared that Pakistan could become a Western outpost aimed at containing Soviet influence, particularly given its proximity to Afghanistan, a region of historical concern for Moscow.
These suspicions were further reinforced by British manoeuvrings in the princely state of Jammu & Kashmir. The British handling of the northern frontier regions—such as Skardu and Gilgit—seemed aligned with their old “Great Game” instincts, aimed at securing access routes toward Central Asia and curbing Soviet expansionism.
Against this backdrop, the Soviet Union moved swiftly to cement ties with India. Moscow extended diplomatic recognition to India as early as April 1947, two months before Indian independence. In contrast, it was slow to engage with Pakistan. The USSR didn’t send any congratulatory message to Pakistan’s founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, nor did it immediately recognise the new nation. When Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan finally proposed diplomatic ties in a meeting with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in April 1948, it took another 17 months before Pakistan appointed its first ambassador to Moscow. The Soviet envoy arrived in Pakistan only in March 1950.
Early Scepticism and Strategic Apprehensions
Any prospects of a balanced Soviet relationship with Pakistan were short-lived. The decisive turning point came in the mid-1950s, when Pakistan chose to align itself with the West through its membership in two key U.S.-led military blocs: the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954 and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1955. This formal alliance with the Western bloc pushed the Soviet Union further into India’s embrace. Moscow not only became an overt supporter of India’s position on Kashmir but also used its diplomatic weight to counter Pakistan’s narrative. In a landmark moment during his visit to India in December 1955, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin openly declared that Kashmir was an integral part of India—a statement that underscored Moscow’s strategic choice and effectively froze meaningful engagement with Pakistan for decades. These strategic choices, made under the shadow of the Cold War, had far-reaching implications for the region.
Nevertheless, against this background of suspicion engendered by Pakistan’s partnership within the US-led Western security alliances, there were instances when both the Soviet Union and Pakistan took significant steps to improve their relations.
In 1956, the Soviet Premier Bulganin offered Pakistan the Soviet technical know-how for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Pakistan’s Republic Day in Moscow, in August, was attended by the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, who hinted that the Soviet government would be willing to construct a mill in Karachi (which is basically what they have made a deal recently to develop). Leader of the Soviet Parliamentary delegation, I. A.Benedictov, paid a visit to Pakistan in February 1958. He expressed his country’s willingness to give economic and technical assistance to Pakistan, mainly in agriculture, control of floods and desalination, control of pests and soil erosion. Following the change in government in Pakistan, Moscow once more renewed its offer of assistance in November 1958 to help explore natural resources, particularly oil. The two countries signed a barter deal in December 1959.
However, the U-2 spy plane incident in May 1960, where the Soviet Union shot down an American U-2 spy plane over its territory, brought the bilateral relations to their worst position. The relationship between Pakistan and the USSR hit a further low point. Efforts again were made in 1965 as the USSR provided a mediation ground for the Indo-Pak war in Tashkent.
The final nail in the coffin of Pakistan–USSR relations was struck when India signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1971, followed by the USSR’s decisive support for India during the Bangladesh Liberation War. The Soviet Union played a pivotal role in the dismemberment of East Pakistan, both militarily and diplomatically. During the December 1971 India–Pakistan War, the USSR not only provided critical military assistance to India but also shielded it at the United Nations Security Council. On December 5, 1971, it vetoed a US-backed resolution—supported by China—that called for an immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of troops, and the deployment of UN observers along the India–Pakistan border. The Soviet Union, echoing India’s position, insisted that any cessation of hostilities must be preceded by a political settlement addressing the crisis in East Pakistan. When another US-supported resolution came up on December 6, which ignored this demand, the Soviet Union vetoed it once again, underlining its strategic alignment with India and commitment to a political resolution before military de-escalation. This, coupled with Pakistan’s direct backing of the Mujahideen against the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan, further deepened the divide.
Conclusion
Although after the Soviet Union’s disintegration and India’s relations with the United States improving, there has been a trial by both Pakistan and Russia to move beyond their previous reservations and forge a new and fresh relationship. Bilateral trade reached $1 billion in 2023, the highest-ever level between the two countries. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk said in 2024 that Russia would support Pakistan’s inclusion in the BRICS economic bloc.
In 2017, Islamabad joined the Moscow- and Beijing-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to deepen its regional cooperation. Four years later, Russia and Pakistan signed an agreement to construct a gas pipeline from Karachi to Lahore. Despite all these, the development is very slow, and there is a level of distrust between the two countries, and it would not allay very easily. The most recent example of the existence of mistrust can be concluded from the fact that Russia has dismissed recent Pakistani media reports as fake, which claim that Moscow is expanding economic ties with Islamabad.
Nishant Kumar Hota is a policy consultant with a keen interest in politics, history, and international relations. His analyses explore the intersections of governance, geopolitical developments, and historical perspectives.
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