- China’s ‘Xiaokang’ (well-off) border village initiative, which represents both an advanced form of salami slicing and a mechanism for territorial consolidation.
- These are not merely rural development projects; they are “dual-use” settlements designed to create legal and demographic “facts on the ground” that challenge India’s sovereignty.
- India’s VVP-I reverses this logic, recognising that depopulated villages create a security and surveillance vacuum.
- The competition has now extended well beyond troop deployments, evolving into a contest over the resilience and survivability of infrastructure required to sustain a permanent presence in extreme high-altitude conditions.
The geopolitical environment along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has changed drastically due to the transition from a sparsely populated “no man’s land” to a region characterised by permanent, high-density civilian and military populations. The primary driver of this transformation has been China’s ‘Xiaokang’ (well-off) border village initiative, which represents both an advanced form of salami slicing and a mechanism for territorial consolidation. By now, China has largely completed its first phase of approximately 628 villages, with nearly 72% of these located opposite India’s northeastern states.
For New Delhi, these are not merely rural development projects; they are “dual-use” settlements designed to create legal and demographic “facts on the ground” that challenge India’s sovereignty. In response, India has pivoted from a defensive posture of “strategic neglect” to a more assertive policy of “Active Deterrence,” anchored by the Vibrant Villages Programme (VVP).
The Xiaokang Strategy: Weaponising Demographics
Chinese Xiaokang villages combine military readiness with civilian habitation. These sites feature modern, two-storey buildings equipped with high-speed 5G internet and all-weather transport systems. They are often positioned in strategic locations at the heads of key valleys and along critical ingress routes on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), including areas contested by India. Under the 2022 People’s Republic of China Land Borders Law, these villages can function as forward civilian settlements that support border security objectives, with residents, including Han Chinese and state-supported Tibetan populations, expected to assist in surveillance and reporting activities linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). By expanding these contested ‘grey areas’, China seeks to strengthen its position through forms of administrative consolidation that may carry legal weight over time.
In some interpretations of international law, the establishment of a permanent, tax-paying population may be invoked to reinforce claims of effective administrative control, thereby strengthening territorial assertions. This dynamic risks reframing contested border zones as settled administrative spaces, making it more difficult for India to challenge such areas without escalatory implications, particularly where civilian populations are present.
India’s Vibrant Villages: A Strategic Counter-Pivot
The Vibrant Villages Programme (VVP), launched in 2023 and expanded into its second phase (VVP-II) by April 2025, is India’s most direct and structurally comparable response to the Xiaokang initiative. For decades, India’s border policy was influenced by the strategic assumption that developing border infrastructure, particularly roads, could inadvertently facilitate adversarial military advances. VVP-I reverses this logic, recognising that depopulated villages create a security and surveillance vacuum. Now in 2026, India has approved over 2,600 projects worth ₹1,161 crore under VVP-I alone, targeting 46 blocks across Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh.
The programme’s objective is comprehensive “saturation”, ensuring that every border household has access to electricity, potable water, and digital connectivity. By repositioning these villages as tourism hubs and centres of cultural preservation, India is incentivising its border populations to remain, effectively transforming them into informal human intelligence assets supporting the Indian Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP).
Active Deterrence: Beyond Infrastructure to Operational Mobility
While VVP addresses the “softer” aspects of border management, India’s “Active Deterrence” approach constitutes the corresponding “hard” dimension. This shift represents not only substantial enhancements in physical infrastructure but also a marked improvement in rapid force mobilisation capabilities. The completion of the Sela Tunnel in 2024, alongside the ongoing development of the Arunachal Frontier Highway (approximately 1,840 km), illustrates efforts to enable faster and more reliable logistical movement across the Himalayan theatre.
Unlike earlier postures, Active Deterrence prioritises the capacity for time-sensitive deployment, enabling heavy artillery and armoured units to be positioned along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) within significantly reduced timeframes, contingent on terrain and weather conditions. India will also employ drone and satellite technologies to enhance persistent, real-time surveillance of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) activities across the region. Collectively, these measures signal an intent to ensure localised military parity and rapid response capability in the event of further grey-zone incursions linked to Xiaokang settlements.
The New Normal: 2026 and the Future of the Himalayan Frontier
As of March 2026, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has become highly militarised and populated. Although there have been limited recent diplomatic attempts to stabilise tensions, including discussions on disengagement and confidence-building measures in sensitive areas such as Depsang and Demchok, the structural rivalry between India and China has not diminished. China continues to advance its “Rural Revitalisation” narrative to frame the second phase of its border villages as developmental, while India is simultaneously expanding its VVP-II programme to extend coverage to approximately 2,000 villages across its border regions. The competition has now extended well beyond troop deployments at altitudes exceeding 4,000 metres, evolving into a contest over the resilience and survivability of infrastructure required to sustain a permanent presence in extreme high-altitude conditions.
In this emerging strategic environment, India, through the combined application of the Vibrant Villages Programme (VVP) and an Active Deterrence posture, is signalling that the LAC is not merely a notional boundary, but an actively administered and defended frontier, sustained by both a resident civilian population and a rapidly deployable, technologically enabled military force.
Hridbina Chatterjee is a final-year postgraduate student in International Relations at Jadavpur University, Kolkata. She has written for newspapers and think tanks, with interests in South Asian politics, India’s foreign policy, and the Indo-Pacific. Views expressed are the author’s own.
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