Saudi Arabia and Iran - Regional and Global Implications of Improving Ties Between the Two Arab Neighbours

The ramifications to the world order due to the thawing relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran are challenging and multifaceted as the responses of other regional and international actors vary as per their national interests in the Middle East region.
Improved ties between Riyadh and Tehran might have a significant impact on Syria, where Saudi Arabia and Iran have supported opposing factions in the civil war there.
The agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran may have repercussions for the US-led strategy to economically isolate Tehran and also casts a doubt on a US diplomatic effort to mediate a formal diplomatic opening between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

On March 10, 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to resume diplomatic ties and reopen embassies after several years of animosity and proxy conflicts throughout the Middle East.¹ The talks that led to the breakthrough were hosted by China, highlighting Beijing’s growing role as a global economic and political power, as well as a counterbalance to Washington, notably in the Middle East, a region long moulded by the U.S. military and diplomatic commitment.² It also comes as diplomats attempt to settle a years-long conflict in Yemen, in which both Iran and Saudi Arabia are intimately involved. The two nations issued a joint statement on the agreement with China, which mediated it.³

How has Saudi Arabia and Iran’s relationship deteriorated?

Saudi Arabia and Iran, two powerful neighbours, are fighting for regional domination. Religious issues have intensified their decades-old animosity. They each adhere to one of the two major branches of Islam; Iran is predominantly Shia Muslim, whereas Saudi Arabia regards itself as the preeminent Sunni Muslim power. The religious schism in the Middle East is evident on the map. As the cradle of Islam and a monarchy, Saudi Arabia regarded itself as the head of the Muslim world. The Islamic revolution in Iran gave rise to a new kind of state in the region, a revolutionary theocracy in 1979.⁴

The relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia fundamentally worsened after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and their ideological and geopolitical conflict intensified. The two nations were not the only ones impacted by this circumstance; several other nations in the region were also drawn into the conflict. In the Middle East, regional instability has grown, while sectarian rivalry and ideological conflict have intensified. The Hobbesian anarchic structure among the Middle Eastern states, however, was made even clearer by the Arab Spring movement. In this regard, an axis of conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, encompassing nations like Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Bahrain, has arisen in the wake of the Arab Spring. Yemen has been the focal point of this axis of tension. In fact, Iran encouraged the Zaydi Houthis’ (also known as Shiite) progress in Yemen, but Saudi Arabia and its supporters deemed it intolerable. In the end, Saudi Arabia and its allies launched an offensive against the Houthis because they perceived them as a representative of Shiite expansionism. The aggressive policy, on the other hand, the Houthis have improved their ties with Iran for both practical and ideological reasons in response to Saudi Arabia’s treatment of them. The Houthis, who arose as a result of Yemen’s local and socioeconomic issues, gradually added another variable to the equation describing the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia.⁵

Due to Iran’s apparent regional victory, which is escalating the strategic rivalry. President Bashar al-forces Assad’s in Syria have been able to largely defeat rebel factions sponsored by Saudi Arabia thanks to Iranian (and Russian) help. Saudi Arabia is frantically attempting to restrict growing Iranian influence, but the militaristic adventurism of the nation’s young and impulsive de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, is escalating regional tensions. In part to counter perceived Iranian influence in Yemen, he is fighting the rebel Houthi movement, but after four years, this is turning out to be an expensive venture.⁶

Despite many findings from a panel of UN specialists showing significant support for the Houthis from Tehran in terms of both technical and munitions, Iran has denied charges that it is shipping weapons to the Houthis. Hezbollah, a Shia paramilitary group that is an ally of Iran, commands a sizable fighting force and heads a politically potent faction in Lebanon. Saad Hariri, the Lebanese prime minister whom Saudi Arabia supports, is widely believed to have been pushed to quit in 2017 because of Hezbollah’s involvement in regional crises. Then, he went back to Lebanon and postponed his resignation.⁷

Once the two broke off their friendship, tensions intensified. Saudi Arabia opposed Iran’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. As Iran started developing a bomb in 2018, it issued a threat to seek nuclear weapons. Riyadh accused Iran of attacking two significant Saudi Arabian oil sites with a drone and cruise missile in September 2019. The organization promised to retaliate against the “terrorist onslaught.” Any involvement in the strikes by Iran was denied. Iran would launch an “all-out war” in retaliation for the U.S. or Saudi Arabian strike, according to Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Iran and Saudi Arabia started sporadically talking in 2021, with Iraq acting as their middleman. Oman assisted in facilitating diplomacy as well. Five rounds of negotiations between Tehran and Riyadh were placed in Iraq between April 2021 and April 2022, but no agreement was reached.⁸

Recent Rapprochement

Seven years after suspending diplomatic ties, Iran and Saudi Arabia decided to resume ties in March 2023. By May 2023, the adversaries agreed to reopen their embassies in Riyadh and Tehran, the agreement mediated by China.⁹ Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China issued a joint statement. According to the joint statement issued by the three nations, Iran and Saudi Arabia have decided to resume diplomatic relations within two months and reopen embassies and bureaus in both nations. In order to carry out the decision and make the required preparations for the ambassadorial exchange, the foreign ministers of the two nations will have meetings. Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to put into effect the general agreement reached on May 27, 1998, which aimed to promote ties in the economic, commercial, investment, technical, scientific, cultural, sporting, and youth spheres, as well as the agreement on security cooperation signed on April 17, 2001, while reiterating respect for sovereignty and refraining from interfering in one another’s internal affairs. The three nations also reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to exerting every effort to further regional and global peace and security.¹⁰

The development would have a multiplier impact on the region, encouraging more local nations to change their formerly antagonistic foreign policies and explore the possibility of cooperating with a more open-minded mindset to facilitate greater regional growth. By fostering ties, Iran and Saudi Arabia will contribute to Middle East peace and provide a model for resolving conflicts via discussion.¹¹

Iran’s foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said: “The return of normal relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia provides great capacities to the two nations, the region, and the Islamic world. The neighbourhood policy, as the key axis of the government’s foreign policy, is strongly moving in the right direction, and the diplomatic apparatus is actively behind the preparation of more regional steps.”¹²The agreement shows that the two parties have made some headway in resolving important points of contention. Restoring relations would be the first step towards both regional and global dimensions.

Regional and Global Implications

The rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran has regional significance for Yemen. In Yemen, where the two regional powers have been engaged in a proxy war for eight years, restored diplomatic relationships between Iran and Saudi Arabia have sparked optimism about an end to hostilities. The conflict between Yemen’s government, which is backed by a Saudi-led military coalition, and the Houthi rebels, who are backed by Iran, may have had the most direct effects on Yemen. We can only hope that the two nations restored diplomatic ties will usher in a new era in regional relations and put an end to Saudi Arabia’s and Iran’s meddling in Yemeni affairs.¹³

Improved ties between Riyadh and Tehran might have a significant impact on Syria, where Saudi Arabia and Iran have supported opposing factions in the civil war there. Tehran might now be more open to establishing formal diplomatic ties with Damascus as a result of its deal with Iran. Any improvement in relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran is probably good news for Syria. The major barrier to Syria’s regional integration is still Saudi opposition. Not all the issues causing strain in Syria’s bilateral relations will be resolved right away by the diplomatic accord between Riyadh and Iran. Yet, it has a great deal of potential to make it simpler for Syria.¹⁴

A reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran through negotiation mediated by China is an immediate success for China. As it benefits greatly from the agreement by presenting its expanding role as a political and economic force at the same time that the Communist Party of China has backed President Xi Jinping’s third term. China fills the geopolitical void created by the US pivot, which first focused on the Indo-Pacific and is now turning its attention to Europe and the conflict in Ukraine.¹⁵ This shows China’s strong influence in the Middle East against the U.S. and shows that it is an emerging power in the new world order. Additionally, China also gets benefitted from the resources of the Middle East and can be the catalyst for China’s economic sector. Energy, trade, and investment are among China’s primary interests in the Middle East, according to analysts, who also note that brokering the Saudi-Iran détente is intended to protect these interests.¹⁶

The agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran may have repercussions for the US-led strategy to economically isolate Tehran.¹⁷ Also, it casts doubt on a US diplomatic effort to mediate a formal diplomatic opening between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The United States is still a significant security force in the region for the time being, but after China’s successful mediation, the U.S.’s role is now questionable.¹⁸ China’s engagement strengthens the impression of expanding Chinese power and influence, which supports the narrative of a declining U.S. global presence. Since the two countries are increasingly competing for influence in regions of the world outside of their own boundaries, relations between them have deteriorated significantly and have become very contentious over topics ranging from commerce to espionage.¹⁹ Hence, the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran may not be favourable for the U.S.

Conclusion

Security incidents, as well as racist and sectarian language, have caused an enormous impact on the Arab Gulf region in recent years. It is important to work for the success of conversation and push for a genuine change in the relationship since citizens in various countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran, want to live in peace. This would be in the best interests of most of the Middle Eastern countries, thus this rapprochement will require a careful balancing between competing interests regarding both Countries. Developing cooperation on reasonable diligence will take time and involve more discussions and credibility between them. The ramifications to the world order due to the thawing relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran are challenging and multifaceted as the responses of other regional and international actors vary as per their national interests in the Middle East region. So, for now, the optimal approach is to wait and observe how it evolves over the months ahead.

_{(Anjali Singh is a Postgraduate student in political science and international relations. She currently works as a research intern at the Indian Council of world affairs, New Delhi. Views expressed are the author’s own)}

References:

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