Between Conflict and Connectivity: India Recalibrates Its Myanmar Policy Samvada World

The situation deteriorated considerably for the military by 2025. Estimates suggested that the junta’s effective control had shrunk to nearly 21 per cent of Myanmar’s territory, while resistance groups exercised influence over approximately 42 per cent.
One of the most significant statements made during the visit was Myanmar’s assurance that its territory would not be used for anti-India activities.
Improved engagement between New Delhi and Naypyidaw could help address both security and economic concerns while strengthening regional connectivity initiatives.

Myanmar, a strategically located country that serves as a geopolitical bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia, possesses a young demographic profile and is regarded as an important hub of critical minerals. A country that many once viewed as a promising economic and strategic destination has instead found itself increasingly isolated, marginalised, and engulfed in civil conflict. Over the past few years, Myanmar has emerged as a pariah state across the broader Asia-Pacific region, with a political vacuum and an internal civil war leading to the rise of multiple competing power centres.

The 2021 Military Coup and the Rise of Resistance

The current crisis began in 2021 when Myanmar’s military overthrew the democratically elected government of the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi. The military justified its actions by alleging electoral irregularities and accusing the civilian leadership of mismanaging the country during the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, the military seized power and established a junta government.

However, the military’s path to consolidating power proved far from easy. Following the coup, Myanmar witnessed the emergence of several resistance movements and armed groups that challenged the authority of the junta. The military government, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, struggled to gain acceptance across large parts of the country.

Ethnic Armed Organisations and the Shifting Balance of Power

The most significant challenge came from Myanmar’s Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Karen National Army (KNA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army (AA). These groups intensified their operations against the military government, resulting in a prolonged civil war that has continued since 2021.

The situation deteriorated considerably for the military by 2025. Estimates suggested that the junta’s effective control had shrunk to nearly 21 percent of Myanmar’s territory, while resistance groups exercised influence over approximately 42 per cent. More importantly, many of the territories controlled by the EAOs were of immense strategic value. These included resource-rich regions containing valuable minerals as well as border areas adjoining India and Bangladesh, giving the resistance significant geopolitical leverage.

Elections, Legitimacy, and the Return of Diplomacy

Amid this prolonged conflict, Myanmar’s military leadership sought political legitimacy through elections. In December 2025, the junta announced that the country would hold national elections after nearly four years of military rule. The elections were conducted on January 26, 2026, with the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) emerging victorious. Consequently, Min Aung Hlaing assumed office as the President of Myanmar.

Soon after taking office, the new President undertook an important visit to India, where he met Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Several Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) were signed during the visit, making it a closely watched diplomatic engagement across the region.

One of the most significant statements made during the visit was Myanmar’s assurance that its territory would not be used for anti-India activities. This commitment carries considerable importance given the approximately 1,643-kilometre-long border shared by the two countries.

Why Myanmar Matters for India’s Security and Regional Strategy

Myanmar occupies a critical position in India’s strategic and security calculations. Developments inside Myanmar often have direct implications for India’s northeastern region. One of the most visible examples was the Manipur crisis of 2023, during which instability in Myanmar contributed to cross-border migration, particularly involving Kuki-Zo communities residing in Myanmar’s border regions. Given the porous nature of the India-Myanmar border and the historical movement of communities across it, instability in Myanmar can create significant security challenges for India.

Beyond security concerns, Myanmar is also central to India’s broader regional ambitions. The country serves as India’s land bridge to Southeast Asia and remains essential to the success of BIMSTEC. At a time when SAARC remains largely inactive, India has increasingly invested diplomatic capital in BIMSTEC as a platform for regional cooperation. However, Myanmar’s internal instability has limited the organisation’s ability to realise its full potential.

The visit of the Myanmar President therefore, assumes greater significance. Improved engagement between New Delhi and Naypyidaw could help address both security and economic concerns while strengthening regional connectivity initiatives.

The China Factor and the Future of Bilateral Relations

Another factor shaping India’s approach is China’s growing influence in Myanmar. Beijing has invested heavily in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and views Myanmar as a critical component of its broader strategic outreach toward the Indian Ocean and South Asia. This expanding Chinese presence has long been a concern for India.

At the same time, the ongoing conflict within Myanmar has also complicated China’s interests. Several Chinese-backed projects have faced disruptions due to fighting between the military and various armed factions. Consequently, both India and China have a stake in seeing greater stability emerge in Myanmar, albeit for different strategic reasons.

Implications for ASEAN and Regional Stability

The return of democracy in Myanmar would also be a positive development for ASEAN, the 10-member regional organisation that has long been regarded as one of the most successful regional groupings in the world. In recent years, however, ASEAN has faced a challenging period. Much of the instability witnessed in Southeast Asia since 2021 can be traced back to the crisis in Myanmar, followed by other regional tensions, including the dispute between Thailand and Cambodia last year.

These developments have slowed political engagement, hindered economic prosperity, and cast a shadow of uncertainty over the region. Many analysts argue that one of the key reasons Southeast Asia has struggled to fully realize its potential in recent years is the prolonged instability in Myanmar, which has remained a significant challenge for the region.

Myanmar’s continued engagement with India and a gradual return to democratic governance could therefore have wider regional implications. Such developments would not only strengthen bilateral relations between India and Myanmar but could also enable India to play a constructive role in supporting regional stability and helping restore the geopolitical balance in Southeast Asia.

Overall, the visit of Myanmar’s President to India marks an important and long-awaited diplomatic development. It has the potential to reset bilateral ties and open new avenues for cooperation in areas ranging from security and connectivity to trade and regional integration. Sustained diplomatic engagement between India and Myanmar is not only essential for the interests of the two countries but also for the broader stability and security of South Asia and Southeast Asia.