From Ally to Adversary: Is Bangladesh’s Crisis Aiding Pakistan in its Campaign of Subterfuge Against India? 

• The growing defence ties between Bangladesh and Pakistan, coupled with China’s expanding influence in South Asia, have raised alarms for India’s national security.
• The interim government in Dhaka has been increasingly critical of India, partly fueled by perceptions of Indian support for Hasina’s regime and exacerbated by incidents such as the August 2024 flooding in Bangladesh, which many attributed to the operations of India’s Damodar Valley Corporation.
• While the Bangladeshi government has reports of Pakistan training the Bangladesh Army, Indian analysts are raising concerns about a potential strategic pivot.
• A more coordinated approach between Bangladesh, Pakistan, and China could place adversarial influence on multiple borders, aligning with China’s broader geopolitical strategy to encircle India, further undermining India’s regional security position.

Introduction

During Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, relations between India and Bangladesh have experienced one of their strongest and most cooperative phases. Sheikh Hasina prioritised close ties with India, underlining the shared history, cultural bonds, and mutual strategic interests of the two neighbours.

A major area of progress was security cooperation. Under her leadership, Bangladesh took firm action against anti-India insurgent groups that had previously found haven across the border. This move was instrumental in building trust between the two countries. In a landmark achievement, India and Bangladesh signed and ratified the Land Boundary Agreement in 2015^[1], resolving decades-old border disputes and exchanging enclaves peacefully.

Economic and connectivity links also flourished. Trade volumes increased significantly, with India extending billions of dollars in lines of credit to Bangladesh for infrastructure, energy, and transport projects. Reviving historical road, rail, and river routes further strengthened physical connectivity between the two nations.

Defence ties deepened with new agreements on military training, equipment support, and joint exercises, reflecting growing strategic trust. Meanwhile, cultural and people-to-people ties expanded, supported by simplified visa procedures and significant cross-border celebrations, such as India’s prominent participation in Bangladesh’s 50th Independence anniversary.

However, some challenges remained. The long-discussed Teesta River water-sharing agreement, although agreed upon in principle at the central government level, stalled due to opposition from Indian state governments, particularly West Bengal.

Overall, Sheikh Hasina’s government ushered in a period marked by warmth, stability, and comprehensive engagement between India and Bangladesh, setting a strong foundation for future cooperation.

Political Transition and Foreign Policy Reset

The political landscape in Bangladesh underwent a dramatic shift following the ouster of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government in August 2024. The change came after months of student-led protests demanding greater democratic reforms and economic transparency. Hasina’s administration had long been associated with close ties to India and a strained relationship with Pakistan, rooted in the historical scars of the 1971 Liberation War.

The formation of an interim government under Muhammad Yunus marked a turning point, opening the door to a recalibration of Bangladesh’s foreign policy. Determined to move away from the India-centric approach of the past, Yunus sought a different diplomatic strategy.

High-level diplomatic engagements

Pakistan and Bangladesh have signalled a renewed commitment to strengthening bilateral ties. Meetings between Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Bangladesh’s Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus took place on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2024 and later at the D-8 Summit in Cairo in December 2024, where Sharif called Bangladesh a “brotherly country”. These discussions focused on enhancing trade, promoting cultural exchanges, and exploring ways to revive the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which had remained largely inactive in recent years.^[2]

In a further positive development, formal talks between the foreign ministries of the two countries resumed in April 2025 after a 15-year gap. Both sides expressed a clear desire to ease long-standing tensions and rebuild a more cooperative and stable relationship.

Economic and Trade Engagements

Economic relations quickly followed the political thaw. In late 2024, Bangladesh resumed direct trade with Pakistan for the first time since 1971, importing 50,000 tonnes of rice. Two Pakistani cargo ships arrived at Chittagong Port in November and December, reviving maritime trade links that had remained dormant for decades.

Further cementing this economic revival, the two nations signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on January 13, 2025, establishing a joint business council aimed at promoting bilateral trade. Since Hasina’s departure, trade volumes have surged by nearly 27%, reflecting the momentum of this new relationship. Additionally, Pakistan’s move to simplify visa procedures — including scrapping the need for security clearances for Bangladeshi travellers — has facilitated greater economic and people-to-people engagement.

Both countries, as emerging economies and active members of organisations like SAARC, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the Developing-8 (D-8), recognise the mutual benefits of closer commercial cooperation to address shared economic challenges.

Geopolitical Realignment and China’s Catalytic Role

China’s growing influence in South Asia has also played a catalytic role in fostering closer Bangladesh-Pakistan ties. As a strategic partner to both nations, Beijing has provided infrastructure investments, arms deals, and diplomatic support, subtly encouraging greater regional coordination as a counterweight to India’s dominance.

The interim government in Dhaka has been increasingly critical of India, partly fueled by perceptions of Indian support for Hasina’s regime and exacerbated by incidents such as the August 2024 flooding in Bangladesh, which many attributed to the operations of India’s Damodar Valley Corporation. These developments have nudged Bangladesh toward a closer alignment with Pakistan and China, reshaping the regional balance.

Military and Security Cooperation

Military relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan have gained significant momentum in early 2025. In January, a high-level Bangladeshi military delegation visited Islamabad, where they met with Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Asim Munir^[3]. Discussions focused on enhancing joint military exercises, expanding officer training exchanges, and exploring avenues for Defence trade and technology transfer.

In a major symbolic gesture, the Bangladesh Navy participated in Pakistan’s multinational “AMAN-25” naval exercise held in February 2025, alongside navies from over 40 countries. This marked Bangladesh’s first active participation in a major Pakistan-hosted military drill, highlighting a growing comfort level in Defence collaboration^[4].

Reports indicate that Bangladesh is considering the purchase of Pakistan’s JF-17 Thunder fighter jets, a joint China-Pakistan development known for its cost-effectiveness and combat versatility^[5]. Discussions have also reportedly extended to the potential acquisition of short-range Abdali ballistic missiles, which would mark a significant step in Bangladesh’s force modernisation efforts under its “Forces Goal 2030” roadmap.

Beyond procurement, both sides are exploring deeper cooperation in Defence production, with proposals for joint ventures in small arms manufacturing and armoured vehicle maintenance. Pakistan has also offered increased slots for Bangladeshi officers at its prestigious institutions like the National Defence University (NDU) and the Command and Staff College, further institutionalising military-to-military ties.

This growing Defence engagement reflects a broader strategic realignment by Bangladesh to diversify its military partnerships, reduce historical dependencies, and enhance its operational capabilities amid an increasingly complex regional security environment.

Historical Context and the Road to Reconciliation

There have been sporadic indications of rapprochement between Bangladesh and Pakistan across the years, despite long-standing historical disputes. Leaders like Ziaur Rahman and Hussain Muhammad Ershad previously sought to distance Bangladesh from India’s shadow and foster ties with Pakistan.

Ziaur Rahman and Hussain Muhammad Ershad are founders of BNP and Jatiya Party, respectively, parties which seek to reduce India’s influence by fostering ties with Pakistan, China, and Muslim-majority nations. Both emphasise Islamic identity and oppose the Awami League’s pro-India stance.

Pakistan’s formal recognition of Bangladesh in 1974 and continued diplomatic overtures over the years, although hampered by unresolved tensions over the 1971 conflict, laid the foundation for eventual reconciliation. The current interim government’s willingness to prioritise practical cooperation over historical grievances has accelerated this thaw, reflecting a pragmatic shift in Bangladesh’s foreign policy outlook.

In the terms of China, does Bangladesh’s increased engagement with Pakistan signify a strategic realignment and the acknowledgement of new relationships in an increasingly multipolar South Asia as it navigates a complicated and changing regional landscape?

Under Sheikh Hasina, India and Bangladesh enjoyed close ties and strong security cooperation. Her ouster in 2024, amid mass protests, led to a new interim government under Muhammad Yunus, signalling a shift away from India-focused diplomacy.

Potential Threats to India

India’s northeastern states are geographically vulnerable, connected to the rest of the country by the narrow Siliguri Corridor—a 20-25 km stretch often referred to as India’s “soft underbelly.” This corridor is a critical lifeline, and its disruption could isolate the entire Northeast. Historically, this vulnerability has made India wary of external influence, especially from Pakistan’s intelligence agency, ISI, which is believed to have supported separatist militants in both Kashmir and the Northeast.

While Bangladesh, post-1971, maintained a close relationship with India, with cooperation on counter-insurgency efforts and agreements like the Extradition Treaty 2013^[6] and Border-Security Pact 2015^[7], its posture shifted notably in 2024-25. Reports surfaced suggesting Pakistan’s ISI chief secretly visited Bangladesh^[8], and Pakistan would begin training the Bangladesh Army in early 2025, the first such military accord since 1971. While the Bangladeshi government has denied these reports, Indian analysts are raising concerns about a potential strategic pivot.

This change could see Bangladesh become a staging ground for Pakistan’s activities in the region, further complicating India’s security landscape. The growing anti-India sentiment in Dhaka, the release of militants, and reports of meetings between Pakistani officers and Bangladesh’s military have heightened alarm. Such developments increase the risk of cross-border insurgencies, which had once been supported by Bangladesh-based camps, such as those used by ULFA.

Given these shifting dynamics, India is compelled to strengthen its Defences in the Northeast, particularly along the Siliguri Corridor, to prevent any destabilising influence from across its eastern borders. The rising tension around Bangladesh-Pakistan military cooperation and alleged ISI activities in Dhaka poses several security challenges for India:

1. Eastern Front Complication:
   India has historically focused its military strength on the western (Pakistan) and northern (China) fronts. A more militarily capable Bangladesh, with advanced jets and missile systems, would force India to stretch its resources thinner, particularly in the eastern sector, complicating Defence planning and strategic deployment.
2. Air Superiority Challenge:
   The JF-17 Thunder, particularly in its advanced Block III variant, comes equipped with modern avionics, AESA radar, and long-range air-to-air missiles. Should Bangladesh acquire such aircraft, it could challenge India’s air superiority in the eastern theatre, especially near regions like Assam and West Bengal, necessitating adjustments to India’s air Defence strategy.
3. Strategic Encirclement:
   As Bangladesh strengthens ties with Pakistan (and, by extension, China), India faces the risk of a “strategic squeeze”. A more coordinated approach between Bangladesh, Pakistan, and China could place adversarial influence on multiple borders, aligning with China’s broader geopolitical strategy to encircle India, further undermining India’s regional security position.
4. Intelligence and Tactical Cooperation:
   Beyond arms deals, military cooperation could extend to intelligence sharing and joint training exercises, enhancing Bangladesh’s familiarity with Pakistan’s military doctrines. Such cooperation could narrow India’s operational advantages and introduce new complexities in any future conflict scenario, particularly in eastern India.
5. Domestic Security Risks:
   India is also concerned about the domestic security implications of this evolving Defence cooperation. Historically, regions like Northeast India have been vulnerable to cross-border insurgencies. Any support for militant activities in Bangladesh could reignite dormant insurgent networks in the Northeast, posing a direct threat to India’s internal security.

The growing defence ties between Bangladesh and Pakistan, coupled with China’s expanding influence in South Asia, have raised alarms for India’s national security. These developments represent a significant shift in regional dynamics, as Bangladesh, traditionally aligned with India, begins to pursue an anti-India foreign policy. China’s increasing presence in Bangladesh through infrastructure projects and military cooperation further complicates India’s strategic calculations.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s closer relationship with Bangladesh, especially in military and defence cooperation, poses an additional challenge. The strategic rivalry of India and Pakistan is long known, and any strengthening of ties between Bangladesh and Pakistan could have implications for India’s security interests in the region. Under these circumstances, India faces the need to recalibrate its defence posture in the Northeast to safeguard its interests. Strengthening border security, enhancing military readiness, and deepening diplomatic and military ties with regional partners will be crucial as India navigates an increasingly complex security environment.

References:

• _{[1] https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/26048/Exchange+of+enclaves+between+India+and+Bangladesh}
• _{[2] https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/bangladesh-muhammad-yunus-meets-pakistan-pm-shehbaz-sharif-in-egypt-settle-issues-of-1971-war-2652909-2024-12-20}
• _{[3] https://x.com/manaman_chhina/status/1879184011928699186}
• _{[4] https://bharatshakti.in/bangladesh-joins-pakistans-naval-drill-aman-25-signals-shift-in-chinas-ior-strategy/}
• _{[5] https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/india-alarmed-by-bangladeshs-interest-in-jf-17-fighter-jets-amid-growing-strategic-realignment-with-china-and-pakistan/}
• _{[6] https://www.hcidhaka.gov.in/press?id=eyJpdiI6ImwzN2MwUXZjd204Rmtielp0RHlHVXc9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoiYVNnWHJ1d0dJR2U5ZGNWTVpqWkc1dz09IiwibWFjIjoiZmFkY2UyZDliODQxOTk1MjBiMGU2MzViMWNiMDdhMjY5YjcxNWQ0OWY5MGJhNWQ0YTY2MzQ4YmZmYWFmZjU5ZCJ9}
• _{[7] https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/26048/Exchange+of+enclaves+between+India+and+Bangladesh}
• _{[8] https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistans-isi-sends-high-level-delegation-to-dhaka-india-says-keeping-an-eye-7553031}

Sughosh Joshi