- Pakistan’s 2025 Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Riyadh has come under intense scrutiny due to Iran’s retaliatory drone and missile strikes on Saudi Arabia and key oil refinery facilities.
- This incident highlights the “commitment credibility problem” at the heart of alliance theory in international relations.
- The episode emphasises a fundamental lesson: converging threat perceptions and realistic cost-sharing, rather than symbolic statements or shared identity, are what sustain coalitions.
Pakistan’s 2025 Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Riyadh has come under intense scrutiny due to Iran’s retaliatory drone and missile strikes on Saudi Arabia and key oil refinery facilities, which came after joint US-Israel attacks and the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Islamabad quickly declared “full solidarity” with the Kingdom and denounced Tehran’s “dangerous escalation.” However, concerns about whether Pakistan’s response would go beyond rhetoric grew as Iranian attacks persisted.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed the defence pact in September 2025 at the Al-Yamamah Palace, indicating that any attack on one nation would be considered an attack on both. Officials suggested that Pakistan’s strategic capabilities might be included in the pact, despite the text’s avoidance of overtly nuclear terminology. The accord was largely seen as an indication of an expanded deterrent framework and was hailed as a turning point in Islamic strategic cooperation.
However, the pact’s structural limitations were revealed by events in early 2026. Pakistan’s increasing cross-border clashes with the Taliban rule in Afghanistan along the Durand Line served as its first test. Saudi Arabia contributed no overt military or intelligence assistance, despite the agreement’s pledge of joint security. A few days later, Saudi Arabia was subjected to persistent Iranian attacks that targeted vital locations and oil installations. In response, Islamabad did not operationalise the agreement; there were no coordinated orders, joint deployments, or obvious deterrence actions.
This incident highlights the “commitment credibility problem” at the heart of alliance theory in international relations. Defence pacts show resolve before crises arise, but whether states are prepared to bear high costs after hostilities start will determine how long they last. From a game-theoretic perspective, both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan encountered an asymmetric threat perception and a high-cost coordination dilemma. India, internal militancy, and instability along its borders with Iran and Afghanistan are Pakistan’s main security worries. Iran and local proxy networks are the main targets of Saudi Arabia’s threat matrix. There isn’t much strategic overlap.
The alliance’s “security-autonomy trade-off” is also reflected in the crises. Supporting Riyadh militarily against Iran would increase sectarian tensions within Pakistan and increase the likelihood of Iranian retribution along the country’s 900-kilometre border, especially in unstable Balochistan. On the other hand, Riyadh gained little strategically from Saudi engagement in Pakistan’s conflict with the Taliban. Therefore, restraint was preferred over escalation based on rational cost-benefit evaluations.
In the end, the episode emphasises a fundamental lesson: converging threat perceptions and realistic cost-sharing, rather than symbolic statements or shared identity, are what sustain coalitions. Mutual defence agreements run the risk of acting more like strategic signalling tools than legally binding collective security measures in the absence of these pillars.
Anjali Singh is a postgraduate student of Political Science and International Relations, a Social Media Analyst, and a former Research Intern at the Indian Council of World Affairs. Views expressed are the author’s own.
Aayush Pal 
Anusreeta Dutta 
Pranav S