Future Threats and Converging Interests: Pakistan’s ICBMs and Indo-Israeli Preemption

• The revelation that Pakistan is developing nuclear-capable ICBMs with the potential to reach the continental United States represents a paradigm shift in how the world’s major powers must view the Pakistani nuclear program.
• The development of Earth Penetrating Weapons (EPW) systems, originally conceived to address concerns about hardened nuclear facilities and the potential for nuclear materials falling into terrorist hands, provides new tactical options for addressing underground nuclear infrastructure.
• From India’s perspective, there is growing consensus within strategic circles that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons represent the greatest hindrance to India’s great power ambitions.”
• The concept of terrorism conducted under nuclear protection has moved from theoretical possibility to grave strategic reality, creating an environment where traditional deterrence calculations break down. 

Recent US intelligence disclosures revealing Pakistan’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching Washington, D.C., have fundamentally altered strategic calculations. This development, when viewed alongside Israel’s recent preemptive strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and the historical precedent of planned Indo-Israeli cooperation, suggests we may be witnessing the emergence of conditions that could make the previously unthinkable not only possible but strategically necessary.

The revelation that Pakistan is developing nuclear-capable ICBMs with the potential to reach the continental United States represents more than just a technological advancement—it constitutes a paradigm shift in how the world’s major powers must view the Pakistani nuclear program. A senior White House official recently described this development as making Pakistan an “emerging threat” to the United States, a characterisation that fundamentally changes the bilateral relationship from one of strategic necessity to a potential adversary. This shift becomes even more significant when considered alongside America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, which eliminated one of the key factors that previously mandated US-Pakistan cooperation.

The historical precedent for Indo-Israeli cooperation against Pakistani nuclear facilities is well-documented and instructive. In March 1984, under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s leadership, India approved a joint operation with Israel to destroy Pakistan’s nascent nuclear facilities. This operation was meticulously planned and ready for execution when the CIA alerted Pakistan to the impending strike, leading to its cancellation. Even earlier, in the late 1970s, another attempt at such cooperation was conceived but ultimately called off at the last moment. These historical episodes demonstrate both the feasibility of such strategic partnerships and the complex intelligence dynamics that can derail even the most carefully orchestrated operations.

What makes the current moment particularly significant is the convergence of multiple factors that were absent during those earlier attempts. Israel’s recent Operation Rising Lion on June 13, 2025, which targeted Iranian nuclear facilities including Natanz, Fordow, and Arak, has established a clear precedent for preemptive action against regional nuclear threats. This operation, supported by US strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, has solidified international consensus that rogue states cannot be permitted to develop nuclear weapons capabilities. The success of these strikes demonstrates both Israel’s continued willingness to act preemptively and the international community’s tacit acceptance of such actions when directed against regimes considered threatening to global stability.

The parallels to Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor are particularly instructive. That successful operation was made possible by a critical geopolitical shift—Saddam Hussein’s deteriorating ties with the USSR, which created a strategic window for Israeli action. Today, Pakistan’s development of ICBMs capable of hitting Washington represents a similar departure from previous US-Pakistan dynamics, potentially creating the geopolitical conditions that could enable action against Pakistani nuclear facilities, possibly with tacit American support.

Israel's recent Operation Rising Lion on June 13, 2025, which targeted Iranian nuclear facilities including Natanz, Fordow, and Arak, has established a clear precedent for preemptive action against regional nuclear threats.

Israel’s strategic thinking has evolved through distinct phases of existential challenges, each requiring different responses and adaptations. The nation successfully weathered the strategic onslaught of Pan-Arabism and Nasserism in the twentieth century, then confronted what became known as the Axis of Resistance—various groups under Tehran’s control. Through recent operations against Iran, Israel has not only neutralised this threat but also established a new international understanding about preventing rogue nuclear proliferation. Now, as Israel moves toward what it considers securing its periphery and the potential resettlement of Palestinians, it faces a new form of resistance likely to manifest as Islamism. Unlike previous political challenges, this represents a shift toward moral and emotional opposition that transcends traditional geopolitical boundaries.

Pakistan emerges as the perfect candidate to capitalise on this emotional dimension of opposition to Israel. The country has increasingly relied on anti-Israel vitriol for domestic regime survival, including public proclamations of the capability to “nuke Tel Aviv.” What makes Pakistan particularly dangerous in this context is its complete absence of public restraint in making nuclear threats—a characteristic that distinguishes it from other nuclear powers. This rhetorical escalation is not merely political theatre; it reflects a strategic calculation that external threats can deflect attention from mounting internal problems.

The historical pattern of Pakistani-sponsored terrorism provides additional cause for concern. Pakistan’s first wave of terrorism against India came in the form of targeting Jewish tourists and included the infamous beheading of Daniel Pearl. With terrorist organisations now returning home from Afghanistan following the Taliban takeover, these groups present both a domestic threat to the Pakistani military and an opportunity for the establishment to redirect their activities toward external targets like Israel, all while operating under the protection of Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella.

Pakistan’s internal dynamics create multiple incentives for such escalatory behaviour. The country’s domestic problems are multiplying—economic crisis, political instability, and social unrest—making external scapegoating an increasingly attractive political strategy. Pakistan also sees an opportunity to position itself as the leader of the Islamic world, and nothing would symbolise Islamic hegemony more than confronting Israel from a position of nuclear strength. This ambition is further enabled by China’s increasingly anti-Israel posture, which, combined with Pakistan’s ICBM capability targeting Washington, creates dual constraints on America’s ability to contain Pakistani nuclear threats.

The development of Earth Penetrating Weapons (EPW) systems, originally conceived to address concerns about hardened nuclear facilities and the potential for nuclear materials falling into terrorist hands, provides new tactical options for addressing underground nuclear infrastructure. These weapons were developed partly in response to intelligence about potential terrorist nuclear attacks, including documented concerns about suitcase nuclear devices that were reportedly planned for use in America as continuation attacks following 9/11, as detailed in George Friedman’s “America’s Secret War.”

Pakistan has increasingly relied on anti-Israel vitriol for domestic regime survival, including public proclamations of the capability to 'nuke Tel Aviv.'

The spectre that terrorist groups could get hold of nuclear weapons in Pakistan due to lax control systems, and due to which internally USA started developing the EPW system program and negotiated to get observers in their nuclear facilities, is a threat that has not become any less likely than what it was more than two decades ago. On the contrary, Pakistan-based terrorists have proliferated, with only a relatively meagre percentage of the terrorists under direct control of the establishment. Even if all of them have doctrinal unity, the conflict is operational.

From India’s perspective, there is growing consensus within strategic circles that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons represent the greatest hindrance to India’s great power ambitions. This understanding goes beyond traditional security concerns to encompass a fundamental strategic reality: for India to achieve true great power status, Pakistan cannot remain a nuclear weapon state. Indian strategists increasingly recognise that their country missed critical opportunities in the past—failing to nuclearise before Pakistan, not destroying Pakistan’s nuclear facilities before they became operational, and demonstrating costly indecisiveness in strategic timing.

Perhaps most significantly, India’s experience of suffering cross-border terrorism while being unable to respond decisively due to Pakistan’s nuclear shield has crystallised thinking about the fundamental incompatibility of Pakistani nuclear weapons with regional stability. The concept of terrorism conducted under nuclear protection has moved from theoretical possibility to grave strategic reality, creating an environment where traditional deterrence calculations break down.

Israel may have learned from the strategic costs of India’s historical indecisiveness and could be more inclined toward decisive action regarding Pakistani denuclearisation. Both nations now understand that allowing nuclear proliferation to reach fruition creates insurmountable strategic constraints, and that windows for action close rapidly once nuclear capabilities become operational and defended.

The current convergence of factors—Pakistan’s ICBM development, Israel’s demonstrated willingness to strike nuclear facilities preemptively, America’s changing strategic priorities, and the precedent established by recent operations against Iran—creates an unprecedented set of circumstances. While the challenges of such an operation would be immense, involving complex diplomatic, military, and strategic considerations, the historical precedent of Indo-Israeli cooperation and the current threat landscape suggest that what was once considered unthinkable may now be within the realm of strategic possibility.

The implications of Pakistan’s development of Washington-capable ICBMs extend far beyond South Asian regional dynamics. This capability fundamentally alters the global strategic balance and presents decision-makers in Washington, New Delhi, and Tel Aviv with choices that may define international security for decades to come. The question is no longer whether such capabilities pose a threat, but rather what combination of diplomatic, economic, and potentially military responses will be required to address them.

Although the ICBM program may be a way for Pakistan to get the attention of the USA, something similar to what has been said for Iran—that it was a want for a negotiation for which it enriched Uranium to 60%—we are talking about apples and oranges. Pakistan has been at the geopolitical sweet spot forever. Even after Pahalgam, it garnered the praise of the USA for its wisdom to initiate a ceasefire, rather than how it got more than expected resolve and coercive power from India, and therefore folded, wanting a stop to the consistent damage it was going through. It is still possible that, through the ICBM, it wants to have a higher standing in the American calculus, which could give it some more negotiating leverage to extract favourable terms of credit from different institutions. Given Pakistan’s experience with the United States, it may very well achieve that objective. After all, if there is one nation that could be at peace after bombing Iran based on principles of preemption and yet tie its hands down when dealing with Pakistan, then that most certainly is the United States of America. Such has been the history that Pakistan may be shrewd enough not to count on the fact of the USA following strategic logic—it has not done so one time in its interactions with Pakistan, why should this time be any different? Botched calculations have always been the driver of US policy towards Pakistan, yet this time it is not intel management and control from Rawalpindi to prevent the next 9/11—it is the possibility of an existential threat staring the United States in the face. K. Subrahmanyam termed the US entrusting Pakistan with its Afghanistan policy before the withdrawal, ‘The Second Deception’, and it could be the third deception if the US does play into the hands of the Mullah-Military nexus.

One must also entertain the possibility that it is not entirely the fact that terrorists seize command and control of nuclear weapons, yet such seizure may not be given the due resistance by the military to initiate certain actions upon an adversary in an attempt at escalation management.

As Pakistan continues to integrate nuclear protection with terrorist operations while pursuing Islamic world leadership through anti-Israel positioning, the international community faces a challenge that combines the most dangerous elements of nuclear proliferation, state-sponsored terrorism, and ideological extremism. One must also entertain the possibility that it is not entirely the fact that terrorists seize command and control of nuclear weapons, yet such seizure may not be given the due resistance by the military to initiate certain actions upon an adversary in an attempt at escalation management. Such actions could be tailored with more conventional surprise attacks. This represents perhaps the most dangerous evolution in nuclear strategy—the deliberate non-resistance to terrorist seizure as a form of plausible deniability for limited nuclear use. 

While such deliberation may not happen at the highest rungs of command, the Islamic fervour within Pakistan’s military structure could certainly enable it at operational levels. The concept involves escalation management through limited use of nuclear weapons on limited targets, given through limited access to terrorist groups, most likely targeting India. Given India’s official position that all terror acts will be considered acts of war, Pakistan could calculate that an act of war conducted first and as large as possible might paradoxically leave India appearing as the escalating party when it responds to what appears to be “terrorist” nuclear use rather than direct state action. The response to this challenge may well determine whether the international nuclear order can adapt to new forms of threats or whether it will be overwhelmed by actors willing to operate outside traditional constraints of nuclear deterrence and international law.

The convergence of these factors suggests we are approaching a moment of strategic decision that could reshape the geopolitical landscape of both South Asia and the Middle East. The historical precedents, current capabilities, and evolving threat environment all point toward a scenario where the unthinkable becomes not just possible, but perhaps inevitable.

References and Citations:

1. _{Foreign Affairs Report on Pakistani ICBM Development – “Pakistan’s Pursuit of ICBM Capability Raises Alarms in Washington”: https://idrw.org/pakistans-pursuit-of-icbm-capability-raises-alarms-in-washington-foreign-affairs-report-warns/}
2. _{U.S. Intelligence Assessment on Pakistan’s Long-Range Missiles – Arms Control Association: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-01/news/us-says-pakistan-developing-long-range-missiles}
3. _{CSIS Analysis: U.S. Sanctions on Pakistan’s Missile Program: https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-sanctions-pakistans-missile-program-highlight-nuclear-threats-beyond-south-asia}
4. _{International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – Pakistan’s Ballistic Missile Programme: https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2025/02/developments-concerning-pakistans-ballistic-missile-programme/}
5. _{George Friedman – “America’s Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies” –} 
6. _{Documentation of post-9/11 nuclear terrorism intelligence and suitcase bomb concerns; Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/Americas-Secret-War-Worldwide-Struggle/dp/0767917855; Publisher: https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/56540/americas-secret-war-by-george-friedman/}
7. _{CIA Declassified Documents on 1984 Indo-Israeli Operation – National Security Archive:https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/ (Historical documents section)}
8. _{Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Nuclear Forces Data: https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2024/06}
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19. _{Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs: https://www.belfercenter.org/}
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25. _{Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute: https://www.nonproliferation.org/}
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Sushruta Batsya

Sushruta Batsya holds an MA in International Relations from the Central University of Punjab. A passionate writer on economics, finance, security, and international affairs, he has contributed to esteemed publications like The Assam Tribune. He served as a Junior Research Analyst at the Institute for Conflict Research and Resolution for over two years, focusing on Northeast India.