- Strategic thinking would dictate strengthening ties with Myanmar, the other major neighbour on the eastern front, which, in recent times, has been witnessing strained ties with Bangladesh as well.
- Another major plank bringing together New Delhi and Naypyidaw is the potential exploitation of the Rohingya crisis by external powers such as the US to further its geopolitical aims in the region.
- Having established the cruciality of Myanmar for India’s current dilemmas in its ‘Near East’, it should provide impetus for more robust and strengthened engagement with all the major stakeholders and players on Burmese soil by New Delhi.
- From India’s perspective, it is especially important to develop deeper ties with the AA and the Chin National Council (CNC) because of the latter’s control over the Rakhine and Chin provinces, which are crucial for the connectivity and stability of NE India.
As the dust clears on India’s western front in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor brought about by a ceasefire mired in uncertainty, the eastern front has become the centre of much geopolitical buzz and activity, drawing the interest of security and strategic thinkers. This is especially true about Bangladesh, which has emerged as a new addition to the strategic challenge posed traditionally by the China-Pakistan nexus. This realignment of Dhaka was evident long enough in comments ranging from the emphasis on the ‘landlocked nature’ of India’s North Eastern (NE) states by the leader of the current interim government, Muhammad Yunus to calls for ‘occupying India’s NE in collaboration with China’ by Major General (Retd.) Fazlur Rahman, a close aide of Yunus, as per reports. While the Dhaka administration was quick to distance itself from the remarks by Rahman, the hidden expansionist ambitions harboured by the current dispensation was brought to the fore by the publication of a map of Greater Bangladesh reportedly encompassing India’s Northeast, Bihar, Jharkhand and Odisha along with Myanmar’s Arakan state by an allegedly Turkish backed NGO named Saltanat-e Bangla. In addition, the reported appearance of the above map in university halls across Dhaka and the rising influence of Islamic parties and influence in post- Hasina Bangladesh as exemplified by the above mentioned NGO does not allow the threat of Greater Bangladesh to be taken lightly or brushed aside as the misplaced dream of a few rogue marginal elements.
Confronting the above situation, strategic thinking, especially in Chanakyan terms, would dictate strengthening ties with Myanmar, the other major neighbour on the eastern front, which, in recent times, has been witnessing strained ties with Bangladesh as well. While placed within the Chanakyan framework of Mandala, both Myanmar and Bangladesh should be counted as the Ari (enemy) to the Indian position of Vijigishu (the aspiring conqueror surrounded by hostile states on all sides) who forms the focus of the current South Asian Mandala given the proximity and shared boundaries of both Dhaka and Naypyidaw to New Delhi, yet the common threat posed by Bangladesh to both transforms India and Myanmar into Mitra (friend) or natural allies. This shared concern is also underlined by the fact that the ambition of Greater Bangladesh also includes, in addition to Indian, a portion of Myanmar’s territory− a fact unacceptable to all key stakeholders including the military junta in power, the National Unity Government (NUG) in exile and the Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) such as the Arakan Army (AA).
New Delhi has maintained a delicate tightrope walk by engaging simultaneously with all the major stakeholders in Myanmar, but the current strategic changes underway in the eastern borderlands and the Bay of Bengal calls for more urgent and robust engagement with Naypyidaw, especially the EAOs who in recent times have scored major victories against the junta and have become a significant player in the geopolitical chessboard of Burma as well as the NUG. The Indo-Myanmar alignment and the strengthening of India’s position in Burma must also take priority, keeping in view the increasing consolidation of the Chinese footprint not only in Myanmar but also in Bangladesh. The latter has resulted in the formation of a Beijing, Dhaka and possibly Islamabad nexus aimed at the multi-front containment of India through actions such as the revival of the Lalmonirhat air base in Bangladesh overlooking the strategic, vital and vulnerable Siliguri corridor or Chicken’s Neck connecting the Indian NE with the rest of the country.
Given the above bottleneck posed by Bangladesh vis-à-vis India’s Northeast, the salience of Myanmar has increased as an alternative pathway facilitating the connection between NE and the Indian mainland.
Given the above bottleneck posed by Bangladesh vis-à-vis India’s Northeast, the salience of Myanmar has increased as an alternative pathway facilitating the connection between NE and the Indian mainland. This is especially true of the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Project (KMTTP), which envisages fostering connectivity between the ports of Kolkata and Sittwe in the Rakhine state of Myanmar, extending further through an inland waterway via the Kaladan river to the town of Paletwa and finally terminating at Zorinpui in Mizoram via a highway. The importance of the KMTTP has further increased with the announcement of the Shillong-Silchar four-lane highway project, which is seen as an extension of the Kaladan project from Mizoram (Zorinpui) passing through Meghalaya (Shillong) and reaching Assam (Silchar). Both these initiatives are aimed at allowing NE states to overcome their landlocked status, bypassing the geographical blockade posed by an increasingly recalcitrant Bangladesh, as Indian interests in the ports of Mongla and Chittagong have increasingly come under strain due to Chinese and Pakistani inroads. Hence, the importance of Bangladesh for India has increased not only as a potential counter to Dhaka but also as an important insurance against any nefarious designs aimed at the Siliguri corridor.
Another major plank bringing together New Delhi and Naypyidaw is the potential exploitation of the Rohingya crisis by external powers such as the US to further its geopolitical aims in the region. Such views have taken traction, especially in the light of rumours over the establishment of a UN-mandated ‘Humanitarian corridor’ from Bangladesh to the Rakhine state, ostensibly aimed at the repatriation of Rohingya refugees and the supply of food, medicine, and other essentials to combat the ‘famine-like situation’ in the Arakan region. However, there have been allegations that the said corridor would be used to funnel lethal arms including military hardware to the Arakan Army (AA) by the US in a bid to bolster the EAO’s capabilities against the junta and also to counter the increasing Chinese presence in Rakhine thereby transforming the region into a proxy battleground between Beijing and Washington with Dhaka as a possible conduit facilitating American penetration. The corridor also poses a significant threat to India as the latter could also be used to channel drugs, narcotics and insidious terrorist elements originating from Bangladeshi soil into NE via the Rakhine state. Such fears are not unfounded, given the reports of the increasing role of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in forging a united front among the Rohingya armed groups, thereby posing an equal threat to both New Delhi and Naypyidaw, as well as Rakhine. Not to mention the negative ramifications upon the KMTTP and other Indian interests, as well as to the fragile situation within Myanmar, the Arakan region is mired in civil war and proxy battles.
About the US, also crucial for both New Delhi and Naypyidaw is the need to keep an eye out for the alleged American conspiracy of ‘carving out a Christian state’ from territories of Myanmar and India’s NE and even Bangladesh, as revealed by former Bangladeshi PM Sheikh Hasina last year. Given the transactional nature of American diplomacy under the current Trump administration, it wouldn’t be far-fetched to say that Washington won’t be tempted to follow the above strategy in its bid to contain both China as well as India.
India should be wary of incidents such as the 14 May gunfire between the Assam Rifles and members of the Public Defence Organisation (PDOs) of the NUG’s Ministry of Defence in Manipur’s Chandel district along the India-Myanmar border, resulting in the death of 10 Burmese PDO volunteers.
Having established the cruciality of Myanmar for India’s current dilemmas in its ‘Near East’, it should provide impetus for more robust and strengthened engagement with all the major stakeholders and players on Burmese soil by New Delhi. This is especially true regarding the EAOS, whereby New Delhi should shed its traditional inhibition of non-engagement with non-state actors and instead actively interact with the latter to not only protect its interests but also build goodwill and a favourable image amongst the latter, thereby bolstering its position vis-à-vis contenders like China. Interestingly, India should seek to learn and emulate the Chinese art of maintaining amicable ties not only with the Junta but also EAOs like the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which have transformed into Beijing’s proxy.
From India’s perspective, it is especially important to develop deeper ties with the AA and the Chin National Council (CNC) because of the latter’s control over the Rakhine and Chin provinces, which are crucial for the connectivity and stability of NE India. Especially the Chin state bordering Mizoram and southern Manipur, which is also marked by cross-border kinship ties between the Kuki-Chin and Zo communities on both sides of the boundary. Moreover, the above geographical proximity also establishes the umbilical link between a stable Chin state and the security of NE, as witnessed in the case of Manipur. The importance of a stable Rakhine for the future of projects like the KMTT, as well as for NE, has already been established. Hence, questions of stability, security and the cultivation of pro- Indian dispensation necessitate and justify New Delhi’s active interaction with CNC and AA. If similar logic and reasoning vis-à-vis Afghanistan could justify Indian engagement with the Taliban, why not the same enthusiasm shown for outreach to the EAOs?
The level and manner of engagement have to go beyond the extension of invitation to the NUG and EAOs for attendance at a closed-door seminar organised by the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) in 2024. Para-diplomacy involving local state-level actors like the Mizoram government is a step in the right direction. This was seen during Mizo MP K. Vanlalvena’s outreach to the AA in 2024 and the Chinland Council in March 2025, expressing Indian concerns and building goodwill, as well as the merger of rival Chin factions brought under the auspices of the Mizo CM Lalduhoma− all this happening ostensibly without the knowledge of the Centre. Such plausible denial from New Delhi is crucial not to overtly alienate the Junta nor raise suspicions with the NUG. At the same time, instances such as the above Mizo MP inviting the Chin populace to ‘consider joining India’ could jeopardise ties not only with the Junta but also the NUG and other EAOs, who might start harbouring suspicions about any sort of Indian irredentist ambitions.
Broader actions of goodwill, such as Operation Brahma, involving the provision of humanitarian and medical aid in the aftermath of the devastating 28 March earthquake in Myanmar, are of immense significance. Similarly, the decision to fence the border as well as the scrapping of the Free Movement Regime (FMR) should be reconsidered, keeping in mind the costs in terms of ethnic sensitivities and squandering of Indian soft power and presence in the Burmese borderlands. However, at the same time, genuine security interests resulting from a porous border should also be considered, which again reiterates the need to maintain cordial ties with the EAOs like CNC.
Broader actions of goodwill, such as Operation Brahma, involving the provision of humanitarian and medical aid in the aftermath of the devastating 28 March earthquake in Myanmar, are of immense significance.
Finally, India should be wary of incidents such as the 14 May gunfire between the Assam Rifles and members of the Public Defence Organisation (PDOs) of the NUG’s Ministry of Defence in Manipur’s Chandel district along the India-Myanmar border, resulting in the death of 10 Burmese PDO volunteers. The conflagration, allegedly over the PDO’s attempt at ‘opposing fencing work’ by ‘laying an ambush against Assam Rifles personnel and labourers’ as per the Indian side, has been met with accusations of the Burmese volunteers being tortured and killed by the Assam Rifles personnel.
While the NUG has been quick to make the first move towards de-escalation by calling for joint investigation with relevant Indian counterparts while emphasising on cooperation and conduct of restraint to its defence units along the border, any such future misunderstandings and accidents of a more serious nature might provide fodder to inimical forces to exploit and tarnish the image of India thereby jeopardising its relations with the EAOs. Hence, caution must be exercised by both sides to prevent such confrontations in the first place and if otherwise, the same should be resolved through robust channels of ground communication and dialogue before they flare up to engulf the ties in their entirety.
With Bangladesh boiling the eastern frontier, the need for strategic friendship with Brahmadesh (Myanmar) is more than ever.
Anuraag Khaund is a PhD scholar in International Politics at the School of International Studies, Central University of Gujarat (CUG). He has published opinion pieces in The Diplomat, Kashmir Observer, Modern Diplomacy, and Deccan Herald, and writes the column ‘Yours Geopolitically Khaund’ for the Global Strategic & Defence News (GSDN). Views expressed are the author’s own.
Pranav S 
Lakshmi Karlekar & HM Greeshma 
Megna Devkar