- With the inclusion of foreign military equipment in the Ukrainian arsenal for the first ever time, Ukraine hopes to break the ‘Taboo’ and leave behind its Russo-Soviet military dependence.
- Russia will not react well to the ‘breaking’ of this dependence as highlighted by Putin’s recent statements warning the West from crossing the ‘red line’.
- Ukraine has successfully survived the Russian offensive through the Summer, Autumn and Winter of 2022-23 and the initiative is on the side of Ukrainian forces.
- Given the high possibility of a Russian offensive in the spring, Ukraine should strongly consider a preemptive Spring offensive against Russian forces.
On 24 February 2023, the world marked the first anniversary of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. A year later, the war has no long-term end in sight and is estimated to continue for a long and only get worse in terms of intensity going forward. This increasing intensity arises from multiple dangers such as the possibility of direct NATO involvement, Chinese military support to Russia or more importantly the possible risk of Nuclear weapon use as a desperate bid to end this conflict.
However, as the spring approaches, the stalemate in this conflict is predicted to break with a possible Russian offensive as warned by Western intelligence communities. However, countering this offensive would be very resource intensive for Ukraine despite all the Western aid and support. Additionally, this also poses an omnipresent risk of Russia once again gaining the initiative in this war.
Keeping in mind the present state of stalemate and the improvement of Ukrainian military capabilities with the newly arriving tanks and other equipment from the West, there is a small window of opportunity for Ukraine to launch a preemptive counter-offensive this spring.
This move could effectively bring Russia to the negotiation table and bring an end, at least in the short term to this conflict.
Introduction
This week, the Russia-Ukraine conflict marks its first year. A conflict that was predicted to end within a couple of weeks with an overwhelming Russian victory is now in a state of stalemate with the chances of a peaceful, mutual end-looking beak.
Multiple experts from strategic studies, Foreign Policy establishment and the intelligence community predict this war to continue. Comparing it with the slow-moving first world war- a war of attrition, this conflict is predicted to only get worse for both sides moving forward. However, this spring provides a unique chance for Ukraine and the West to attempt a bold offensive and force Russia to the negotiation tables towards the end of it.
In News
On 8 February 2023, (Reuters) German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced a plan to deliver a battalion of Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine by late February and early March. In addition to this, there is also an announcement of a planned pool funded by Denmark and the Netherlands to supply three to four battalions or over 100 Leopard 1 tank to Ukraine.
On 4 February 2023, (AlJazeera) Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Minister Dmytro Kuleba mentioned the plans to import the American F-16s into the Ukrainian arsenal, however, stated that it might come at a much later time.
This is the light of the Biden administration’s announcement on 25 January, (Reuters) dispatching a battalion of M1A1 Abrams tanks, and the promised long-range GLSDBs, Javelins and Patriot missiles to Ukraine by early March.
Issues at Large
First, Ukraine has successfully survived the Russian offensive and has pushed the Russian troops back through the Summer, Autumn and Winter of 2022-23. With such success, the initiative is on the side of Ukrainian forces. Capitalizing on this advantage, the Ukrainian offensive strategy aims to reclaim the Donbas region by mid-2023. However for this plan to succeed, they would need additional Western support in aid and technology as their existing resources, which fared well in defence, would not sustain in offensive operations.
Secondly, since the beginning of the conflict, PSU’s strategy of Air Denial saw massive success in defending Ukrainian air space against the superior Russian Air Force. However, this strategy, based on Ukraine’s Soviet-era air defence technology, didn’t have the desired impact in supporting the recent Ukrainian counter-offensives. This creates a space for NATO aircraft such as the American expected F-16s, or French Rafaels, whose multi-role, long-distance operational potential can help Ukrainian offensives massively.
Thirdly, when Ukraine’s offensives began on 22 March 2022, Russian forces were pushed out of Kyiv rapidly, by April 2022. This quick victory was owing to the Forest Steppe terrain of the region that was not ideal for Russian Tank operations, proving to be an added advantage to the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
However, offensives around Kharkiv to the northeast and Kherson in the southeast were slower (lasting from April to November) and slowed the Ukrainian offensive to a crawl. This is owing to the tank-friendly terrain of the Russian Steppe seen in the region.
Ukraine’s Soviet-era T-84s and other light tanks were inferior to the Russian T-90s and T-14 Armata tanks, and this disparity has been seen since the Ukrainian offensive reached the Russian Steppe. However, with the addition of German Leopard 1 and 2s and American Abrams, Ukrainian forces will have the capability to match the Russians in tank battles.
In perspective
Firstly, Ukraine and the overall NATO intelligence apparatus are predicting a Russian offensive by early spring. If this happens before the Ukrainian troops launch their offensive, Ukraine might not have the much-needed resources to launch a counter-offensive. Thus, the Ukrainian strategy should strongly consider the option of a preemptive strike as soon as they are ready with an updated military through Western Aid.
Secondly, with the inclusion of foreign military equipment in the Ukrainian arsenal for the first ever time, Ukraine hopes to break the ‘Taboo’ and leave behind its Russo-Soviet military dependence. This can be viewed as a symbol of Ukraine leaving behind its Russian identity and moving towards the West militarily.
However, Russia will not react well to the ‘breaking’ of this dependence as highlighted by Putin’s recent statements warning the West from crossing the ‘red line’. This red line is the indication of NATO’s aid to Ukraine with high-end tanks, missile systems and aircraft which can trigger massive Russian responses ranging from transport column strikes to the threat of a nuclear strike in the coming months of this war.
Taking into consideration, firstly the high possibility of a Russian offensive in the spring, secondly, the increasing offensive capabilities arriving in Ukraine, and lastly, a window of opportunity that might not be available post the forecasted Russian offensive, Ukraine should strongly consider a preemptive Spring offensive against Russian forces in Ukraine.
(Abhishek Kadiyala is a Research Scholar in the Department of International Relations, Peace and Public Policy (IRP&PP), St. Joseph’s University (SJU), Bengaluru-Karnataka, India. Dr Karamala Areesh Kumar teaches in the Department of International Relations, Peace and Public Policy (IRP&PP), St. Joseph’s University (SJU), Bengaluru-Karnataka, India.)
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